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The Construction of a 'National Identity': A Study of Selected
Secondary School Textbooks in Malaysia's Education System,
With Particular Reference to Peninsular Malaysia
The overriding concern of a multiethnic, multicultural and
multireligious Malaysia has always been with inter-ethnic conflict and
resolution. It is therefore little wonder that the Malaysian education
system is seen arxl utilised by the State as an important social
institution where certain ideas, values and symbols can be transmitted
to students, the country's future generations, with the primary
objective of fostering ethnic harmony in schools in particular and in
the country in general. nd it is against this backdrop that this
study seeks to examine what kinds of images, ideas, values and symbols
that are being selected and promoted (and at the same time, excluding
other items, images, ideas) in the reading materials of school
students, which collectively are deemed as constructing Malaysia's
'national identity'. The textual analysis shows that the majority of
these school texts tend to give heavy emphasis on Malay culture and
interests, thus indicating that the construction of the 'national
identity' is largely informed arid influenced by the State's policies
such as the Malay-biased national culture policy and the New Economic
Policy. In addition, the study also examines other related
institutions such as the Ministry of Education (i.e. its Textbook
Bureau) and the book publishing industry as a whole to see how they
relate to the formation in the school texts of the kind of 'national
identity' that is largely defined and sanctioned by the State. A group
of 150 students were interviewed to ascertain their social and
political consciousness. Their responses on the whole tend to suggest
that the school texts are capable of creating, if not reinforcing,
sub-national loyalties or ethnic sentiments among the students, the
kind of consciousness that could seriously compete with arid challenge
the nationalist project of creating a 'national identity'. In other
words, national unity could be threatened.
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1.1 Problem Statement
Most states in the world today have populations that are
ethnically heterogeneous, often 'composed of two or more ethnic
communities, jostliog for influence and power, or livirg in uneasy
harmony within the same state borders' (A.D. Smith 1981:9). It follows
that inter-ethnic conflict has become more intense and regular
particularly in the past several years (ibid.:1O-11; Stone 1985:9-14).
This is why many of these states are determined to foster rapid
'national' integration (Smith 1981:10). And it is therefore little
wonder that in a multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious
Malaysia, inter-ethnic conflict and resolution has become one of the
country's overriding concerns. Since the political independence of
1957, successive Malay(si)an governments have utilised one of the
state apparatuses to forge a national identity arxi national unity,
I . e. through educational institutions. For as Smith obeerves, 'New
states, often top-heavy and fragile, are anxious to establish their
"national" credentials, especially when they lack any semblance of
common ethnicity. (1988:2)' The period after the bloody ethnic riots
of 1969 made the pursuit for national identity and unity all the more
urgent. Hence, the government's Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975)
stressed: 'This search for national identity and unity involves the
whole range of economic, social and political activities: the
formulation of education policies designed to encourage common values
and loyalties among all communities and in all regions... (Malaysia
1971a:3)' The Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) was not only equally
emphatic as regards the role of the education system in forging a
national identity, it also spelled out what 'national identity'
entailed:
A national identity is born out of a common set of
social norms arid values evolved over a period of time. This
plurality of race and the fact that Malaysia is a relatively
young nation present a great challenge to the moulding of a
national identity within the time-frame of the present
generation. The effort calls for greater determination and
sacrifice on the part of all Malaysians.. It calls for (i) a
full identification (with) arid commitment to the national
goals and ideals; (ii) viewing emergent problems of whatever
nature in terms of a challenge to Malaysia's capability as a
nation arid a people; (iii) accepting the country's
socio-cultural diversity as-a source of pride in regard to
the nation's uniqueness; arid (iv) treating internal
differences arid conflicts as a natural process of consensus
seeking in the pursuit of the most satisfying compromises
and alternatives. A common national identity lies in the
willingness of the people to accept the above as guidelines
for action... The evolution of a Malaysian national identity
will be based on an integration of all the virtues from the
various cultures in Malaysia, with the Ma lay culture forming
its core (Malaysia 1976: 93-94).
Such an ideological prescription underlines Deutsch's contention
that national consciousness has the effect of giving added
significance to a sense of 'relative complementarity and distinctness
of a people' (1978: 178). However, he cautions, such consciousness can
only develop if nationality is valued; that is, 'if it is seen as a
winning card in the social game for prestige, wealth, or whatever else
may be the things culturally valued at that time arid place; or if it
fulfils a need in the personality structure which individuals have
developed in that particular culture - or if it is at least valued
for lack of any more promising opportunities... (ibid.)' A national
identity achieves political saliency arid recognition particularly in a
social context where, as in Malaysia, there is clearly a need to make
such an identity reign supreme over other competing loyalties or
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'primordial' ethnic attachments (A.D. Smith 1988:150) in the ultimate
desire to achieve some measure of ethnic unity arid goodwill in the
society concerned. In addition, as Smith argues, a single strategic
ethnie (ethnic community) that dominates a multiethnic society terxs
to seek, 'to a greater or lesser extent, to incorporate, or influence,
the surrourxuirç smaller or weaker ethnie (ibid.)' • 2 It therefore
necessitates the examination of what form or shape this national
identity would take out of such ethnic configurations (with the Malay
culture as an example of one great cultural influence).
1.2 Objectives of the Study
It is against this backdrop that this study aims to find out to
what extent has the Malaysian government succeeded in fulfilling its
professed commitment towards designing a school curriculum - within
the national education system - that can help promote national unity
and form a positive national identity among students of various ethnic
backgrounds. In particular, the study seeks to examine the content of
the reading materials, i.e. texthooks, in their depiction of a
'national identity'. Textbooks are chosen in this study as the primary
unit of analysis because of the educational and social significance
that is accorded them by educational authorities, teachers, parents
and last bit not least, students themselves. In addition, other units
of analysis are book publishers, students and. teachers. The specific
aims of the study are:
1. to ascertain what were the images and ideas, or to borrow
Anthony 1). Smith's terms, 'myths, symbols, memories arid
values (1988:211)', presented in the reading materials (i.e.
textbooks) of students that were acknowledged by the
3
education authorities as being important and necessary to
forge a lived arid active sense of belonging to 'the nation'
amongst students.
2. to examine the process of selection, and exclusion or
marginalization of certain soclo-economic, cultural and
political aspects of Malaysian life - in the reading
materials.
3. to determine the ideological sources involved in the
overall process of selecting items or images arid ideas for
the reading materials.
4. to examine the socio-economic, cultural arid political
context of Malaysian society in which these reading
materials were written, published and distrilxited arid in
turn its impact, if any, on these materials.
5. to study the social arid political consciousness of the
students and their sources of awareness, arid to gauge how
these would possibly influence their response to the reading
materials.
1.3 Siqnificarice of the Study
s intimated earlier, the Malaysian society as a whole is very
much concerned about the formation of a national identity arid the
promotion of national unity. Arid the formal education system has been
identified as one of the principal agents in Malaysian life by which
such social and political objectives could be met to some degree over
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a long period of time, albeit it is admitted that education alone
cannot ensure success as this involves other equally important
contributory factors such as the economics arid politics of the larger
society. But, as A.D. Smith remarks, the images the society's
intellectuals and intelligentsia 'piece together arid disseminate
through the education system arid media become the often unconscious
assumptions of later generations in whose social consciousness they
form a kind of rich sediment... (1989:207)'
1.4 Review of relevant literature
Fast researchers have shown interest in educational policies that
are essentially aimed at fostering good ethnic relations. Hans Md.
Jadi (1983), for instance, argues that educational attempts arid
policies such as the Razak Report that were essentially aimed at
building a Malayan nation were often confronted with political
problems, and frequently had their objectives frustrated. He however
seems to have overemphasized - as stipulated in the Razak Report -
the role of the national laruage (I . e. the Malay 1 aruage) to the
extent of implying that it was the most important factor in the
forging of national integration, arid thereby de-emphasizing other
political, economic arid cultural factors that are basically seen as
mere 'interruptions'. The failure on the part of the Malay (si ) an
governments to implement the recommertions of the Razak Report, he
conterxis, was due to their hesitance and lack of political willpower,
leaving them vulnerable to the pressures arid opposition of certain
groups, particularly the non-Ma lays. He therefore holds that a strong
arid 'pragmatic' government, such as the one after the 1969 riots which
was well equipped with the necessary laws arid commanding a subetantial
political majority, is crucial to the effective implementation of
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policies important for creating national unity.3
Like Md. Jadi, Chai Hon-than (1977), in his study of 'Education
and natiori-bñlding in plural societies: The West Malaysian
experience', also contends that most of the new states tended to
perceive education as the primary tool of 'changing individual arid
group identities so as to replace primordial group loyalties with an
overriding national identity. Centralized control over education
therefore tended to be total, arid the spirit of nationalism tended to
be pervasive. (1977:1)' This, he adds, entails, amongst other things,
the changing of the curricula arid rewriting of textbooks. Unlike Md.
Jadi, however, he points out that it is possible in plural societies
for different groups, even though put under the same educational
system, to possess different values arid views arid to 'vary their
respective allegiance to the political centre'. The degree of the
groups' differences, he adds, depends on their social, economic arid
political status in the society. This therefore implies the need to
look into the wider social context when dealing with the question of
changes in policies arid curricular materials in the overall objective
of fostering good ethnic relations.
Studies such as the above point to the need to examine not only
the process of policy change and implementation but also the need to
look into changes in the curricular materials proper, I . e. textbooks.
In their 1984 study of 'The Malaysian Lower Secondary School
Curriculum and National Unity', a group of education experts at the
University of Malaya's Department of Social Foundations, Faculty of
Education analysed textbooks pertaining to history, civics, Bahasa
Malaysia (national language), English laruage and geography with the
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primary intention of identifying 'ways in which images and ideas
associated with the goal of national unity are portrayed'. Research
into textbooks is lacking in Malaysia, they assert, because of what is
seen as the difficulty of assessing the textbooks' impact on students.
Nevertheless, they argue, the fact that Malaysia's education system is
centralised and standardized arxi. under which teachers depend heavily
on texts, makes it more important to examine these textbooks. The
University of Malaya study also involved interviews with 83 teachers.
It concluded that (a) there hd been an overemphasis on Peninsular
Malaysia and ethnic Malay in the textbooks; (b) a large number of
schools was using textbooks that teachers were not satisfied with kut
could not charge due to the Ministry of Education' s rules governing
textbook changes; and (C) none of the teachers interviewed perceived
the fostering of national unity as a primary responsibility.
That school textbooks are important teaching tools gains support
from Benedict PrKlerson's (1983) contention that, new modes of
communication, like mass-produced newspapers and books, would help
members of an 'imagined community' to forge a sense of being part of a
large community that is made up of numerous, name less and faceless
people. By extension, this would therefore suggest that textbooks in
schools can play an important function in helping students identify
themselves with the nation. These students are young and hence their
identifications are continuously being formed. D.it they are also old
enough to have developed a number of identifications which can
distance them from those offered in formal education.
Also relevant to this study is Raymond Williams'
conceptualization of what he terms 'the tradition' or 'the significant
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past' (in de Caste 11 et al. (eds) 1989:58). Here he argued that most
accounts of 'tradition' can be proven to be highly selective. Certain
meanings and practices from the past and present of a particular
culture are chosen for emphasis while 'certain other meanings and
practices are neglected and excluded'. In this process a certain
selection is usually successfully portrayed as 'the tradition' or 'the
significant past'. 'It is,' Williams observed, 'a version of the past
which is intended to connect with and ratify the present. What it
offers in practice is a sense of predisposed continuity (emphasis in
the original). (ibid.)'
1.5 Method of the Study
A major portion of this study comprises a textual analysis of
selected reading materials (i.e. textbooks) of pre-university level
students which are recommended for reading by Malaysia's Ministry of
Education. This study contrasts with the one conducted by the
University of Malaya (tiM) group (1984) in that firstly, it was an
analysis of reading materials in particular and formal education in
general at the pre-university level as opposed to the tiM study of
curriculum materials at the lower secor1ary level (Forms One to
Three). Secondly, the scope of this study is limited to the analysis
of textual materials pertaining to Peninsular Malaysia and not, as in
the case of the UM study, the whole of Malaysia. Thirdly, the analysis
of each book was conducted in relation to the other books that came
under this study. The rationale is to determine the process of
selection and exclusion or emphasis and de-emphasis within a text and
between texts. In the case of the UN study, reading materials of a
particular subject (like history, and geography) were analysed in
isolation from those of another subject.
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Five books pertaining to the subject of General Studies and four
books on History were chosen for this study. These two subjects were
selected not only because they were popular amongst the students
interviewed bit also because they particularly related to the emphasis
given by the government to the 'study of the historical, economic, and
social development of Malaysia' arid the 'moulding of civic and
national consciousness' (Malaysia 1986:6). In order to have a good
grasp of the full range of mater.ials available on the socio-economic,
political and cultural background of the Malaysian society, the
researcher had access to government ocum, reports, books,
professional journals, published arid unpublished dissertations,
magazines, newspapers, arid pamphlets, arid to a lesser degree,
conversations with individuals who were deemed relevant to the study.
While in certain cases being a Malay proved to be a disadvantage, in
others the researcher's ethnic origin was instrumental in helping him
gain cooperation from his respondents. Eperience has shown that it
was considered prudent, for instance, not to broach so-called
'politically or ethnically sensitive' issues at the initial stage of
conversation. It was also being Malay that helped the researcher get a
sense of ethnic fears, suspicion and anxiety that exist within a
particular group of respondents as well as the degree of ethnocentrism
in another.
For analytical convenience, three divisions were constructed in
the analysis of the reading materials: the political, the economic arid
the cultural, of which in many cases were not mutual ly exclusive. This
involved the analysis of the ideas arid images within arid between the
texts (i . e. reading materials) in order to examine the process of
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selection and exclusion or emphasis and de-emphasis that is taking
place in these texts. For example, an item in an History book assumes
a position of relevance or significance not only if it is found in
many places in this and other History books, but particularly if it is
also used repeatedly in many of the General Studies books under study.
In this case, such repeated use of the item in question has the effect
of the present being ratified by the past. This selected item, i.e.
image or idea, therefore constitutes 'the tradition'. On the other
hand, an item that, for instance, is missing in a set of General
Studies books but exist in many of the History books is considered
being excluded or de-emphasised, and hence could be construed as being
not 'the tradition' of at least the General Studies book writers.
Certain phrases or terms that are used in the reading materials were
also analysed in order to ascertain their possible ideological effect.
Apart from the textual analysis, the study also involved personal
interviews with a few teachers in the state of Penar arid book
publishers and editors in Kuala thmpur and Petal ing Jaya (Malaysia),
primarily to gauge their teaching experiences arid views of the
students, arid their publishing experiences respectively. Structured
interviews were also conducted on 150 students from three upper
secondary schools in Penang. Since these (accessible) schools were in
a predominantly Chinese area, it is therefore little wonder that the
ethnic composition of these students turned out to be as follows: 103
Chinese, 25 Malays, 13 Indians, arid 9 who considered themselves as
'Malaysians'. These interviews were generally aimed at eliciting the
students' general views on education and schooling experiences as well
as detecting their social and political awareness. The fact that the
study sample was predominantly Chinese presented the researcher with
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an opportunity to ascertain the response of these students to the
government's effort in forging a national identity and. fostering
national unity. With regard to the research problems (below), these
schools were selected on the basis of the researcher's personal
contacts with a section of the local teaching community. In the
absence of an official permission, the researcher had to make the best
of what was on offer. Time constraint was very evident, particularly
when personal interviews were conducted by the researcher himself
within the often busy school hours and on the school ground. The
interviews were conducted in classroom, canteen, school corridor, and
unused (and dilapidated) building. Time was even made more precious
with many of the students busily preparing for their examinations.
This therefore indicates that gaining rapport with the students, where
possible, was an arduous task. nd where part of the survey could not
be conducted by the researcher himself because of certain
restrictions, the help of a few teachers was acquired.
1.6 Scope of the Study
Due to financial and time constraints, this study is confined to
matters pertaining to educational situation in Peninsular Malaysia,
that is, not including the eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and
Sarawak. In addition, due to some logistical problems (which will be
spe lied out below) this study gave more emphasis on the students'
reading materials in regard to the promotion of national identity and
unity rather than on other factors such as classroom practices and
interaction between teachers and students, and interaction between
students themselves.
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1.7 Research Problems
a. The political factor: The research was done some months after
a political clampdown was struck by the State against politicians,
political activists, trade unionists, religious activists, human
rights campaigners, etc. beginning October 27, 1987. Since then, a
climate of fear has descended upon the Malaysian society, with many of
its members browbeaten - directly or indirectly - to acquiescence.
Hence, talk of thirçs that relates overtly or implicitly to ethnicity,
ethnic conflicts or ethnic reltions could easily cause uneasiness
even if the conversations or interviews were conducted with great care
and subtlety. Many a time, questions asked about such matters drew
responses that were, at best, too brief or succinct, or at worst,
indirect, vague or none at all.
b. The institutional factor: The reliance on the goodwill of
certain teachers and headmasters meant that the researcher's physical
movement on the grounds of the schools was quite restricted. Jn
official request to do research was initially made with the relevant
local authority. However, the political situation in the country at
that time pushed the researcher into a dilemma: Making an official
request might mean having to wait for quite a long time while the
application was being processed in the central administrative body.
The waiting might prove worthwhile, or it might just not procure
success at all, especially given the nature of the research which
might be construed, at least at that time, as fishing in troubled
waters. The request was cancelled. Finally, a decision was regretful ly
made to rely only on the goodwill and assistance of certain
individuals in the selected schools. It was in this relatively
restricted context that the fieldwork was conducted - eventually
12
without the desired participant obeervation done in classrooms and on
the school ground.
c. The personal factor: Finally, one's ethnic origin (the
researcher's beirç Malay) could also pose a problem when dealing with
questions whose central concern was inter-ethnic relations in the
country. In other words, certain respondents tended to sound rather
too 'blunt' or presumptuous (if s/he is a Malay), or too polite,
diplomatic or over-cautious (if s/he isn't a Malay).
1.8 Plan of the Study
This study is made up of eight chapters. After this chapter, the
second chapter deals with the theoretical discussion of nationalism in
relation to national culture and socio-economic development; the third.
sets the Malaysian scene; the fourth discusses the State and
education; the fifth traces the ideological sources of textbook
knowledge; the sixth devotes itself to the major textual analysis of
the students' reading materials; the seventh provides an analysis of
the interviews conducted on the school students; and finally, the
eighth chapter constitutes a summary and conclusions.
Notes
1. In this study, for the era between Malaya's independence and
the formation of Malaysia. the term 'Malayan' shall be used,
while for the period after the Malaysian formation, 'Malaysian'
shall be applied. However, when both periods are taken into
account in a particular discussion, the term 'Malay(si)an' shall
prevail.
2. Claphain, for instance, asserts that 'the dominance of the core
(Malay) group is so assured that most of the critical political
bargaining takes place within it, and it is left to the minority
Chinese and Indian communities... to associate themselves with
it, only the occasional outbreak indicating the frustrations of
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permanent subordination' (1985:79). It should be added that the
political dominance of the Malays as a community in this case can
be interpreted as one that has been maintained and enjoyed to a
large degree by the ruling coalition's senior partner, the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), which is supposed to
champion 'Malay interests'.
3. This view strikes
that democracy has a
Malaysia: 'People who
divided further. Incri
the population into
(1983:31)' He however
in the new nations
interest is to oppose
through the process
disturbirçly, that th
as shown by Thai la
rather than a democra
chord with Wan Hashim Wan Teh who believes
disunitirç effect upon new nations such as
are already dissimilar culturally have been
ase (sic) politicization further polarizes
more distinct coinpartnientalized groups.
goes even further by saying that 'democracy
encourages dissident groups whose main
the ruling elites and to struggle for power
)f election. (ibid.)' He concludes, rather
succesful assimilation of the minorities,
id, 'required a strong authoritarian rule
:ic form of government. (ibid.)'
CHAPTER II
COMMON CULflJ1RE • AND ECONOMIC DEVEWPMENT AND MODERNIZATION:
ThE NATIONALIST PROJECT
To many nation-states, including those in the Third World arid
particularly those that are multiethnic in character, the nationalist
desire to create a common culture (Smith 1988:136) is perceived as
being crucial to the project o? forging national identity amongst
their people. This national identity in turn is essential in
facilitating the nationalist design of pursuing economic development
and modernization (Murphree in Rex arid Mason (eds) 1986:156-7; Pettman
1979:39) of these countries. 1 In this nationalist perspective, both
the common culture and economic development and modernization are
vital ingredients in these countries' ultimate objectives of achieving
cultural and economic growth, political stability and consequently,
national unity.
2.1 Nationalism
Benedict Anderson defines a nation as 'an imagined political
community'. This sense of belonging to a nation is not artificially
manufactured nor false, bot it is a sense born out of ideological
construction. Thus Anderson argues that 'It is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of
each lives the image of their communion' (1983:15). And
'print-capitalism' - that led to printing technology and mass
publication of books arid newspapers - he adds, facilitates this
imagination of communal belonging as people are brought together or
15
given a strong sense of togetherness by these mass media. His argument
necessarily suggests that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. nthony
Smith (1988), while acknowledging the importance of this sense of
'fraternity', emphasises the salience of the ethnie or ethnic
community as constituting the durable foundation or core of a nation
or nationalism. This concept of ethnie is so important to him that he
feels that the project of 'nation-b..iildirq' would be seriously
hampered if the ethnic base is lacking or abeent. One can appreciate,
he adds, the special qualities an1 durability of ethnie if one looks
at the forms and content of the 'myth-symbol' complex, 'at the
mechanisms of their diffusion (or lack of it) through a given
population, and their transmission to future generations' (ibid. :15).
Smith asserts that his perspective strikes a middle ground
between the extremism of what he calls the 'modernist' view (of which
1inderson is held to be an advocate) and the 'primordial ist' or
'perennial 1st' standpoint:
In rejecting the claims of both the modernists, who say
that there is a radical break between pre-modern units and
sentiments and modern nations and nationalism, and equally
of the perennialists, who say that the latter are simply
larger, updated versions of pre-modern ties and sentiments,
we look to the concept of the ethnie or ethnic community
and its symbolism, to distance our analysis from the more
sweeping claims on either side. On the one hand, rejection
of the modernist standpoint immethately concedes a greater
measure of continuity between 'traditional' and 'modern',
'agrarian' and 'industrial', eras which many sociologists
are prone to firmly dichotomize. Even if the break is
radical in some respects, in the sphere of culture it is
not as all-encompassing and penetrative as was supposed,
and this in turn casts doubt on the explanatory value of
concepts like 'industrial society' or 'capitalism' outside
their economic context. At the same time, in rejecting the
claims of the perennialists, due weight is accorded to the
transformations wrought by modernity and their effects on
the basic units of human loyalty in which we operate and
live. (ibid:13)
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An ethnic community or ethnie, we are told, must have a sense of
belonging and an active solidarity that is strong enough, particularly
in time of tension and danger, to 'override class, factional or
regional divisions within the community' (ibid. :30). At this juncture,
however, one strand of the 'modernist' view would serve as a useful
reminder to us of the possible 'instrumentalist' function of
ethnicity: Ethnicism and nationalism provide convenient 'sites' for
the elites to gather support-%from the masses in their universal
pursuit for wealth, power and prestige, particularly in a multiethnic
society. Miles (1989:115) argues that by creating a sense of 'imagined
community', the rising bourgeoisie can achieve its goal of capital
accumulation when it mobilizes politically the people it intends to
dominate economically and politically into believing that its
interests that are about to be served are the 'national interests'. In
other words, such pursuit of the elites can be effectively camouflaged
by ethnic or nationalist appeal. This perspective asserts that
ethnicity helps to combine economic and political interests with
cultural 'affect'. For this reason, Smith (1988:10) believes that
ethnic and national communities are often superior to classes in
providing sound bases for rival elites to mobilize and co-ordinate
mass action in support of their collective policies or quest for
power. Bocock (1986:16) however feels that groups other than classes,
such as 'national-popular movements', hold out hope in that they can
be potential (human) agents of social charge as they are seen as
aiming at creating their own economic and political world.
Nationalism, says Smith (1976:1), is 'an ideological movement for
the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality
for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an
17
actual or potential nation'. He proposes two approaches to
nationalism: territorial and ethnic (1988:135). A 'territorial nation'
is tied to the notion of a geographical territory that is carved out
of a diversity of cultures. As Murphree notes, 'The territorial
dimensions of these states, derived from colonial partition and
tenaciously maintained in the post-colonial period, embrace ethnically
diverse populations... (in Rex and Mason (eds) 1986:157)' And it is
therefore crucial that this nation of people is held together by 'a
community of laws' and legal institutions, and the concept of
citizenship. Such a nation must necessarily be a cultural community
(Smith 1988:136) that requires a common culture, a place where its
members would identify with national symbols, myths and national
values. Smith maintains, 'The solidarity of citizenship required a
common "civil religion" formed out of shared myths and memories and
symbols, and communicated in a standard language through educational
institutions. So the territorial nation becomes a mass educational
enterprise. (ibid. :136)' The civil religion is, in other words, the
common culture. He cautions, though, that if these meanings, myths and
symbols 'ceased to strike a responsive chord', cultural boundaries of
the nation would emerge and subeequently halt the process of
nation-building. Once again, schools and other educational
institutions are singled out as necessary instruments for propagating
the common culture. And in this context, as Bocock (1986:36) argues,
intellectuals that include teachers, writers and politicians, amongst
others, can play a vital role in the construction of national
identity by the State.
The second approach, the 'ethnic nation', is founded on
pre-existing ethnie and ethnic ties and sentiments, which then are
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transformed into national ones through the process of mobilisation,
territorialization and politicization. This perspective of the nation
stresses elements like genealogy, populism, customs and dialects, arid
nativism (Smith 1988:137). Although the ethnic base of a nation is
crucial and can be strong enough to arouse nationalist sentiments, a
secure sense of possessing a recognized territory or 'homeland' arid
everything that it stands for would be an added advantage to the
nationalist dream of forging national integration. It is therefore
hardly surprising that the ethnfc concept of the nation mingles with
the territorial, particularly in cases where nation-states, which
initially opt for the ethnic route, find difficulty in integrating
their members who happen to come from diverse ethnic backgrounds. As a
consequence, 'all nations bear the impress of both territorial and
ethnic principles arid components...' (ibid. :149).
The importance of national integration is made all the more
pertinent arid urgent when Smith declares that 'the tension between an
ancient ethnic community arid a modern territorial state still helps to
destablize the "nation" arid its self-conception' (ibid. :150). This
dualism and instability 'become endemic and divisive' with multiethnic
societies. Here the multiethnic states are normally dominated by 'a
single strategic ethnie' which seeks, to a larger or lesser degree, to
incorporate, or influence the surrounding smaller or weaker ethnie.
Out of this situation surfaces the phenomenon of dual sentiments of
the minority ethnie or ethnic immigrants: loyalty to the political
unit, the state, and solidarity with the ethnic community (ibid:151).
This dualism, or its sediments, or perception of such dualism by the
dominant ethnie, could be construed as a lack of strong nationalist
sentiments on the part of minority ethnie, arid therefore could also
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become a source of ethnic tensions within a given polity. It is here
that the State would make a conscious attempt to ensure that members
of the nation-state share or learn to share meanings, myths and
symbols of a constructed common cultural community. The concept of
hegemony, initiated by Gramsci, would serve a useful purpose in this
context.
According to Bocock (1986:63), 'Hegemony, in its complete form,
is defined as occurring when theintellectual, moral and philosophical
leadership provided by the class or alliance of classes and class
fractions which is ruling, successfully achieves its objective of
providing the fundamental outlook for the whole society.' To attain a
hegemonic position, whatever emerges as the leadership must have a
coherent philosophy or world-view with (and acquire consent of) all
major groups in a society. Hegemony is seen as being exercised in the
economy (like factories), in the State (especially in law and
educational institutions), and in civil society (such as the mass
media and religions). Hence, the nationalist pursuit of a common
culture and of economic development and modernization would require
that the ruling group be in a hegemonic and dominant position so as to
ensure better reception of these objectives by the society's main
groups. Otherwise, such a project would be fraught with serious
challenges 'from below' and consequently face failure.
2.2 Common culture
As stated above, the task of forging integration between ethnic
communities in the long-term process of nation-ixtilding becomes more
imperative and vital. In the realm of 'civil religion', i . e. common
culture, this involves 'ceaseless re-interpretations, rethscoveries
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and reconstructions; each generation must re-fashion national
institutions arxi. stratification systems in the light of the myths,
memories, values and symbols of the "past", which can best minister to
the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and
institutions. Hence that activity of rediscovery and re-interpretation
is never complete and never simple; it is the product of dialogues
between the major social groups and institutions within the boundaries
of the "nation", and it answers to their perceived ideals arid
interests. (Smith 1988:206)'
This cultural dynamics relates closely to the notion of a lived
hegemony as a process. For such a hegemony, argued Williams
(1978: 112), needs to be continually 'renewed, recreated, defended, and
modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered,
challenged by pressures not at all its own'. And the images that are
constructed and transmitted 'through the education system arid media
become the often unconscious assumptions of later generations in whose
social consciousness they form a kind of rich sediment... (Smith
1988:207)' In other words, social institutions such as schools and the
mass media become the ideological 'sites' where the State can
continuously attempt to disseminate its own version of historical and
cultural 'past' that has been re-interpreted and re-constituted for
the consumption of the public in general and students in particular.
This practice of selecting certain segments of the past is very much
part and parcel of hegemony. Williams, in this connection, introduced
the notion of selective tradition, which means that the selection of a
certain segment of the past is passed off as 'the tradition' or 'the
significant past', arid this particular past is then used - through
institutions	 'to ratify the present and to indicate directions for
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the future' (1978:116). In terms of curriculum materials, subjects
such as history, social sciences, literary and cultural studies
present themselves as appropriate areas for the dissemination of what
constitutes the official historical and cultural knowledge.
It is envisaged that such cultural transmission particularly in
schools can be effectively implemented through the use of a common
language understood by the citizens concerned (Smith 1988: 136) •2 This,
however, doesn't necessarily imply that such cultural messages or
images from the State would not possibly face, to a certain degree,
some kind of resistance from groups or individuals, particularly those
who originate from the ethnic minorities and those who disagree with
the ideas advanced by the dominant groups in society. On the contrary,
a State attempt to propagate say, what constitutes as national or
common culture may face opposition or even competition from ethnic
sub-cultures, especially when the ethnic minorities perceive
themselves to be subordinated and marginalized, if not eradicated, by
the dominant group (Smith 1981:141). This is why Williams (1978:117)
maintained that central to all contemporary cultural activity is the
struggle for and against 'selective traditions'.
2.3 Economic development and modernization
National isin, says Hoogvelt (1985:57), 'presents a unifying force
that on the one haiti may psychologically rationalise present
dissatisfactions, for example by using former colonial powers as
scapegoats, and on the other haiti excite people to even greater
efforts and sacrifices.' Moreover, as Smith (1981:37) bluntly puts
it,	 'Capitalism's	 uneven	 development	 is	 necessarily
"nationalism-producing" because development always comes to the less
22
advanced peoples within the "fetters" of the more advanced nations...'
In other words, nationalism becomes a driving force for an imagined
community to pursue economic development and objectives that are
largely arid closely associated with what is known as 'modernization,
the kind of achievements that their former colonial masters have
obtained. Most of the elites of the developing world are persuaded to
accept this notion of modernization and industrialisation - which is
largely capitalistic in principle - uncritically while choosing to
ignore, or being ignorant of, the ethnocentrism of the concept (Gibbe
in King 1986:201). This notwithstanding, the 'catching up' with the
economic status of the former colonial powers, i.e. western countries,
necessitates to a large degree socio-economic, political and cultural
changes in the former colonies or Third World countries. What this
also means is that social institutions, particularly the education
system, are mobilized and shaped to the needs of such development.
This is especially so when there are western modernization theorists
who advocate not only the specialized training of the natives but also
go as far as suggesting that the 'niodernising elites' of the
underdeveloped countries require some training courses 'so as to imbue
them with the values and motivations appropriate to modern economic
behaviour' (Hoogvelt 1985:54). Hence, one would witness the flurry of
activities within a particular education system where schools arid
tertiary educational institutions are encouraged to fit into this
development and industrialisation mode by offering more technical
subjects so as to economically 'help build the nation'. Arid if this
isn't enough, development and education experts from the west are
invited to design development policies arid educational curricula.
Indicators of 'development' which, according to this perspective, are
necessary for a developing country to acquire include urbanisation,
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formal education, a high literacy rate, newspaper circulation,
political democracy, free enterprise, social mobility, national unity,
and independent judiciaries (ibid. :61).
Economic development and modernization in the context: of
nationalism are also perceived as an available route for a State to
take, especially for one that feels the urgency to institute a social
engineering programme that in principle intends to correct a
socio-economic imbalance particularly in a multiethnic society. In
this case, the State, in the name of national development and
'national interest', would consciously and systematically adopt a
redressive soclo-economic policy and/or an 'affirmative action' (or
'positive discrimination') strategy that would in principle try to
help the economically disadvantaged. It is hoped, according to this
view, that such soc jo-economic planning would go a long way towards
creating a citizenry that would be able to identify itself with the
economic prosperity, cultural affluence, and socio-political stability
of the country. If and when this is achieved, national development, as
Bottomore (1979:107) obeerves, 'may itself generate a more intense
nationalism - as it did in the case of older nation states'. But
things could go wrong if and when the economic well-being of members
of a particular ethnic community captures the imagination of the
ruling elites to the extent of marginalizing or excluding those of
other ethnic and needy groups (Edwards 1987:30), for such economic,
political and/or ethnic preferences would result in socio-econoinic
disparity and injustice and ethnic conflicts.
In their redressive mode as shown above, modernization and
industrialisation promise, at least for some, some kind of a solution
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to ethnic problems. On the one hand it was largely assumed that 'the
processes of modernization and industrialisation would lead to the
early dissolution of "primitive" ethnic affiliations, as people
adopted a more "rational" and "individualistic" approach to life'. On
the other, it was argued that ethnic groups would become redundant,
and that people would 'abandon the "false consciousness" of ethnic
groups for the supposedly more "realistic" arena of class stniggle'
(Richardson and Lambert 1986:52). Such a promise can become
contentious and lear when one is feniinded of Smith' s earlier argument,
that elites can employ the ethnic or nationalist appeal in order to
serve their political and/or economic interests to such an extent that
class consciousness - instead of becoming pronounced as is expected
of a modernizing society - is effectively suhnerged by ethnic and
nationalist sentiments (1981:26-7; 1988:10). rid also, as Hunter
(1972:141) contends, 'Industry works within the total environment of
political and social values, and has to conform to them. ' In
addition, an economic development, which normal ly takes on a
capitalistic form, would necessarily mean uneven development and the
concentration of economic and political resources in a few hands, and
thus markedly stratifies the society concerned. This therefore has the
grave potential of creating, if not exacerbating, ethnic tensions in a
society particularly if those resources are perceived, real or
imagined, to be scarce and monopolised by members of a certain ethnic
community (Eanton 1988:121).
This picture can be made even more complicated if one were to add
the international dimension where foreign capital could play a vital
role in determining or at least influencing the kinds and locations of
economic activities in the country. A concentration of economic and
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industrial activities in one particular geographical area, for
example, could mean greater accessibility to employment opportunities
for members of a particular ethnic community. Or, the kind of
technology employed by certain industries could well spell a division
of labour that largely coincides with ethnicity. In other words, the
ethnic situation in a society can become increasingly critical if and
when economic cleavages coincide with ethnic divide. Thus, 'new
insecurities, anxieties arid frustrations' that the modern and
industrial economy bring can be exploited to the fullest by
'unsctpulous demagogues' who would appeal to 'the comforting warmth
of old ethnic bonds' (Smith 1981:3).
Thus, while the long-term objectives of achieving national unity
arid creating national identity through the nationalist pursuit of a
common culture and economic development arid modernization are noble in
themselves, their actual implementation may not necessarily yield the
desired positive result. For one, the creation of (national) identity
'always has its inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions', and with it
carries the danger of 'being a resource of sectional interest'
(Murphree in Rex arid Mason (eds) 1986:165). In a multiethnic society,
this can be translated as the practice of creating an identity that
over-represents aspects of a particular ethnic group over those of
another. Secondly, like the case of identity, the common culture
created may be the product of including too many elements from a
particular ethnic sub-culture to the exclusion of those of another.
Moreover, the dominant ethnie has the tendency to reap 'advantages
greater than those of the minority ethnie' (Smith 1988:148). Finally,
the nationalist fervour to pursue economic development, often of the
capitalist kind, may necessarily give rise to uneven development arid
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soclo-econoinic disparity between social and/or ethnic groups. Worse
still, the nationalist zeal may be exploited by the society's dominant
group to mask their true intention of advancing their own economic
interests - all in the name of promoting and protecting 'national
interest'. If and when this occurs, two possible scenarios are on
offer: The society concerned would experience an uneasy socio-economic
and political calm when the ruling group is in a hegemonic position,
with the ethnic minorities and the poor still believing that their
welfare and rights (which by now are gradually eroding) are still
being taken care of by the ruling regime. On the other hand, serious
conflicts could arise if the moral and political leadership of the
ruling elites is being challenged, with ethnic or economic boundaries
emerging markedly within the nation. Raving said this, the nationalist
project may on the contrary end up with the creation of a more
egalitarian society where the national identity of the people
possesses a positive quality and is closely tied to the measured
notion of equal citizenship, socio-economic justice and egalitarianism
- irrespective of race and ethnicity and socio-economic background.
In other words, this provides an escape route from the overzealous and
blind commitment to 'My country, right or wrong'. Furthermore, an
ideological shift from the dogmatic attachment to sta-ucturalisin to the
emphasised reliance on human agency in the Grainscian fashion would
enable one to perceive a nationalist movement - as opposed to
class-based groups - as having the potential of initiating real
social change (Bocock 1986:106). Put another way, nationalism, common
culture and development seen in this light have great potential in
creating a more just and equitable and progressive society.
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Notes
1. It is argued that a new (national) identity and sense of
belonging, provided by nationalism, are crucial in replacing the
traditional systems of kinship and security that crumble under
the strain of modernization (Gibbe in King 1986:195). On the
other hand, keen competition for scarce resources under the zeal
of economic development and modernization, particularly in
multiethnic societies where ethnic groups by and large coincide
with economic functions, can only aggravate the already existing
ethnic tension and conflicts, and therefore reinforcing separate
ethnic identities to the point of subuerging the national one.
2. Ernest Gellner cited in Smith (1981:46).
3. In the case of transnational corporations, John Rex (1986:55)
argues that they have the option of employing 'racial or ethnic
domination' for their own ends. He adds, 'If a system of racial
domination is most effective in promoting profit they will
support it, but, if not, then they will be ruthless in
supporting its overthrow.'
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CHAFFER III
fl-IE M4LAYSIAN SETTING
3.1 The Geographical Background
Malaysia is made up of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak.
Peninsular Malaysia was formerly known as the Malay Peninsula until
the states within it were united and becanie independent from the
British colonial power as a Federation of Malaya in 1957. Malaya
U iteral ly in Malay, Tanah Melayu, 'the Land of the Malays') later
transformed into Peninsular Malaysia in 1963 when it merged with the
Borneo territories of Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and Sarawak to
form the Federation of Malaysia. 1- The Peninsula lies to the south of
Thailand while Sabah and Sarawak sit on the northern part of the
Borneo island. The two eastern states of Sàbah and Sarawak are
separated from the Peninsula by the South China Sea, but share common
borders with Indonesia. Peninsular Malaysia, stretching an area of
740 km (460 miles) from the northern state of Perils to the Straits of
Johor in the south, comprises the states of Perlis, Kedah, Pulau
Pinang (Penang), Kelantan, Trengganu, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, the
Federal Territory, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, and Johor (neighbouring
the republic of Singapore). Sabah and Sarawak stretch some 1120 km
(700 miles) from Taniung Datu, Sarawak in the west to Hog Point, Sabah
in the east. 2
 Being in the tropics, the country experiences an
average temperature of 26°C (or 80°F), high humidity and heavy
rainfall all year round.
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3.2 The System of croverrunent
The country's constitution provides that Malaysia be ruled by a
bicameral parliament, consisting of the constitutional monarchy, the
Yanq di-Pertuan Agorx (YDPA, literally, 'He who is made Supreme
Lord'), i . e. the Supreme Head of the Federation; the Dewan NecTara
(Senate); and the Dewan Pakyat (House of Representatives). The YDPA
is elected by the Conference of Rulers (whose members are the nine
Malay Rulers in the Peninsula) for a term of five years. He may at
any time resign his office in writing to the Conference of Rulers or
be removed by the same body (Malaysia 1979:45). The YDPA is also the
Supreme Commander of the M-med Forces, and the head of the Islamic
religion. In addition, he is deputised by the Timbalan Yari
di-Pertuan Agor (TYDPA. Deputy King), who is also elected by brother
Rulers for five years. The Dewan Rakyat, the primary law-making body,
has 154 seats which are elective while the Dewan Negara, which can
initiate legislation and also ratify to a certain extent, has 58 seats
that are part appointive and part. elective. The leader of the
majority party and who commands the confidence of members of the Dewan
Rakyat is appointed the prime minister. The twelve states in the
federation, with the exception of the Federal Territory where the
parliament sits, are ruled by their respective unicameral legislative
assemblies where elected representatives conduct their legislative
b.isiness. A chief minister:3 is obtained from each assembly to appoint
an executive council so as to manage state affairs that are within its
jurisdiction.
3.3 The Origins of A Society Divided
The population of Peninsular Malaysia is divided into three major
ethnic groups: the Malays, Chinese and Indians (i.e. those who came
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from the Indian sub-continent and Sri Lanka). According to the Fifth
Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990 (Malaysia 1986:128), Malays and other
aimiputeras in 1985 constituted an estimated 56.5 of the population
of Peninsular Malaysia, while Chinese 32. 8, Indians 10. 1, and Others
0.6; the corresponding proportions in 1980 were 55.1, 33.9%, 10.3%,
and 0.7%. In Sabah. Bumiputeras formed 84.2% of the population in
1985, while Chinese 14.9%, Indians 0.6%, and Others 0.3% compared with
82.9%, 16.2%, 0.6% arid 0.3%, respectively, in 1980. In Sarawak, 70.1%
of the 1985 population were &imiputera, while 28.7% were Chinese, 0.2%
Indian, and 1% compared with 69.6%, 29.2%, 0.2% arid 1% respectively,
in 1980.
The Malays4 also include the Javanese, Banjarese, Boyanese, &igis
arid Minangkabau. all of whom are of Indonesian origin. 5 The majority
of the Malays in the Peninsula are traditionally found in the East
coast states of Kelantan, Trengganu and Pahang, arid the northern
states of Penis arid Kethh, particularly in the niral areas where
agriculture is the main occupation. The Malays constitute the major
ethnic group in the Peninsula, and their numerical arid political
dominance explains in part where the name '' ('Land of the
Ma lays') was derived from. 6
 'Bumiputera' is a term whose meaning
originally was restricted to the Malays who consider themselves to be
literally 'sons of the soil I However, with the formation of the
Malaysian Federation (which includes Sabah arid Sarawak) the term was
enlarged so as to encompass those ethnic groups that are also
considered indigenous, arid thus making 'Bumiputeras' the single
largest ethnic group in the country. Ross-Larson (in Young, Bussink
arid Hasan 1980:19-20) argues that the term Bumiputera gained currency
particularly in those years prior to the tragic 1969 ethnic riots when
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the Malays felt that their economic situation hadn't improved
satisfactorily, which went against the promises given to them since
Independence. Hence, the term was used by the Malays and particularly
the government to further emphasise the significance of this
socio-economic divide between the two major ethnic groups. for they
feel that this is one way to highlight and subeequently rectify the
economic backwardness of the Malay majority. The term's usage also
helps to enhance the numerical position of especially the Malays
vis-a-vis the Chinese and Indians. It should be noted here however
that all Malays are constitutionally considered Diiniputeras; but not
all Bumiputeras are necessarily Malays. This is to differentiate
between the Malays in the Peninsula and such non-Muslim irxi.igenes of
Sabah and Sarawak as the Kadazans and the Ibans respectively. Hence,
the 'Bumiputera' group is further sub-divided into three broad
categories: (a) the aborigines (Orar Ash; literally, 'the original
people'); (b) the Malays; and (c) the Malay-related. The membership
of the first group remains the same while the second experiences a few
additions in the form of the Malays of both Sabah and Sarawak as well
as the Baiau of Sabah. The Malay-related group refers to all the
non-Malay Bumiputera groups of Sabah (i . e. Kadzan, Murut, Kelabit and
Kedayan) and Sarawak (i . e. Iban, Bidayuh, Melariau, Kenyah, Kayan and
Bisayah). Consequently, those who are not considered as 'Bumiputera'
are automatically termed as 'non-Bumiputer&.
The 'non-Bumiputer& (or 'non-Malay') group, on the other hand,
comprises chiefly the Chinese and the Indians, with minority
communities of Arabs, Eurasians, Europeans and Sinhalese. The Chinese
population mainly originated from South China, with the Cantonese and
Hokkien forming the largest dialect groups, followed by U.iichiu,
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Hakka, , Hainanese, Hokchew, Hokchia, Hengchua arid Kwangsai.
Most Chinese are located on the relatively developed West coast states
of the Peninsula such as Penang, Perak, Selangor, the Federal
Territory, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka arid Johor. In these states, the
Chinese usually gravitate around urban centres where commerce arid
industry thrive. Since the coming of the Chinese into Malaya was
closely linked to the opening up of economic opportunities, tin mining
arid businesses in particular, on the West coast and the beginning of
British colonialism in this part of the country, it is therefore
hardly surprising that most Chinese are found in these geographical
locations. This also meant the beginning of an identification of such
economic activities with the Chinese community as a whole. Although
the Chinese are in many ways a disparate group (in terms of dialect
groups, clans, etc.), they are easily perceived to be monolithic,
especially in relation to the Malays as an ethnic community.
Within the Indian category, the Tamils of South India and Sri
Lanka constitute the largest group, followed by minorities Sikh,
Pakistani arid Malayalee. Like the Chinese, the Indians tend to
concentrate in the urban areas, particularly on the West coast of
Malaya because their descendants too came primarily due to the
economic activities offered by these regions of the Peninsula. Indian
labourers were 'imported' into the country as indentured workers to
work the rubber plantations in Malaya. 8
 Like the Chinese, the Indians
as a community are identifiable with economic activities that are
related to rubber industry and, to a lesser degree, commerce and the
professions. In contrast, the Malays were divorced from either all of
the new commercial activities in the urban areas or the prospering tin
and rubber industries. This is because in general they preferred
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their traditional rural lifestyle to the squalid working conditions in
the mines and rubber plantations. 9 This social and economic distance
of the Malays was reinforced by the British who kept the Malays
isolated from the modern sector so as to maintain their traditional
lifestyle. The British confined the Malays to areas of agriculture,
peasant farming and, for the Malay aristocrats and their sons, the
civil service. Even when public education was initially introduced to
the Malays, it was primarily meant to 'make the son of the fisherman
or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had
been' .-° Hence, there developed ethnic divisions of labour in British
Malaya, with the Chinese in general taking a hold on Ixisinesses,
Indians in the plantations, and Malays in agriculture (W.Y. Hua
1983:109), which in turn dictate to a large degree their respective
geographical concentrations.
Apart from the above major groups, the Peninsula also has smaller
ethnic communities such as the Orang Ash (literally, the 'Original
People') or the Aborigines who reside in the jungle interiors. Other
minorities constitute Arabe, Eurasians, Europeans and Sinhalese who by
and large reside in towns.
It needs to be said here that the dichotomization of
Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera in the present-day Malaysia provides a
constant source of ethnic irritation in the nation's politics.
economy, culture, and daily social intercourse. This dichotomy is so
pervasive that it has become, in a sense, 'the de facto culture'
(Muzaffar 1987:23).	 Peninsular Malaysians, in particular, are
constantly reminded of this ethnic divide in their everyday life, such
as in applying for jobe; places in schools, colleges, and
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universities; arid scholarships and other government assistance. To be
sure, there is ethnic discrimination in the largely Malay-dominated
public sector as well as in the private sector where non-Malays, the
Chinese in particular, predominate. In short, ethnic label is usually
made to be very significant.
The ethnic divisions in the Malaysian society are, at least in
the popular perception, reinforced and complicated by religious
differences. Since all Malays are Muslims, at least nominally (and
they constitute the majority of the country t s Muslim population), it
follows that Islam can be easily 'ethnicized'. The Malays practise
their Malay culture which is highly influenced by Islamic culture and,
to a lesser extent, by elements of Hindu culture. Most of the Chinese
are &iddhists, Confucianists, Taoists or Ancestor Worshippers, or a
combination of these; a few are Muslims, while some are Christians.
Almost all Chinese follow their Chinese culture. Most Indians are
Hindus, although there are a subetantial number of them as well as the
Pakistanis who are Muslims. A few of them are Christians. With the
exception of the Muslim Indians and Pakistanis who may be abeorbed
into the Malay culture, the majority of the Indians practise their own
Hindu culture. The majority of the Punjabis are Sikhs. About half of
the Sabah population and about a quarter of the Sarawak population are
Muslims. The rest of the population in the two states are Christians
and Pagans. In other words, instead of emphasisirç common arid shared
features of these different cultures and religions and thus celebrate
the diversity of cultures, Malay(si)ans most of the time are goaded to
highlight their differences that divide them socially, politically,
and culturally.
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3.4 The Politics of National Unity: Before and After Malaya's
Independence in 1957
3.4.1 The Alliance Party : UMNO the dominant player
The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was formed on 11th
May 1946 to help organize Malay opposition to the Malayan Union
proposal, which sought to displace Malay rulers' sovereignty; taking
away the special position of Malays; and the liberal citizenship
provision. Given the extreme anger of the Malays regarding the
Malayan Union proposal that essentially affected their political
supremacy in the country, UMNO at the time made itself into the most
powerful platform for the expression of Malay disgust and
opposition. 11 UMNO, led by its first president Dato Onn bin Jaafar,
was indeed born with the basic goal of protecting the communal
interests of the Malays. 12 And by oppos:ing the British scheme, U1'4N0
was also actually seeking to maintain the traditional Malay status quo
(K.J.Patnam 1967:145).
The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was established in 1949
with two main objectives in mind: (a) to enable the British to gain
cooperation from the Chinese community in helping to end the
&iergency; and (b) to help the Chinese to unite themselves so as to
improve their status under the new constitution. In addition, the
party - in the eyes of the Chinese capitalists - provided the
opportunity and ways to compete more effectively with the Communists
in attracting the allegiance of the Chinese poor, especially the New
Villagers (ibid: 152-3). Hence, like UMNO, the party's primary concern
was to protect and maintain the narrow interests of the Chinese
community as a whole.
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The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was founded in 1946 with the
principal aim of representing the interests of the Indian community
and providing a channel for Indian opinions in the country. The party
had also associated itself with the inter-ethnic political coalition,
AMCJA (All Malaya Council of Joint Action), but later left it after it
was dissolved during the Fnergency. Subsequently, MIC went back to
its original form: communal.
The Alliance began with the electoral pact between UMNO arid MCA
just before the Kuala thmpur Municipal elections of 1952. Mutual
dislike and opposition toward the IMP (Independence of Malaya Party)
is also another reason for their newly-found unity. It was, in other
words, a 'marriage of convenience' (ibid: 160). It was also described
as 'a freak of history' (Vasil 1980:63). It should be said here that
the UMNO-MCA partnership was less a test of their non-communality than
a case of UMNO using the Ma lays and MCA the Chinese in an effort to
deprive the IMP of the opportunity to win under the prevalent climate
of communalism (ibid:160). The result was that the IMP and the Labour
Party lost in the elections. And just before the Federal elections in
1955, the original UMNO-MCA Alliance admitted the MIC. It should be
noted here, however, that the Alliance is inter--ethnic as opposed to
being multiethnic, in the sense that membership is not direct but
through respective component parties. In other words, UMNO would only
admit Malays, the MCA Chinese, and the MIC Indians. This explains to
a large degree the internal problems that beset from time to time the
collective body, what with each component party competing with the
other in trying to respond to the demands and claims of the respective
ethnic constituencies in the Peninsula (ibid:162-4).
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The Alliance, being the political party that was acknowledged by
the British as one that was capable of ruling independent Malaya, was
in large measure responsible in setting the divisive and ethnic
pattern of Malayan politics. This subeequently 'ethnicizes' almost
every aspect of Malay(si)an life. Although a coalition party, its UMNO
partner emerged as a dominant player, which in many ways helped
preserved certain 'Malay features' of the Malaysian life, particularly
the political and the cultural and, along the way, excluded or at
least marginalized many of those of the non-Malays. UMNO's dominance
is linked to 'the special position of the Malay rulers in the colonial
set-up, the predominance of the Malays in the electorate, as well as
the state's political strategy and ideology of bumiputraism' (W.Y. Hua
1983:109).
3.4.2 The 'Political Bargain'
The 'political bargain' that was reached between the major
partners of the Alliance was that certain aspects of Malay traditions
will be maintained: The pos 1 tion of the Malay Rulers; Islam as the
official religion; Malay language would, by 1967, be the sole official
and national language; and the 'special position' of the Malays.
Islam and the Malay language, which were later written into the
Malay(si)an Constitution, represented part of the endeavour of the
Malays to retain a Malay identity in the independent nation (C.B. Tan
in Al iran 1987a :247) In return for these concessions, the
non-Malays gained further relaxation in citizenship provisions. This
would increase the political strength of the non-Malays, particularly
the Chinese. Another feature of the 'bargain' was that the Chinese
would not be hindered from playing their dominant role in b.isiness
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(Mime and Mauzy 1980:39).
With regards to the Malay's special status, Article 153 of the
Malayan Constitution stipulates that it is the responsibility of the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to 'safeguard the special position of the Malays
and the legitimate interests of other communities' 14 The Article also
states that the Head of State may reserve for Malays (a) positions in
federal public service; (b) scholarships, exhibitions and other
similar educational and training privileges or special facilities; and
(c) permits or licences for the operation of any trade or b.isiness
(ibid.). Article 89 in the Constitution provides for the reservation
of Malay land. Some of the reasons offered for the Constitutional
provision of Article 153 are (a) the indigenousness of Malays; (b) the
Malay rights were already there when Malaya was under British rule;
and (c) to help Malays achieve a higher degree of economic equality.
The last reason is often employed by the government in its declared
determination to tackle Malay poverty. Two objections were raised
against Article 153: (a) Since poverty exists in the Chinese, Indian
as well as Malay communities, a constitutional protection should be
accorded to individuals on the basis of socio-economic reasons; and
(b) the protection under Article 153 is open to ab.ise. Another
contentious aspect of the Article however is its duration. The
Constitutional Commission had recommended that the matter be reviewed
after 15 years, bt the Constitution is silent on this (ibid. :40-i).
Malay-based Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS), which has undergone some
ideological changes since 1982, however has deemed this 'special
position' provision un-Islamic (Utusan Malaysia: 19/9/85), for it
argues that Islam is universal and non-discriminatory in its fight for
social justice. That this pronouncement was not well received by the
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Malay electorate in general - as illustrated by P1S's tragic defeat
in the 1986 general election - can be attributed to an ethnically
conscious environment as well as PAS's own failure to withdraw
completely from actions that are still coloured by ethnic chauvinism.
The controversy of this aspect of the Constitution continues to
threaten, to a certain degree, Malaysia's ethnic relations.
3.4.3 National education system
The development of educat;on in Malaya can be traced from the
steps taken by the British authorities in Malaya since 1950 to
commission a few successive committees to look into the country's
education problems. 1 The end result of all these studies took the
form of the Education Ordinance of 1952, which stipulated that only
two systems of education would be established: one type of school
using Malay as its medium of instruction, while the other employed
English. Mandarin and Tami 1, according to this ordinance, would be
taught in these two types of school if there was request from at least
15 non-Malay pupils. Non-Malay opposition to this led to some
modifications. Thus, the teaching of Eglish and Malay would be
implemented gradually in Malay vernacular schools; three languages
would be taught gradually in the Chinese and Taniil schools; and
students' enrolment into Engi ish-mediuin schools would be restricted
(S.S.Mok and S.M.Lee 1988:42-3).
After its victory in Malaya's first general election in 1955, the
Alliance government immediately set out to improve the country's
education system. A committee, headed by the then Education Minister
Dato' Aul Razak Hussein, was set up to assess the education policy
at that time 'with a view to establishing a national system of
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education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which
will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic
and political development as a nation, having regard to the intention
to make Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving
and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of other
communities living in the country' (Razak Report, Para 1(a) cited in
Malaysia 1985 :4-5). The Razak Report also emphasised the importance of
the education system having a 'Malayan outlook'. Given the Committee's
concern for the creation of a united Malaya, whose people were
expected to possess a national identity, it recommended a single,
integrated education system with Malay and English as the media of
instruction. Having said that, the Razak Committee's recommendations
were in general more moderate because the Committee did not seek to
abolish the use of Mandarin in Chinese (independent or private)
secondary schools as the medium of instruction. This moderation was
also due to the Committee's belief that what was more important was
the content of education rather than the medium of instruction. In
addition, the Committee's recommendations reflected an Alliance type
of 'political bargain' or 'compromise'.
The 'moderate', if riot vague to some extent, characteristics of
the Razak recommendations gave rise to conflicting and oppositional
responses from certain groups in both the Malay and non-Malay
communities. The Malays in general became dissatisfied by what they
saw as a slow implementation of the Razak Report of 1956, especially
the fact that Malay secondary schools had yet to be set up in the
country. The Chinese on the other hand were alarmed by what they
perceived as the gradual marginal ization of their language and
culture.
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Soon after the 1959 general election in Malaya, the Alliance
government set up a new education committee, led by the new Education
Minister Mxlul P.ahman Talib, whose primary purpose was to review the
Education Policy outlined in the Education Ordinance of 1957. While in
many ways the recommendations of this Review Committee (1960) were
very much similar with those of the Razak Report, the former was more
demanding in its goal to make the national language the medium of
instruction for the country's education system. Hence, the Review
Committee argued that in the interest of national unity all public
examinations at the secondary school level should be conducted only in
the national language. This also implied that the medium of
instruction at this level should also be in the national language.
This again became the object of resentment for the Chinese because
this meant for them the curtailment of the teaching of their language
and culture (von Vorys 1975 : 215). Faced with these mounting
oppositions, the government decided to tread carefully so as not to be
seen as pushing too hard its line of establishing Malay as the
country's official language (ibid. :216). In the meantime, certain
steps had already been taken towards achieving this long-term goal of
making Malay the national language, such as the setting up of the
Language Institute (Maktab Perguruan Bahasa) in Kuala Lumpur in 1956
to provide training for specialist national language teachers.
The 1969 ethnic riots 6 provided the government the rationale to
hasten its effort to make the national language the sole medium of
instruction in schools and institutions of higher learning in order to
forge national unity, thus dispelling any ambiguity that might have
been associated with the earlier education reports' method of
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implementing the national language policy in the national education
system. In July 1969, taking a tougher line, the then Education
Minister Datuk Patinggi lthdul Pabman Yakub declared, 'English would be
replaced by Malay one year at a time, from primary school to
university' (Mi me and Mauzy 1980:371). The government launched, for
example, an extensive programme of training and re-training teachers
to flesh out this pronouncement. In 1970 the government established
the first university that uses the national language as its medium of
instruction, the National Universiy (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia).
Later, other universities gradually followed suit.
3.4.4 Communist Insuraency : The Beqmnninq of Curbed Liberties
The year 1948 marked the beginning of a state of Energency in
Malaya that was to last for 12 years. The Malayan Communist Party
(MCP), which had been active during the fight against the Japanese
Occupation, decided to resort to armed struggle against what it
claimed to be an imperialist hold on the Federation. The Communist
rebellion however failed due to several reasons, one of which being
the Communist terrorism alienated a lot of people, and secondly, the
setting up of 550 'New Villages' for those Chinese who had been living
on the jungle fringes cut of f food supply (which normally was
obtained through the coercion on these Chinese 'squatters' by the
Communists) from reaching the Communists (ibid. :32). The perceived
Communist threat to the national security has had a long lasting
impact on the country's furxlaniental liberties. The British authorities
in Malaya instituted several laws that were perceived to be essential
in containing or quelling the Communist threat. These laws usurped a
major portion of a citizen's basic freedoms. For instance, the
Internal Security Act (1960) provides the authorities the unquestioned
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right to detain an individual for an indefinite period of time, arid
without charge or trial. The Printing Presses Act (1948) and Control
of Imported Publications Act (1959) both contravened a citizen's
freedom of expression arid right to information. Pnd the Thade Unions
Act (1959) affects an individual's freedom of association. These laws
were later further tightened to suit the needs of successive Malaysian
governments which could cause undue anxiety and frustration for
Malaysians particularly in matters concerning fundamental liberties
and rights of ethnic minorities.17
3.4.5 Format ion of Malaysia and Sinqapore' s Withdrawal
The subject of a union of the states of Malaya, Singapore, North
Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak arid Brunei was first broached by the then
Malaya's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rabman on 27 May 1961 when he said
that there was a need for a political arid economic cooperation between
these states (Gullick and Gale 1986:105).
The idea of forming Malaysia was received with suspicion and fear
by the Malays in Malaya as a whole, for they feared that the inclusion
of Singapore into this scheme meant that its predominantly Chinese
population would tip the 'ethnic balance' in the Peninsula in favour
of the Chinese, thereby threatening Malay political supremacy through
electoral contests in the country. This Malay fear was later allayed
by the inclusion of the Borneo states in the federation so as to
ensure that the latter's native populations, which were to be
classified as 'Malays' (and 'Bumiputeras'), would help maintain the
majority position of the Malays in the entire federation (M.N.Sopiee
1974:137). Eventually, after successfully resolving certain
outstanding problems related to the merger project, Tunku AJxiul Rahman
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announced the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 with the
agreement of the majority of the peoples of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah
and Sarawak. Brunei declined the invitation.
In 1965, Singapore left the federation. Its withdrawal
essentially revolved around questions of political stability and
national unity. When Singapore was in the fold, its ruling
Chinese-based People's Action Party (PAP) was locked in fierce
competition with Peninsular Malaysia's MCA for the hearts and minds of
the Chinese electorate. The cdntest got stiffer and tougher when PAP,
armed with its 'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan, mobilised non-Malays with
the promise of equal rights and end to 'Malay Malaysia' (Means
1976:347). This resulted in an acrimonious relationship between PAP
and the Alliance. Singapore's departure had an impact on Malaysian
politics and ethnic relations. MCA branches demanded 'a more liberal'
approach toward Chinese education and the implementation of Malay as
the national language, while UMNO branches called for tighter
citizenship laws and enhancement of Malay as the sole official
language (ibid. :359). Once again, ethnic relations were affected.
3.4.6 The May Thirteenth Ethnic Riots
Riots broke out on May 13th 1969 immediately after the general
election when the Alliance suffered major electoral reversals. The
election results reflected popular disillusionment among both Malays
and non-Malays with the Alliance's policies, particularly if the
ruling party's electoral performance is compared to that in the 1964
general election. Opposition parties, DAP and Gerakan in particular,
made huge political gains in non-Malay urban areas, while PAS managed
to acquire extra seats in predominantly Malay rural areas. (See Table
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3.1 be low for electoral results and comparison.) Popular account had
it that the first few clashes in }(uala Iiimpur were triggered off by
the provocative display of political victory by jubilant non—Malay
supporters of the Opposition and the counter'—action of loyal UMNO
supporters who were trying to defend 'Malay interests' and honour.
This eventually led to the killing of a few hundred people, both
Malays and non—Malays, and a considerable destruction of property.
Table 3.1
The Peninsular Malaysian Federal Election Results by Party (1964 and 1969)
1964
Alliance
UMNO	 59
MCA	 27
MIC	 3
P'S
People's Progressive Party
DAP
Gerakan
Socialist Front
People's Action Party
United Democratic Party
89
UMNO
MC'
MIC
9
2
0
0
2
1
1
1969
66
51
13
2
12
4
13
8
0
0
0
Vacant	 0	 1
104 seats	 104 seats
Source: Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, p.13.
At least two primary factors were presented by the government as
being the causes for the outbreak of the ethnic riots. Firstly, it was
asserted that there were elements in the Malay community, during the
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1969 general election, who questioned the constitutional provision of
the Malay language as the national language and the special position
of the Malays (Malaysia 1971b: 1-2) . These Malay elements, according
to this version, created in the Malay community a sense of
dissatisfaction and insecurity by claiming that the government had
inadequately implemented these two provisions. Among the non-Malays,
on the other hand, it was said that there were elements who 'created
the fear and mistrust that their legitimate interest as provided in
the Constitution would be eroded' (ibid. :2). As a corollary to the
alleged inadequate implementation of the first two constitutional
provisions above, the second cause was attributed to the 'the growing
sense of fear and insecurity among the Malays due to the disparity
existing between themselves and the non-Malays particularly in the
fields of education and economics' (ibid. :4-5). Mime and Mauzy
(1980:86-88) highlight another factor that was claimed to be yet
another possible cause of the riots: the alleged 'softness' of premier
Tunku Abdul Rabinan towards the Chinese was perceived by certain
quarters in the Malay community in general and UMNO in particular as
being contributory to the ethnic riots.2-9
3.5 The Politics of National Unity: Post-1969 Period
3.5.1 Barisan Nasional: Consensual politics or politics of
cooptation?
Following the restoration of the Malaysian Parliament on 30th
August 1970 after the bloody ethnic riots on 13th May 1969, several
amendments were made to certain Constitutional provisions, measures
that were deemed by the government as necessary to the interest of the
nation's security and stability. Article 10 of the Constitution was
amended to restrict freedom of speech, for it prohibits anyone having
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'a seditious tendency' (according to the Sedition Act that was amended
under the Energency Ordinance No.45 of 1970) to question lrticles 152,
153, or 181 of the Malaysian Constitution. 20 This prohibition also
applies to the Parliament (P1rticle 63 amended) arid State Assemblies
(1rticle 72 amended).
With the May 13th riots still fresh in mind, Tun lthdul Pazak, the
UMNO politician who took over the premiership from Tunku lthiul Iahman
(who resigned on 21st September 1970), discussed with his close
advisers arid decided that 'po'iticking' would have to be minimised;
UMNO dominance would have to be ensured; Malay unity and Malay
nationalism would be a major goal; the Alliance should be enlarged to
enable conserisual politics; Westminster model of democracy need to be
modified so as to suit local conditions; arid elements of ambiguity in
political relationships would have to be eradicated (Mime and Mauzy
1980:177).
The first step in the coalition-building exercise, which was
mounted in the Peninsula, involved the Alliance and the predominantly
Chinese Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (popularly known as Gerakan) in
February 1972. It was said that a split in the Gerakan triggered it
to move towards the direction of a coalition with the Alliance. What
this meant for the Alliance on the other hand is that it enabled it to
share political power with the Gerakan in Penang State which was and
still is the latter's political base. This also meant that the
Alliance managed to coopt a moderate opposition party which had a grip
over a highly politicized state (ibid. :181).
Next was the People's Progressive Party (PPP)-Alliance coalition
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which occurred on 1st May 1972. PPP's move was precipitated by its
declining popularity as a result of the death of its popular
president; its failure to form a coalition with the Gerakan in order
to form the State Government in Perak in 1965; and the prohibition
(through the several Constitutional anierxlments mentioned earlier) on
sensitive issues which were its favourite subjects. The Alliance on
the other hand was keen on the coalition because it didn't have a
secure majority in the Perak State Assembly; it wanted greater
non-Malay representation in the state to compensate for MCA's and
MIC's weaknesses; and also itwanted to wrest control over the Ipoh
Municipal Council (ibid.:183-4).
And next in line was the PAS-Alliance coalition which happened on
1st January 1973. PAS's reasons for getting into this 'marriage'
were: to achieve greater Islamic influence in the government; to
promote national development; to promote Malay unity; to receive
Federal assistance for State economic development projects; paralysed
by the Sedition Act and the Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1971 which
prohibit 'sensitive issues' from being discussed or raised; a decline
of power in its base in Kelantan state; to have a share in national
power; and to contain leadership stniggle in Kelantan PAS. The
Al 1 iance 's reasons on the other hand were: to reduce 'politicking'; to
achieve Malay unity; to channel all energies to implement the NEP; to
participate in the PAS-dominated Kelantan State government; and to
reduce State-Federal tensions (ibid. :187).
Prior to this, the Alliance had already managed to form a
coalition with the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) in Sarawak on
July 1970. In Sabah, the coalition idea took a little more time to be
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attractive so that it was only in June 1976 that the Alliance managed
to form coalition with the Berjaya party.
After getting a sufficient number of parties in all the states in
the federation, the National Front (or in Malay, Barisan Nasional) was
formed on 1st June 1974. Pazak's motives were basically to reduce
'politicking' and to channel all energies and resources towards the
implementation of the NEP. These motives were also prompted by
Razak' s desire 'to coopt or neutralize the Opposition, most especial ly
Malay opposition' (ibid. : 190) The dominance of UMNO was more marked
in the new coalition than it was in Alliance because the party was
able to control electoral bargaining with the coalition partners and
ensured that '"government" candidates, and not potential opposition
members, were selected' (W.Y. Hua 1983:152) •22 UMNO' s senior partner,
the MCA, had its bargaining position weakened especially by its poor
performance in the 1969 general election (P.K. Heng 1988:261-262) and
its decision to opt out of the government after the election (J.K.
Sundaram 1988:255). Furthermore, dissatisfaction within
	 the
Malay-based PAS could now be easily contained by UMIX). PAS however
eventually left the coalition in December 1977 after facing
intra-party struggle and aiming for its own 'political expansionism'
(Mime and Mauzy 1980:385).
As of 1986, the Barisan Nasional comprises UMNO, MCA, MIC,
Gerakan, PPP and Berjasa (all from the Peninsula); and Berjaya, Parti
Bersatu Sabah (PBS) and United Sabah National Organization (USNO) (all
from Sabah); and the Part i Pesaka Bemiputera Bersatu (PPBB), Sarawak
National Party (SNAP), and Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) (all
from Sarawak). With its control over a two-thirds majority in
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Parliament as a result of this coalition, the Barisan Nasional has
since been able to amend - without much difficulty and, in certain
cases, debate - subetantial and crucial aspects of the Malaysian
Constitution. 23
 Besides, with such a parliamentary majority the party
is in a position to indulge in gerrymanderirç if its political fortune
is seen to be at stake (Means quoted in Higgott and Robison (eds)
1985:115). With its political position consolidated and power
entrenched, the ruling party's initial argument about reducing
'politicking' and advancing consensual politics so as to get on with
'development' can only be interpreted as a shrewd attempt at muzzling
opposition, discouraging, if not outlawing, legitimate debate and
dissent, and eroding the democratic principle of checks and balance -
all in the name of promoting ethnic unity.
3.5.2 Rukunegara: 'State Guidance' to a more united Malaysia?
The flukunegara (or National Ideology) was formulated during the
period of emergency after the 13th May bloody riots by the
newly-established National Unity Department since its overriding
concern is the unity of all Malaysians. The objectives of the
Rukunegara are that Malaysia is dedicated to (a) achieve a greater
unity of all Malaysians; (b) maintain a democratic way of life; (C)
create a just society in which the wealth of the nation should be
shared equally; (d) ensure a liberal approach to Malaysia's rich and
diverse cultural traditions; and (e) to build a progressive society
which shall be oriented to modern science and technology. To achieve
these goals, Malaysians are guided by the following principles: Belief
in God; Loyalty to King and Country; Upholding the Constitution; Rule
of Law; and Good Behaviour and Morality.
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The implication of instituting this ideology is that the
government at that time was committing itself, at least in principle,
to socio-economic justice and democratic values, and at the same time
had demonstrated its appreciation of diverse cultures found in the
society - all this as part of the strategy to forge national
integration. Over the years, however, the importance of the Rukunegara
was somehow eclipsed by successive governments' pre-occupation with
Malay economic welfare, particularly in the objective of creating a
small group of Malay capitalists. The significance of the national
ideology has also been overshadowed by the growing attention given by
the governments towards the issues of (Malay-based) National Culture
Policy and Islamization Policy, which instead have in many ways
worsened ethnic relations. The seriousness, if not sincerity, of the
government to overcome ethnic problems in the country is therefore
brought into question.
3.5.3 The New Economic Policy
The economic pci icy, although deemed as 'new', is not entirely
new, for it actually represents a conscious effort of the post-1969
governments to continue previous policies undertaken by the colonial
government which purportedly served to protect the interests of the
Malay community as a whole. Prior to 1969, socio-economic programmes
were basically aimed at reducing economic disparity between the rural
and urban Malays. Hence, various governmental institutions were set
up to help improve the living conditions of the rural Malays: for
instance, the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was
initiated in 1950 (which was then re-organised in 1965 to become M7RA
(Mailis Amanah Pakyat, or Council of Trust for the Indigenous People);
the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) was established in
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1956; the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA) and Bank
Bumiputera in 1965 for the purpose of agricultural credit (Mime and
Mauzy 1980:322).
However, the approach towards granting economic assistance by the
government to the Malays changed after the ethnic violence. The Policy
constitutes an indigenous economic nationalism in the wake of the 13th
May riots whose primary cause the government attributed to Malay
economic backwardness. The government believed that unless the
economic status of the Malay was improved vis-a-vis other ethnic
communities, unity between ethnic groups might be endangered. Thus,
the government felt that there was the dire need for state
intervention in an economy where the philosophy of laissez faire
prevailed - in order to help the Malays not only raise their living
standards but also, more importantly later, participate effectively in
the business and commercial sectors of the Malaysian economy. With
the perceived socio-economic disparity between Malays and non-Malays
in mind, governments since 1969 have been emphasising the significance
of the two-prong objectives of the Policy: '(a) to reduce and
eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race; and
(b) to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to
correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eventually eliminate
the identification of race with economic function.
	 This process
involves the modernization of rural life, a rapid and. balanced growth
of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and
industrial community... The New Economic Policy is based on a rapidly
expanding economy which offers increasing opportunities for all
Malaysians. (Malaysia 1971a:1)'. Coupled with this twin objective is
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the government's aim to help acquire for the Malays 30 per cent of the
country' s corporate and commercial wealth by the year 1990.
Several years since the implementation of the Policy have
witnessed a dramatic shift in emphasis towards its second objective,
that is, to restructure society, which in effect means to create a
small community of Malay capitalists. To achieve this aim, the State
has deployed its energy and resources towards providing training
facilities and financial and professional assistance to the Malays in
the hope of preparing them fo the challenges that lie ahead in the
competitive world of commerce and industry. Various training
institutions were set up, notably the MRA Institute of Technology
(MIT) which essentially provides professional and technical courses to
Thmiputera students only; MRA vocational institutes; and the National
Productivity Centre (Milne and Mauzy 1980:331). In addition, several
state agencies emerged with the professed objectives to help Malay
entrepreneurs survive in the business world as well as, for some of
them, acting as trustees for the Malays. One of the major arid serious
implications of this pre-occupation with creating a community of Malay
entrepreneurs and capitalists is that the opportunities provided by
the Policy have mainly benefitted the 'already urbanized, educated
and, to a certain extent, better-off Malays' (Means 1976:450). Also,
the trustees apparently have exploited their privileged position to
advance their own interests (Mehmet 1988:124; S.G. Tan in DPP
1986:141). This consequently sharpens social differentiation and
economic disparity within the Malay community (Means 1976:451). The
government's focus on Malay economic welfare to the neglect of those
of the non-Malays has caused much unhappiness among the non-Malays,
particularly the Chinese. 26 This socio-economic scheme also
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necessarily means greater urbanisation of Malays through rural-urban
migration.	 Consequently, the influx of Malays into the once
predominantly Chinese urban areas is invariably perceived, real or
imagined, as an increasing threat to the economic survival of the
urban non-Ma 1 ays, the Chinese in particular. Thus an economic policy
that started out as a holistic strategy to combat poverty of all
Malaysiaris has, through its implementation, alienated the non-Malays
as a whole, and hence affected ethnic relations in the country. More
importantly, the relative neglect of the Malay poor as a whole, as a
result of the government's obession with creating Malay capitalists,
can further aggravate ethnic relations in Malaysia since Malay poverty
could be easily 'interpreted' by certain skilful politicians as a
consequence of unrestrained material affluence of the Chinese
community. In other words, the Chinese can be made a scapegoat for the
poverty and economic hardship experienced by the Malay majority.
3.5.4 The National Culture Policy
This Policy was essentially formulated on the recommendations
made at the National Culture Congress in 1971 at the University of
Malaya which, judging by the composition of paper presenters, was
highly dominated by Malay participants (Malaysia 1973: Contents). In
its publication, Asas Kebudayaan Kebanqaan, which constitutes a
compilation of the proceedings arid resolutions of the Congress, the
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports stipulated that the Culture
Policy would be based on the three major principles outlined by the
Congress. They are:
(i) The National Culture must be based on the indigenous
culture of this region.
(ii) The suitable elements from other cultures can be accepted
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as part of the National Culture.
(iii) Islam is an important component in the moulding of the
National Culture.
In addition, the publication specifically states that the second
principle must be seen only in the context of the first arid third
principles 'and not from other values' (Malaysia 1973: vii).
Given this heavy emphasis by the Policy on Malay culture, it is
less surprising that, when the Ministry called for a ten-year review
of the Policy in 1981, the d-iinese community as a whole voiced its
apprehension and opposition to what it saw as 'a tendency towards
forced assimilation of the other cultures in this country with hardly
any cultural democracy' (K. S. Kua (ed) 1985:3). The Chinese group.
comprising representatives from all the 13 state organisations of
Chinese guilds and associations, the United Chinese School Committees'
Association of Malaysia (UCSCAM), the United Chinese School Teachers'
Association of Malaysia (UCSThM). scholars and experts in the various
fields of culture, held and participated in a Chinese Cultural
Congress on March 27, 1983. The proceedings and resolutions were later
submitted in a Joint Memorandum to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and
Sports (ibid. :2). The Joint Memorandum proposed an alternative 'Four
Principles', which are essentially more democratic, multiethnic and
multicultural in approach (ibid. :4), for the formulation of the
National Culture. The government failed to respond.
Apprehensions regarding the Policy were also voiced by the
component parties in the ruling Barisan Nasional government; the
Chinese-based MCA (The Star: 12/10/83), the Chinese-dominated Gerakan
(Gerakan pamphlet: July 1983) and the Indian-based MIC (The Star
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13/8/84) as well as former Lord President Tun Salleh ,bas (The Sunday
Star: 16/12/84). The opposition Chinese-based Democratic Action Party
(D7P) (The Star: 5/2/64) also joined in the fray. In addition, 10
major Indian cultural associations submitted their joint memorandum
to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in April 1984 essentially
calling for a liberal and democratic interpretation of the national
culture (K.S. Kua (ed) 1985:303_321). 27 If anything, these criticisms
only hardened the resolve of the government, in particular its
dominant UMNO component to pursue the current Policy as it is, for
these criticisms were primari'iy construed as a direct attack on the
perceived cultural and political supremacy of the Malay community
(Berita Harlan: 4/4/83). In other words, UMNO as well as other members
of the Malay community believe that the national culture should be
founded on the fact that the country was a Malay polity and hence
necessitates the conscious preservation and promotion of elements of
the Malay culture - but almost to the marginalization of other ethnic
cultures. UMNO also accused those who criticised the Policy as
bringing their loyalty to the country into question (Berita Harian:
6/4/83) apart from displaying their insincerity towards the quest for
national unity. In conclusion, the Policy is still considered
controversial and questionable by sections of the non-Malay
communities even though the then Minister of Culture, Youth and
Sports, J\nwar Ibrahim, had already declared the matter closed (
Straits Times: 18/2/84). Here we witness again 'unity' being employed
to help promote the government's notion of a national culture that has
disuniting potential.
3.5.5 Islamization Policy
Islaniization is perceived by the government as the gradual
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infusion of Islamic values into the country's administration and
public domain, while at the same time safeguarding the constitutional
rights of non-Muslims. These values, the government argues, are
essential to the long-term objective of forging national identity and
unity. Furthermore, it adds, this would require all Malaysians to make
a 'commitment to the tradition and culture of this nation' and thereby
prevent them from being ideologically and politically swayed by alien
forces and cultures (Intan 1988:91-2).
The Islamic resurgenc movement, whose 'backbone' constituted
Muslim youths, 28
 started in mid-1970s when dakwah (missionary) groups
sprang up in many parts of the country with the primary goal of
propagating Islamic fundamentalism to Muslims. This Islamic fervour
largely stemmed from a rejection of what were seen to be Western
values, culture, materialism and 'decadence' (Mauzy and Milne in Gale
(ed) 1986:88), and the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979
provided the impetus and was primarily interpreted by many as an
Islamic triumph over Western cultural Intrusion. PAS, whose ideology
is Islamic fundamentalism, was spurred by this turn of events to push
for more Islamization of Malaysian life. It is in this context that
the UMNO-led government under Mahathir found it necessary to pursue a
more Islamic line in many of its actions and policies so as not to
allow PAS to 'out-Islam' it (ibid. :90). While the government is in
many ways goaded by its opponents to push for greater Islainization in
the state, it is still not completely clear as to what its ultimate
goals are nor is it able to make explicit the content of this
religious drive. Uncertainty of what Islamization would lead to makes
non-Muslims feel uneasy and subsequently creates a climate of tension
between Muslim adherents and non-Malays, particularly when certain
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religious and cultural practices are applied in such a rigid and
conscious way as to divide these two large groups.29
There is also an ethnic dimension to the Islamization drive in
Malaysia. It has been argued that Islam is perceived by many Muslim
Ma lays as the last of the cultural markers that not only protects
their Malay identity but also separates them from the rest. 3° Malay
language used to be an effective device for promoting arid protecting
Malay identity until it became the national language for all
Malaysians, utilized by the àountry's new generations. In a society
where ethnic consciousness is high and the Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera
dichotomy plays a major part in the public life of the nation, the
promotion of cultural markers such as religion would only exacerbate
ethnic tension and suspicion. 31
 Such a situation would only result in
Muslims and non-Muslims having the tendency to employ religion to
mobilize ethnic solidarity against one another, particularly in the
competition for economic and political gains. Thus like the National
Culture project, Islainization, unless checked, can instead contribute
to further ethnic disunity in the country.
3.5.6. The October 27, 1987 Political Crackdown: Impact on
Ethnic Relations
The 27th October of 1987 saw the beginning of what turned out to
be a massive political crackdown. Some 106 people - human rights
activists, politicians, social workers, church workers, Chinese
educationists, unionists, academics, environmentalists, Muslim
religious teachers, and also certain leaders of the ruling Barisan
Nasional - were detained under Section 73 (1) of the formidable
Internal Security Act 'for activities that have been or may be
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detrimental to national security' 32 In addition, publishing permits
of four national newspapers - the Star, 3 the Sunday Star, Sin Chew
Jit Poh, and Watan - had been suspended for allegedly having fuelled
ethnic tension in the country. The Mahathir government argued that
this drastic action was necessary so as to prevent the country from
experiencing a recurrence of the bloody ethnic riots of 1969 when
hundreds were killed in the capital city. Tensions that ran high prior
to the political clampdown were primarily precipitated by the
controversy over the Ministry of Education's appointment of
non-Mandarin educated teachrs to administrative posts in Chinese
vernacular schools. This drew immediate response from the
Chinese-based MCA and Gerakan parties (both partners in the nil ing
Barisan Nasiorial), the opposition DAP arid 15 other Chinese
organisations who jointly protested against this move. UMNO and its
members and supporters in the Malay community in turn perceived this
as a direct challenge to their political supremacy. The planned
massive rally (to celebrate UMNO's 41st anniversary) of about half a
million of UMNO members arid supporters on 1st November 1987 provided
an excellent opportunity for them to display Malay unity against
'external threat'. The rally was later cancelled by the government for
fear of escalating ethnic tension in the country, particularly in
Kua 1 a Lumpur.
The appointment of the non-Mandarin educated teachers was one of
the issues pertaining to language, education arid culture that haunted
the Chinese and the Malays. Another factor was a new ruling imposed by
the University of Malaya that elective courses in the English, Chinese
and Indian studies departments must be taught in Malay. And another
one is about UMNO Youth's call to the government to withdraw financial
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assistance to the predominantly Chinese Tunku Pul Rahman College
(TARC).
Apart from the above issues, there are also other important, if
not more important, factors that collectively forced the hands of the
government to execute the mass arrests of inthviduals who had been
generally critical of the government's policies arid actions. The fact
that most of the arrested individuals were not involved in instigating
ethnic animosities or religious conflicts but on the contrary were the
ones promoting ethnic harmony lends credence to the suspicion that the
MahathIr government had used this 'tense situation' to silence and
frighten off its critics 4 in general and Mahathir's rivals in UMNO in
particular. Firstly, the acute factionalism within UMNO had caused it
to split into two teams: 'team A' led by Dr Mahathir himself and 'team
B' by former trade and industry minister, Tengku Pazaleigh Hajnzah.
Because of some alleged irregularities in the party's April 1987
election (where Pazaleigh lost only by 43 votes to Mahathir for the
party' s presidency), supporters of Razaleigh brought the case to the
court to challenge the validity of the election. Secondly, financial
scandals (apart from the BMF (Bumiputera Malaysia Finance] loan
scandal) that involved the main parties of the ruling coalition,
notably and most recently, the United Engineers Malaysia affair in
which the Malaysian government awarded the company - alleged to have
close links to the UMNO leadership through its parent company
Hat ibudi, an UMNO investment arm - a M$3 .4 billion to build the
North—South Highway in Peninsular Malaysia (The Independent:
16/11/87). The secretary general of the opposition PAP, Lim Kit Siang,
and his lawyer Karpal Singh had brought this case to the Penang High
Court and had subsequently succeeded in obtaining an injunction to
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restrain the signing of the contract. Both individuals, it should be
noted, fell victim to the mass detention. Thirdly, economic recession
had created a lot of retrenchment in estates, tin mines, factories,
construction sites and other industries. Also affected was a large
number of unemployed Malay graduates who in normal times would have
easily been alcorbed into the public sector. A disgruntled group of
people, particularly in Malay quarters, could pose a threat to the
credibility of a Malay-led government especially if some of them had
become vocal in displaying their dissatisfaction. Finally, there were
elements in both government tnd opposition parties who were quick to
exploit this situation by fanning ethnic emotions so as to make
political gains.
If the circumstances that led to the mass arrests and the
personalities of the detainees are important, the constitutional,
political and socio-cultural consequences of this episode are equally
significant. As regards the IJMNO internal squa:bbles, a High Court
judge, Datuk Harun Hashim, not only ruled that there had been
irregularities during the IJMI .O's 1987 election but also further argued
that according to the Societies Act, the presence of unregistered
branches would make the parent organization itself unlawful. UMNO was
therefore declared illegal on February 4, 1988. In response to the
failed attempt of Tunku 7Udul Pabman, Tengku Razaleigh and supporters
to form a new party called 'UMNO Malaysia' so as to take the place of
the old party, Mahathir quickly set up his own brand of UMNO, 'UMNO
Barn' (New JMNO), which was registered on February 13, 1988. UMNO
Malaysia was denied registration by the Registrar of Societies. The
creation of the New UMNO presented Mahathir the opportunity to weed
out his political foes from his new party structure. With both
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factions striving hard to convince the Malay electorate that they can
best protect their interests, Malay unity became the convenient
rallying call.
Confronted by the factors mentioned above, particularly
litigations, the government had decided to take certain measures in
order to secure its position. For instance, a certain section of the
Federal Constitution was amended so as to keep the Judiciary 'in
line'. As a result, Article 121 (1) of the Constitution was amended
in such a way that the statement that 'the judicial power of the
Federation shall be vested in the two High Courts (of Malaya and
Borneo)' was replaced by the fact that the jurisdiction and powers of
both the High Courts and the subordinate courts shall be 'conferred by
or under Federal law'. In other words, 'the Government and Parliament
will be able to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the Courts and
have judicial matters decided instead by persons or bodies responsible
to the Government or Parliament' . In short, the Judiciary is made
subservient to the Parliament, specifically the Executive. As if this
isn't enough to assure the government that the Judiciary would be kept
in line, the Lord President Tun Sal leh Abas was suspended in May 1988
by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister for the former's
alleged 'misconduct'. The only 'crime' of the Lord President was he
tried to defend the Judiciary's independence and protect it from the
criticisms of the Prime Minister. On 8th August 1988, a tribunal,
which was set up to try the Lord President, found Tun Salleh Abas
guilty. Later in July 1988, five Supreme Court judges who had
exhibited some traits of independence, were suspended. Later two of
them were sacked while the rest were reinstated (Aliran Monthly
Vol .8/7 1987). This is an indirect warning to those judges who have
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the tendency to step 'out of line'.
An equal ly important development was the amendment to the already
restrictive Printing Presses and Publications Act in December 1987
which essentially provides that the Minister of Home Affairs not only
has the absolute right to decide whether a publisher's or printer's
application for a permit should be granted, but his decision is final
and he doesn't have to give any reason whatsoever nor can his decision
be contested in a court of law (Al iran Monthl y Vol .9/9 1989: 38). The
Police Act too was amended so'as to basically give police greater
power to 'enter and break up any meeting or assembly which is deemed
subversive and unlawful by a police officer' (ibid.). Thus in the wake
of the 27th October episode, Malaysians have witnessed further and
rapid erosion of their fundamental rights and liberties. This means
that discontent harboured by Malaysians, particularly non-Malays, in
areas of politics, culture and economics will have difficulty in
finding legal avenues for expression (P.K. Heng 1988:276). It thus
follows that remedy to these grievances will also be scarce. When this
happens, not only do we get many crucial and fundamental problems
being conveniently swept under the carpet, many non-Malays
particularly would tend to feel that their genuine problems are not
considered important by the authorities because they are only
'non-Malay problems', while at the same time they would also feel that
their rights as Malaysian citizens are being increasingly eroded. Such
legal and political constraints imposed on Malaysians are politically
damaging and ethnically divisive.
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Notes
1. Singapore also joined the new federation but left it in 1965,
while Brunei declined the invitation to join it and remained a
separate State.
2. See Information Malaysia. 1986 Year Book, Kuala Lumpur: Berita
Publishing, 1986, particularly pp.1-2, for a geographical
account.
3. This political position is called Ketua Menteri in states
where there are no royal heads of state such as Pulau Pinang,
Melaka, Sabah and Sarawak; and Menteri Besar- in other states
where royal heads of state exist.
4. According to the Malaysian Constitution, a 'Malay' is 'a
person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the
Malay language, conforms to the Malay custom and (a) was before
Merdeka (Independence) Day born in the Federation or in Singapore
or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in
Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in
Singapore; or (b) is the issue of such a person' (Malaysia
1979:160).
5. These people are still considered as belonging to a larger
entity of 'Malay stock' who reside in the Malay 1,rchipelago,
which embraces 'the Malay Peninsula and thousands of islands
which today form the Republics of Indonesia and the Philippines'
(Husin All 1987:1-7). For an account of the immigration of
Indonesians into Malaya, see Saunders (1977:18-20).
6. The Malay term, Tanah Melayu, is strongly evocative to the
Malays particularly when they were confronted with the
controversial Malayan Union proposal before the Malayan
independence. Slogans such as 'Malaya belongs to the Malays'
(Utusan Melai [22 Dec. 1945] quoted in W.Y. Hua [1983:77])
clearly bring out a sense of exclusive hold onto the land.
7. This claim was recognised by the British when they were the
colonial power in Malaya. The indigenousness of the Malays has
been established by archaeological evidence (Husin All
1987:8-11).
8. Immigration of Indian labourers into the Peninsula was done
through the kanqani (overseer) system. Under this system, the
British employer would despatch a kangani to his former Indian
village or district where the latter would recruit the labourers
and, with the money provided by the employer, would pay for their
passage to Malaya. The labourers were then employed in the
Malayan rubber estates and assigned under the same kangani who
recruited them. In order to repay the oan' (i.e. the expenses
incurred in 'importing' them into the peninsula), the labourers
would have to work, after which they were free to leave (K.H.
Khong 1984:13).
9. According to B. W. Andaya & L. Y . Andaya (1982: 177), Chinese
labour in mines and rubber plantations faced exploitation, poor
working conditions and terms of employment - despite some
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attempts by the British colonial government to redress this
problem.
10. H.P.Cheeseman	 (1955) cited in J.Gullick arid B.Gale
(1986:221).
11. Bottomore (1966:104) observes that a political party which
has successfully led an independence movement against colonial
rule 'establishes itself as the ruling elite and justifies its
power both by its past deeds and by its promise to create a
modern nation in the future'.
12. UNNO's rallying call has been 'UNNO is Melayu (Malay), and
Melayu is UMNO' (Pahman 1986:9). Dato Onn however did initiate
the idea of opening up UMNO's membership to other communities,
but the majority of UMNO's members found it unpalatable. This
then led to Dato Onn's resignation from the party.
13.The existence of names such as Keretapi Tanah Melayu (Malayan
Pal iway), and 'Neqeri-neqeri Tanah Mel ayu, Malaysia' (Malay
States, Malaysia) written on the identification card of citizens
residing in Peninsular Malaysia can be construed as a conscious
attempt to remind people implicitly that the land was originally
Malays'. It is also instructive to note that the then Prime
Minister Tunku bdul Pahman, when proclaiming the independence of
the Federation of Malaya (in English) used only the Malay term,
Persekutuan Tanah Melai, as Malaya was officially known as such.
For the Proclamation of Independence, see for instance Aliran
(1987:300-302).
14.The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, which was
set up to draft the Malayan Constitution, envisaged the
difficulty in forging a common nationality upon which a unified
Malayan nation was to be established for as long as there existed
what it perceived as the conflictual provision of 'safeguarding
the special position of the Malays arid the legitimate interests
of the other communities' (Quoted in Patnam 1967:107). The
Commission nevertheless felt that, in view of the
socio-economically disadvantaged position of the Malays vis-a-vis
that of the non-Malays at the time, the special privileges that
were to be accorded to the Malays were necessary. It did stress,
however, that such privileges should not be permanent as they
were only relevant in the context of social inequality. This is
why the Commission also recommended that 'it would be more
desirable "in the interests of the country as a whole as well as
the Malays themselves" for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to cause the
matter (of special Malay rights) to be reviewed from time to
time' (ibid.:111).
15. A discussion of educational developments in Malaya will be
dealt with later in greater detail.
16. The case of this inter-ethnic violence will be discussed in
detail later.
17. For a discussion of the state of individual freedom and human
rights in Malaysia, see Azmi Ithalid in Scoble and Wiseberg (eds)
(1985:84-92).
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18.The DAP, while denying that the questioning of Malay special
rights or the status of the national language or citizenship
provisions had caused the ethnic riots, did contest the wisdom of
having the 1957 'political bargain' binding on a different
generation: 'The 1970 generation of Malaysians of all races is
vastly different from the old 1957 generation. They constitute a
majority. Their wants, their hopes, are also different; and the
world they live in at home and abroad is no longer the same. No
generation has the right to dictate to the future generation as
yet unborn or not ready to vote what precisely their political
destiny must be. (Goh Hock Guan, a DAP Member of Parliament,
quoted in Milne and Mauzy 1980:82)'
19.This allegation was contained in the famous and controversial
Mahathir Mohamad letter (on June 17th 1969) to Tunku Abdul
Rahman. It was highly critical of the latter's leadership and the
MCA's continued presence in the latter's Cabinet. This episode
led to the expulsion of Mahathir by the Tunku from the UMNO
Supreme Council (Mime and Mauzy 1980:87).
20. Article 152 refers to the inclusion of 'official purposes' to
the use of the national language; Article 153 refers to the
educational facilities accorded to the Malays and also the fact
that this additional provision is being extended to the natives
of the two Borneo states; and Article 181 relates to the position
of the Ma lay rulers.
21. The government asserts that the Barisan Nasiona 1 'is an
alliance of political parties founded on the premise that open
intemperate debate and party politics based on sectional
interests could divert the energies of Malaysians from the tasks
of nation-building. The development of the Barisan lent itself to
the resolution of sensitive national issues within the structure
of political consensus... In its short history, the Barisan has
demonstrated its capacity for muting divisiveness within society'
(Malaysia 1976:99). Such an emphasis on socio-economic
development of the country reminds one of Göran Therborn's
argument that, 'a variant of co-optation through growth - one
which worked very well in Brazil for some years at least - is
the ideology and practice of developmentalism within the stronger
capitalist states of the Third World' (1980:229).
22. C.B. Tan (1987b:109) asserts that UMNO elections are no less
significant than 'the national election because of UMNO's
dominance in the National Front'. He adds, 'UMNO resolutions are
likely to be implemented by the UMNO-led government.'
23. At least two-thirds majority is required before any part of
the Malaysian Constitution can be amended. For a discussion of
the powers of constitutional amendment, see Azmi Khalid in Scoble
and Wiseberg (eds) (1985:86-7). Examples of some of the crucial
and controversial amendments to the Constitution are the
Constitutional ( Amendment) Act of 1971 (Act A30 of 1971) which,
with the aim of curbing public discussion on certain 'sensitive'
issues and to remedy ethnic imbalance in certain sectors in the
economy, imposed, among other things, restrictions on the
constitutional freedom of speech and expression, and curbed
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parliamentary privilege of members of the Federal and State
legislatures; and secondly, the Constitution (Amendment Act) of
1981 (Act A514 of 1981) that gave unfettered power to the
Executive to declare an emergency at will and to perpetuate
emergency rule. On the relative ease with which the ruling party
has amended the Constitution, Lee Lam Thye, Director of the
Political Bureau of the DAP, commented: 'It cannot be denied that
the Malaysian Constitution has earned for itself the distinction
of being the most amended Constitution in the World... it is not
an exaggeration to say that the history of the constitutional
Amendments in Malaysia is the history of a progressive erosion of
Democracy in our country. (Quoted in Higgott and Robison (eds)
1985:115)'
24. Faced with growing ethnic polarization in the country,
individuals like former Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman and certain
groups have called on the authorities to look into the
possibility of incorporating the Rukunegara into the Malaysian
Constitution as a way of combating this problem (Al iran
1987:312). To date, the government has not responded to this
idea.
25. The notion of development of the post-Independence elite,
including prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, has been very much
informed by Western liberalism and capitalism. For a lengthy
discussion of Malay soclo-economic development, see Shaharuddin
Maaruf (1988).
26. For discussions of governmental neglect of the welfare of the
Chinese community, see L.L. Lim in MCA (1988:37-55); S.G. Tan in
DAP (1986:146-148); and also K.Y. Sim in DAP (1986:164-177).
27. For diverse views on this controversial Policy by
representatives of various religious traditions arid ethnic
minorities in Malaysia, see for instance Kua (ed) (1987).
28. Zainah Anwar (1987:10) holds, 'Nowhere is this (Islamic
resurgence) more pervasive arid effective than in the universities
and the institutions of higher learning in Malaysia'. This is
because university students as well as young graduates were the
prime actors in this religious movement.
29.For an account of anxieties expressed by non-Nalays regarding
the Islamization policy, see Mauzy and Milne in Gale (ed)
(1986:99); and also see Rev. Dr. Paul Tan (in DAP 1986:98-120)
for a discussion of erosion of non-Muslims' rights in the wake of
the Islamization process in Malaysia.
30. For a discussion of the relationship between Islam and Malay
ethnic identity, see Mauzy and Mime (in Gale (ed) 1986:87-88);
Muzaffar (1987:23-26); and Nagata (in Gale (ed) 1986:125).
Shamsul (in Gale (ed) 1986:137-138) however criticises Nagata for
failing to see how her overemphasis of the ethnic and religious
factors could 'obscure' and conceal the class contradiction
within the Malay community.
31. A.D. Smith (1988:26-28) argues that an ethnic community, in
order to sharpen its sense of exclusivity or togetherness, needs,
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among other things, 'a distinctive shared culture' and, he adds,
'the most common shared arid distinctive traits are those of
language and religion'.
32. See for instance Aliran's mimeographed statement on 2nd
November 1987 on this mass detention.
33. P.R. Heng (1988:275) asserts, 'The closure of the Star,
despite its sponsorship by Tunku Abdul Pabman and its status as a
respected journal and unofficial organ of the MCA, sent a clear
message that the government intends to brook no public expression
of opinion that is at variance from official policies.'
34. Saravanamuttu (1987:68) contends that 'this turn of events in
Malaysian politics may be appreciated as further evidence of the
state employing its coercive power to check popular dissent' in
the context of public interest groups having assumed in the past
few years an 'increasingly strident and effective role' of
enlarging to a certain bxtent democratic space in Malaysian
public life.
35. A comment made by the International Commission of Jurists is
cited in Aliran Monthly (Vol.8/i 1986:7).
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CHAPTER IV
THE STATE AND EDUCATION
4.1 The State and Education: Theoretical considerations
In most countries, the position and power of the State is
pronounced and dominant, particularly in post-colonial societies which
inherit a colonial legacy of an 'overdeveloped apparatus of state and
its institutionalized practice through which the operations of the
indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled'	 (Alavi
1972:61). The State has a huge apparatus at its disposal after
attaining political independence from colonial rule, an apparatus that
can be utilised effectively particularly if and when it adopts an
interventionist role in the economy in the desire to achieve certain
professed long-term objectives, such as economic growth, social
change, political stability, and national integration, or short-run
goals like maintenance of power. Alavi (ibid.) asserts that the State
in the post-colonial society is not 'the instrument of a single
class', but rather a representative of the competing interests of the
three propertied classes, i.e. 'the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the
indigenous bourgeoisie arid the landed classes'. The State is also
perceived by Poulantzas (quoted in Dunleavy and O'Leary 1988:243-244)
as having a relative autonomy, a notion that helps to explain why in
its attempt to gain a broad degree of support for its policy, the
State tries to accommodate as far as possible demands from major
social groups in society. To do so, the ruling elites will have to
give the impression that they are acting independently of the dominant
class fraction insofar as this doesn't affect greatly the long-term
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interests of capital (ibid.). It is in this context of accommodation
that the notion of 'space' for some kind of social change can be
situated. Seen in this light, the role of the State could be construed
as one of measured benevolence, concerned with the promotion and
protection of 'national interest' (Gibbs in King 1986:203).
Antonio Gramsci provided a useful notion of 'hegemony' to help us
to try to understand the various factors that are involved in the
context of ideological transmission. He believed that instead of
primarily using physical force the ruling classes utilise a form of
ideological hegemony to reproduce their power in society. This
hegemony is basically established through the use of consent, and
mediated through such cultural institutions as family, schools,
churches, mass media, etc. Unlike Althusser, Gramsci did not identify
what the ideological apparatuses are and what the basically repressive
ones are. Each apparatus, he maintained, has both aspects of coercion
and consent. What is 'liberating' about his theory of hegemony is that
it provides a notion of consent having to be fought for in the 'civil
society' (Forgacs (ed) (1988:420). In other words, he was able to
identify the potential in a human agency to resist and fight against
an ideological domination in the midst of social contradictions of a
capitalist system. This notion therefore breaks away from the
structural reductionism of Marxist theorists such as Aithusser, and
opens up an avenue for some kind of ideological resistance.
That there is space for ideological resistance by the subordinate
groups in society within the education system provokes education
theorists like Giroux to argue that, 'Knowledge ... becomes an object
of analysis in a two-fold sense. On the one hand, it is examined for
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its social function, the way in which it legitimates the existing
society. At the same time it could also be examined to reveal in its
arrangement, words, structure, and style those unintentional truths
that might contain "fleeting images" of a different society, more
radical practices, and new forms of understanding. (1983:36)1
4.2 The Malaysian State, Economic Imperatives and Social Change
Like many nation-states that had just achieved independence from
the colonial masters, Malaya was poised to adopt an economic programme
that was primarily aimed at daveloping the economy in general and
raising the living standards of its people in particular. 1 Apart from
relying on its traditional exports of primary commodities of rubber,
tin, palm oil, etc. so as to sustain its programme of economic
development, the Malayan government also embarked, after being
strongly recommended by a World Bank mission (Sundaram 1988: 220-221),
on an economic diversification programme that included an
import-subetitution form of izilustrialisation. To realise this
economic plan, the government was to provide infrastnictural and
industrial estate facilities, and encourage local industrial capital,
attract foreign capital, etc (ibid:221). This effectively paved the
way for further penetration of foreign capital into the economy and
since then has locked the country into the structure of international
capitalism. 2
 This import-subetitution scheme was later replaced by an
export-oriented industrialisation strategy in the late 1960s after the
former failed to achieve its underlying objective of inducing a
greater flow of foreign investments (ibid. :222), of which the latter
was envisaged to do better.
The pace of socio-economic progress and modernization was
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quickened particularly after Malaysia was jolted by its bitter
experience of the 1969 ethnic riots, the primary cause of which was
attributed to the economic backwardness of the Malays and economic
disparity between the Malays and non-Malays. Hence, the intense
pressure to modernize the Ma lays as a group so as to help them
participate effectively in the modern sector of the economy, side by
side with the non-Malays. To do this, the government felt the need to
expand the economy by playing a major and interventionist role in the
country's economic life as well as encouraging the private sector's
participation (Malaysia 1971a:7) so as to accommodate the government's
strategy of eradicating poverty and more importantly, at least in the
eyes of the government, restructuring the society (i.e. to enable more
Bumiputeras to go into business arid industry) under the New Economic
Policy (NEP). The country has since witnessed a rapid rate of economic
development and industrialisation, 3 particularly under the Mahathir
administration which introduced policies such as the Look East policy
(to emulate the 'hard work' ethic and the aggressive modernization of
the Japanese and Koreans); Privatisation policy (the transfer of
certain government-owned enterprises to the private sector to increase
profitability and efficiency so as to generate more economic
development) ; 'Malaysia Incorporated' policy (to encourage better
cooperation between the public and private sectors particularly as the
latter is seen as the vital 'engine' of national development); and
Heavy Industries policy (to 'foster linkages and the expansion of the
industrial base' (Malaysia 1986:335]). These are policies
essentially formulated with the aim of helping Malaysia procure the
coveted status of a Newly Industrial icing Country (Saravananiuttu
1987:59). Given the heavy emphasis on the modern sector of the economy
by the State, especially in its primary objective of ensuring more
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Bumiputera participation in this sector, their education arid manpower
needs therefore constitute the government's primary concern.
4.3 Formal education in Malaysia
4.3.1 Educational development, 1950 - 1969
A survey of the past education committees commissioned by the
colonial government in Malaya to study and recommend ways to improve
conditions of the country's education system suggests that, unlike the
period before 1950, the British began to appreciate the importance of
providing formal education to the local people in a more systematic
manner and to recognize the significance of designing curriculum that
would pave the way for the fostering of national integration and a
national consciousness, the significance of which captured the
imagination of the local people in the wake of the Japanese Occupation
of Malaya during the Second World War. It also highlights contentious
problems the colonial government had to face that were primarily
associated with a multiethnic society like Malaya. In the period
before the Second World War, the British were more inclined to educate
a minority of the population, in particular those in the urban areas,
to be trained as elites and clerks who could then serve government
bureaucracy and colonial business enterprises. 6
 And since most of the
people in the urban areas and whose children who went to schools were
largely non-Malays, the colonial education system reinforced ethnic as
well as class differences in the Malayan society.
a. The Barnes Committee
To start with, the Barnes Committee, led by the director of
Social Thaining at Oxford University, L.J. Barnes, was set up in 1950
by the colonial government to look into problems faced by Malay
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vernacular schools and to make recommenìdations to the government so as
to improve the situation in these schools. In general, the committee
pointed out the poor conditions, physical and academic, that had been
confronting the Malay schools. It however did argue that improvements
to the Malay schools couldn't be made until and unless the entire
education system of the country was taken into consideration. Thus,
the committee's terms of reference were eventually broadened to
include matters pertaining to Chinese and Tamil schools. The major
recommendation made by the committee was that the government should
undertake a major task of gradually transforming all existing schools
(including vernacular Chinese and Tami 1 ones) into 'national schools'
where children of all ethnic groups would be taught together through
the media of English and Malay languages, a proposal that primarily
stemmed from the desire to foster good ethnic relations and national
integration among the schoolchildren. As a measure towards improving
the position of Malay language, the committee also called for the
setting up of a Department of Malay Studies in the University of
Malaya (A.H. Sal leh (ed) 1980 :48). The committee also stated that
parents who were against this proposal (of transforming all schools
into national schools) would be regarded as disloyal to the country,
for its underlying concern was, it said, nation-building (Cited in
F.H.K.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:36). Such formulation, as expected,
did not go down well in the Chinese community especially at a time
when Malaya was under the Emergency and when Chinese loyalty to the
Federation was already suspect (Gayl D. Ness 1967:77). Furthermore, as
G.D. Ness emphasised, 'Such an equation might easily be accepted by a
community that had never held formal education in high value, or by
one that had not itself built an extensive educational institution.
This could not be said of the Chinese, however. (ibid.)'
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b. The Fenn-Wu mission
The Chinese dissatisfaction with the Barnes report prompted the
British High Commissioner. Sir Henry Gurney, to invite in January 1951
a two-man team of educationists, comprising Dr W.P. Fern (of the
United States) and Dr Wu Teh-Yao (of the United Nations), to survey
and examine the situation of Chinese education in Malaya. The findings
of the Fenn-Wu mission, as it was later known, differed from those of
the Barnes Committee for the former were basically sympathetic towards
Chinese education. The mission tated that:
It is not possible artificially to create one culture out of
several, certainly not quickly. Because of the psychological
and emotional attachments of the racial group, any attempt
at the moment to force unwilling fusion will certainly lead
to further cleavage which neither Malaya nor the world can
afford. What can be hoped for is a peaceful and co-operative
relationship among diverse elements, in which community of
interests rather than differences are naturally stressed.
There can be no justification for turning Malaya into a
cockpit for aggressive cultures. By virtue of its composite
population it should be a land where the developing culture
draws its validity from acceptance of the high values of
other cultures. The people of Malaya will have to learn to
understand and appreciate their cultural differences. They
should be proud of their spirit of mutual tolerance. We have
dealt at length with this question of culture because of
what seems to us the too casual and unconsidered use of the
term 'Malayanisation'. For one thing, to most Chinese in
Malaya, 'Malayanisation' is anathema. In view of the absence
of a culture, or even a society, which can as yet be called
Malayan, it is interpreted as meaning to make Malay rather
than Malayan (Cited in F.H.K.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:37).
As can be seen from the above statement, the Fenn-Wu mission was
not in favour of imposed creation of one culture out of the many
cultures available in the country, especially if the outcome of this
project, as it suspected it would, would be essentially Malay rather
than Malayan. It is therefore not surprising for the mission to
propose that Chinese schools be maintained until the Chinese community
felt that they weren't needed anymore. Regarding the lack of Malayan
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outlook in the Chinese textbooks and of Malayan consciousness in the
Chinese schools as a whole, the mission attributed this in part to the
government's lack of attention and financial assistance to these
schools. The mission later proposed several measures to improve the
situation in the Chinese schools, one of which being more financial
assistance from the government.
c. The Central Advisory Committee on Education
The committee was set up specifically to examine the conflicting
views of the Barnes and Fenn-Wü reports. The committee supported the
Barnes proposal of helping forge a united Malayan society while at the
same time making some concessions to the Chinese demands as found in
the Fenn-Wu report. The committee also agreed that all pupils were
required to learn Malay and English, apart from requiring that all
Chinese and Indian7
 schoolchildren be taught Mandarin and Tarnil
respectively. The medium of instruction should be either Malay or
English.
d. A Special Committee
This committee, set up in 1952 by the government, was made up of
11 members of the Federal Legislative Council and chaired by the
Attorney-General. Its primary objective was to study further the
recommendations of the Barnes, Fenn-Wu and the Central Advisory
Committee on Education reports, and later to make recommendations for
suitable legislation covering all aspects of education in the country.
A bill, which was principally based on the Barnes report and the
Central Advisory Committee on Education's recommendations, was tabled
and passed by the Federal Legislative Council as the Education
Ordinance of 1952. The Ordinance made a slight change to the notion of
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a single bilingual national school to two types of national schools,
with English as the medium of instruction for one and Malay for the
other. In addition, facilities would be provided for the teaching of
Mandarin and Tamil if reested by parents/guardians of no less than
15 pupi is in any one school. Engl ish would be made compulsory as a
subject in Malay-medium schools while Malay would be given similar
status in English-medium schools (F.H.F(.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:38).
The principal contents of the Ordinance reflected an attempt at
compromise of sorts, leaving the major problem of giving more
financial aid to schools still iinresolved.
The objectives stipulated in the Ordinance were met with some
problems. For one, there were not enough Malay and English teachers to
teach in the vernacular schools, coupled by teacher shortage in Malay-
and English-media schools themselves. Further, financial constraints
experienced by the colonial government made implementation of the
objectives rather difficult. But more importantly, thinese and Indian
communities - while they did not mind English and Malay being made
compulsory subjects in their vernacular schools - voiced strong
objection to making these two languages the media of instruction in
these schools (ibid.). This suggests that their opposition was
underpinned by the fear that such a move would threaten the survival
of their own languages and cultures.
Another Special Committee was appointed by the High Commissioner
in 1953 to find ways and means to implement the education policy as
outlined in the Education Ordinance of 1952. In light of the financial
constraints faced by the government at that time, 8 the committee
confined itself to four main objectives: (a) Gradual introduction of
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Malay and English into Malay vernacular schools; (b) Gradual
introduction of trilingualism (i.e. Mandarin or Tamil and Malay and
English) into Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools; (C) Limitation of
students' enrolment in Erigi ish schools; and (d) Deve lopinent of
vocational secondary schools. The government was given a temporary
reprieve as it was not required to set up immediately 'national
schools'. Despite such cost-cutting strategy, the government still
faced financial constraints. This arxi the government 's preoccupation
with the process leading to political independence, led to a failure
to implement the objectives stiulated in the Education Ordinance.
The Alliance government which took over from the British also
shared their predecessors' concern with the general standard of
education in the country and, more importantly, making education as an
effective instrument of national integration and socio-economic
development. As a result, a number of committees were set up to
examine various educational problems and subeequently to suggest
solutions. Some of the recommendations made by these committees were
then implemented.
a. The Razak Committee
The Alliance party, which came to power in 1955 after the first
general election, laid emphasis on education as one of the most
important areas of concern it would tackle before Malaya's
independence. And as a gesture of keeping to its election promise, the
quasi-independent government pledged to provide a more equitable
system of education, stressing equal grants to all government-aided
schools. The government appointed a committee consisting of
representatives from the three major ethnic groups, chaired by the
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Education Minister, Dato Jthdul Razak Hussein. The committee's tasks
were to review the existing education policy of Malaya arid to
recommend any necessary changes 'with a view of establishing a
national system of education acceptable to the people of the
Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their
cultural, social, economic and political development as a nation,
having regard to the intention to make Malay the national language of
the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the
language and culture of other communities living in the country.
(Report of the Education Committee [also known as the Razak Report],
1956, p.1, cited in F.H.K.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:55)' The Razak
Report was published in April 1956, arid was later used by the
government as a basis for its National Education Policy. The report 's
proposals and recommendations were then employed in drafting a new
bill on education. The bill was passed and later enacted in April 1957
as the Education Ordinance of 1957.
The Education Ordinance implies that the government had abandoned
its earlier aim of establishing 'national schools', and instead helped
subsume all the four separate 'streams' of primary education, which is
made freely available by the government - English, Malay, Chinese
(Mandarin) and Tamil - under a common national education system.
Under this Ordinance, two types of primary schools were established:
(a) Standard Primary Schools used the national language as medium of
instruction, while English was made a compulsory subject. Also
provided were facilities for teaching Mandarin and Tamil if requested
by parents/guardians of at least 15 children in the school; (b)
Standard-Type Primary Schools used Mandarin, Tamil or English as
medium of instruction, while Malay and English were made compulsory
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subjects. The teaching of Mandarin or Tamil would be provided in
Standard-Type Primary (English) Schools should there be request from
parents/guardians of at least 15 schoolchildren in any one school. As
mentioned above, central to the concern of the Razak committee were
political unity, ethnic harmony and national development, and this
largely characterized the Ordinance, whereby a common syllabus, to
create a national consciousness, was introduced and Malay (as national
language) was made a compulsory subject in all schools.
Secondary education was -'. however conducted only in Malay and
English. Other languages were taught as subjects arid not as media of
instruction. Schools were either completely aided government schools,
or completely unaided private schools as in the case of secondary
Chinese schools. Although private, 'The independent secondary schools
must adhere to the curricula and language teaching of the government
schools, but they may use whatever language they choose as the medium
of instruction. (G.D. Ness 1967:79)' It is noteworthy, though, that
the Razak Committee had not used the term 'sole' but instead 'main'
when referring to the medium of instruction to be used in the national
education system, given the multicultural and multilingual nature of
Malaysian society. Thus the Razak Report (1956) declared:
We believe further that the ultimate objective of the
educational policy in this country must be to bring together
the children of all races under the national educational
system in which the national language is the main medium of
instruction, though we recognise that progress towards this
goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual. (Cited in
Malaysia 1985:4.)
The Razak Committee's recommendations in essence brought together
the various vernacular schools under a common national education
system, with the underlying objectives of attaining national unity and
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socio-economic development as well as to help forge a national
consciousness. The report was, on balance, moderate in tone as it did
not seek to replace Mandarin, the medium of instruction in Chinese
secondary schools, with Malay because it considered education content
as being more important in forging a sense of nationhood:
One of the fundamental requirements of educational policy in
the Federation of Malaya is to orientate all schools,
primary and secondary, to a Malayan outlook. We consider
that the way to do this is to ensure a common content in the
syllabuses of all schools. (Razak Report, Para 115, cited in
Malaysia [1985:4].)
By being content with making Malay as a compulsory subject in all
schools and not the medium of instruction, the committee managed to
avoid the most thorny and emotional issue of education, language and
culture of the non-Malays. For others, however, the Razak Report
presented itself less as a compromise between the divergent needs of
the Malays and non-Malays than as a set of recommendations that came
close to those of the Barnes Report, particularly the provision for
making Malay a medium of instruction under the common national
education system (S. C .Tham 1983:109). Nevertheless, the Razak
Committee stipulated that its recommendations should be reviewed not
later than 1959.
b. The (Rabman Talib) Review Committee
After winning the 1959 general election, the Alliance government
appointed a committee headed by Education Minister Abdul Rabman Talib
to review recommendations of the Razak Committee. It concluded that
the policy had been faithfully implemented, given the financial
constraints at that time, particularly in three fundamental areas: (i)
introduction of a common Malayan syllabus in all schools; (ii) the
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setting up of teacher training centres that would help in the
educational expansion; and (iii) the provision of primary education
for every child to choose his/her medium of instruction (Rabman Talib
Report, 1960, cited in F.F1.K.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:57). The Pahman
Talib Committee made several recommendations, one of which was
universal free primary education to all children irrespective of
choice of (medium) schools. No change, however, was proposed to the
medium of instruction in primary schools because 'It was believed that
to provide children with six years of elementary education in the
language of the parents would serve to provide a firm basic grounding
for children both linguistically and culturally. (S.C.Thain 1983:112)'
This was also one way of placating the fears and anxieties of many
non-Malays regarding the future of their languages and cultures.
Besides, this recommendation was seen to be in tune with the
underlying objective of providing primary education in one's own
mother tongue only to be followed by a gradual progression towards
Malay as a medium of instruction in the secondary school. This was
felt to be the rational step towards the goal of forging national
unity.
Since national unity is central to the formulation of the
national education policy arid national language is perceived as an
appropriate and effective instrument for this purpose, it was
suggested that the present Standard and Standard-Type primary schools
be re-designated as National and National-Type primary schools so as
to promote the 'national' character of these schools as well as the
national language. In addition, these schools would be supplied with
qualified teachers, particularly those trained to teach the national
language.
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The committee also suggested that all secondary schools would
eventually have as their medium of instruction either Malay or English
and subsequently that public examinations would be held in either of
these two languages. It thus observed:
For the sake of national unity, the objective must be to
eliminate communal secondary schools from the national
system of assisted schools and to ensure that pupils of all
races shall attend both National and National-Type Secondary
Schools. An essential requirement of this policy is that
public examinations at secondary level should be conducted
only in the country's official languages. (Report of the
Education Review Committee, 1960 (also known as the Pahman
Talib Report] cited in F.H.K.Wong and P.M.P.Chang 1975:59).
It should be said here that Malay teachers (the majority of whom were
UMNO members) and nationalists exerted great pressure on the
government to pursue a more aggressive line in accelerating the use of
Malay as the medium of instruction in the national education system.
In fact, they did not try to pretend that their ultimate desire was to
make Malay the sole medium of instruction (S. C.Tham 1983:114).
There were several implications from this recommendation. One,
those students who had had their primary education in Mandarin and
Tamil were now compelled to 'fit' themselves into this 'national'
mould, i.e. to go into the national secondary schools, as officially
recognised certificates at the end of their secondary education would
stand a better chance of helping them secure further educational
qualifications, employment and social mobility. Two, secondary schools
whose medium of instruction was not in one of the official languages
were not eligible for government financial aid. Three, this move also
meant a curb on the growth of secondary vernacular schools, although
allowance was provided for private, independent secondary vernacular
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schools (i.e. for as long as they follow the national curricula). As a
measure to appease the Chinese and Indians who were concerned about
their linguistic and cultural sustenance, the committee proposed that
pupils ' own language (POL) be taught in secondary schools under the
national education system if parents/guardians of at least 15 pupils
asked for it.
The major recommendations of the Rahnian Talib Committee were
incorporated later in the Education Act of 1961, the gist of which was
encapsulated in its preamble:
Whereas the educational policy of the Federation, originally
declared in the Education Ordinance, 1957, is to establish a
national system of education which will satisfy the needs of
the nation and promote its cultural, social, economic and
political development:
And whereas it is considered desirable that regard shall be
had, so far as is compatible with that policy, with the
provision of efficient instruction and with the avoidance of
unreasonable public expenditure, to the general principle
that pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes
of their parents:
And whereas further provision is required for securing the
effective execution of the said policy, including in
particular provision for the progressive development of an
educational system in which the national language is the
main medium of instruction. (Malaysia 1987:1.)
So far, since the Barnes Report, we have seen how the government
had been subjected to the push and pull of the conflicting demands
coming from the various ethnic communities in the country. At the same
time, the government was also conscious of its urgent role of trying
to use education and the national language as instruments of national
unity and socio—economic advancement. It was however the tragic events
in 1969 that compelled the government to succumb to the growing demand
for the progressive and systematic use of the national language, a
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language that was claimed, at least in the official circles, as one of
unity and also of socio-economic upliftment 9
 at all official levels.
c. Measures taken to implement the National Education Policy
In order to meet the needs and demands that come with the
implementation of the education policy, the government has provided
facilities and set up institutions to promote the status of the
national language. For a start, more Malay secondary schools were
built to cater to increasing demands. Secondly, a system of 'remove
class' was introduced to help pupils from National-Type primary
schools familiarise themselves with the national language for a period
of one year. Thirdly, the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and
Literary Agency) was set up in 1956 whose primary functions were to
promote the development of the national language; to translate works
into Malay language; to standardise pronunciation; and to publish
textbooks in the national language for schools, colleges and
universities, and general books for the general public. Also in the
same year, the Maktab Perguruan Bahasa (Language Institute) was
established to provide training facilities for specialist teachers of
national language.
The 1969 ethnic riots provided the underlying rationale for the
government to put into effect recommendations of the earlier education
reports, in particular, making a conscious effort of using the
national language as the medium of instruction in schools and
institutions of higher learning, thus dispelling any ambiguity that
may have been associated with the earlier education reports' method of
carrying out the national language policy in the national education
system. In July 1969, taking a tougher line, the then Education
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Minister Datuk Patinggi lthdul Rahman Yakub declared, 'English would be
replaced by Malay one year at a time, from primary school to
university' (Mime and Mauzy 1980:371). The government launched, for
example, an extensive programme of training and re-training teachers
to give flesh to this commitment. In addition, 1970 saw the
establishment of the first local university that makes full use of the
national language as its medium of instruction, the National
University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia). Malay was later
introduced gradually as the medium of instruction in other local
universities.
4.3.2 Post-1970 Education and Social Engineering
In the wake of the 1969 ethnic riots, the government felt that,
as already intimated, the promotion of national integration and unity
must be the overriding objective of the education system. This was to
be attained through the increased use of Bahasa Malaysia as the medium
of instruction, the moulding of national consciousness and of
spiritual values. 10 In addition, the education authorities were to
develop and orientate the education system and training programmes
towards greater emphasis on science and technology so as to meet the
country' s manpower needs. 11 It is within this context and particularly
under the HElP strategy (i.e. the restructuring of society) that
emphasis was given towards educating and training more Bumiputera
students at all levels of education so as to satisfy the country's
manpower needs in such a way that ethnic imbalances in education and
economic fields are redressed (Malaysia 1971b).
With such a commitment, it is to be expected that money spent on
education and training by successive Malaysian governments since 1969
87
has increased tremendously over the years. In contrast to the actual
expenditure on education and training during the First Malaysia Plan
period (1966-1970), which was M$329.4 million (Malaysia 1971a:231),
the actual expenditure under the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) was
M$697.59 million (Malaysia 1981b:358), and the budget allocation under
the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) was M$5, 566.06 mill ion (ibid.).
Such a large sum of money has enabled the State to provide more
educational facilities and opportunities to especially the Bumiputeras
as a whole within an expanded public education structure, particularly
in areas of study 'where the numbers of Malays are disproportionately
small' (Malaysia 1971b:6).
The Malaysian education system
(i) Primary and Secondary education
The formal education structure in Malaysia has four levels: the
primary (six years), the lower secondary (three years), the upper
secondary (two years), and the pre-university (i . e. Sixth Form; two
years).
Schools at the primary level are divided into three types:
National schools (originally Malay-medium), National Primary schools
(formerly English-medium), and National-type Primary schools (with
Mandarin or Tainil as medium of instruction). All National and National
Primary schools, which are fully funded by the government, use Bahasa
Malaysia as their medium of instruction. On the other hand, the
National-type Primary schools (Chinese and Tamil), are partially aided
by the State. The duration of study at this level is six years.
On completion of their primary education, students are	 -
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automatically promoted to the lower secondary level for three years
(Form I to Form III). Here a comprehensive type of education is
provided. Apart from the academic subjects taught, elective subjects
of a pre-vocational nature like Home Science, Industrial Arts,
Agricultural Science and Commerce are offered. The students are to
choose any one of them. There are also the residential science
secondary schools and the MP1RA Junior Science Colleges which
essentially cater to Bumiputeras in the government' s desire to
increase the number of Buiniputera students in the science stream.
At the end of Form III, students sit for the Lower Certificate of
Education, the result of which determine who will be promoted to Form
IV at the upper secondary level. Here the students are channel led into
two types of schools, both of which use the national language as their
medium of instruct ion: (a) Academic and (b) Vocational or Technical.
Those in the academic schools prepare themselves for the Malaysian
Certificate of Education which, depending on the results, will then
enable them to be promoted to the pre-university level. At the end of
their two years here, students can seek further education in local or
overseas universities. On the other hand, those in the vocational
schools could be considered, after their final examination, for
further training in professional fields in tertiary institutions such
as the Ungku Qnar Polytechnic and the Kuantan Polytechnic. Those in
the technical schools, upon completion of studies, can also seek
further education in colleges and universities. Thus, as shown by
Table 4.1 below, the pattern of enrolments in schools by ethnicity in
Peninsular Malaysia changed considerably. For the Bumiputera students,
their enrolmerits increased substantially at the upper secondary and
post-secondary levels. The enrolment rate of the non-Malay students
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between 1970 and 1975 in general increased in actual numbers, although
it decreased in terms of ethnic proportions.
Table 4.1
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA: ENROLMENTS BY RACE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION 1970-1975
1970	 1975
Malay	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total	 Malay	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total
	
Primary	 759,064	 511,729	 142,147	 8,529	 1,421,469 875,975 550,064 	 151,744	 9,126	 1,586,909
	
53.4	 36.0	 10.0	 0.6	 100.0	 55.2	 34.7	 9.6	 0.5	 100.0
Lower
	
Secondary 193,054
	 146,872	 36,339	 2,270	 378,535 305,700 198,493 	 54,290 2,988	 561,471
	
51.0	 38.8	 9.6	 0.6	 100.0	 54.4	 35.4	 9.7	 0.5	 100.0
Upper
	
Secondary 43,627
	 38,800	 6,258	 715	 89,400 101,486 54,095 	 10,420 1,108	 167,109
	
48.8	 43.4	 7.0	 0.8	 100.0	 60.7	 32.4	 6.2	 0.7	 100.0
Post
	
Secondary	 4,609	 5,267	 637	 106	 10,619	 8,817	 6,617	 804	 97	 16,335
43.4	 49.6	 6.0	 1.0	 100.0	 54.0	 40.5	 4.9	 0.6	 100.0
	
-	 Source: Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980); Table 22.6, p,400.
(ii) Tertiary education
Further education at the tertiary level, academic and
professional,	 is primarily provided by polytechnics, colleges,
institutes and universities.
There are only two polytechnics in the country, the Ungku Omar
Polytechnic and the }Cuantan Polytechnic, which cater to the needs of
especially those who are educated in vocational schools. These
polytechnics provide skilled manpower at semi-professional level in
technical and commercial areas.
As for the colleges, the MARA Institute of Technology (MIT)
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started as a training centre, established by the Rural Industrial
Development Authority (RIDA) in 1956, to train Malays in commerce. In
1965, RIDA became Majlis Amanah Pakyat (MARA, Council of Trust for the
People) and the centre became MARA College. In 1967, the college was
renamed MARA Institute of Technology. Its main objective is to train
Bumiputeras in the field of commerce, industry and other
semi-professional areas. The Tunku Abdul Pahman College (TARC), on the
other hand, was set up in 1969 mainly to meet the educational needs
and demands of the Chinese community. The college, which uses Eahasa
Malaysia and English as its media of instruction, provides
pre-university education as well as professional and semi-professional
courses.
With regard to university education, all of the local
universities by now use Bahasa Malaysia as their medium of instruction
for most of the courses offered. These universities, which are wholly
State-funded, are Universiti Malaya (UM, established in 1959),
Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM, Science University of Malaysia, 1969),
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM, National University of Malaysia.
1970), Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM, Agriculture University of
Malaysia, 1971), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM, Technology
University of Malaysia, 1972), and Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM,
Northern University of Malaysia, 1984). Thus, within a span of 14
years since 1969 four local universities had been set up. There is
also the International Islamic University (IIU) which caters for
overseas as well as local students.
The increase in the number of local universities meant that the
number of student enrolment, particularly from the &imiputera
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Table 4.2
MALAYSIA: ENROLMENT IN TERTIARY EDUCATION BY RACE, 1970', 1980 AND 1985
1970	 1980
Buij-	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total	 BuLl-	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total
putera	 putera
Degree
courses
	
TARC 2 --	 -	 --
	
MIT3 --	 -	 --
UN	 2,843	 3,622	 525
USM4
	67	 126	 33
UKM	 174	 4	 1
	
UPM --	 -	 --
	
UTN --	 -	 --
Institutions
overseas	 --	 --	 --
	
Total 3,084	 3,752	 559
()	 40.2	 48.9	 7.3
Tunku Abdul Rahiian College (TARC)
MIT
UN
USM
UKM
UPM
UTM
IIU
UUM
Institutions overseas
Total
	
--	
--	 6	 1,687	 59	 --	 1,752
	
--	
--	 725	 --	 --	 --	 725
	
277	 7,267	 4,063	 3,124	 677	 181	 8,045
	
5	 231	 1,612	 1,073	 195	 17	 2,897
	
179	 4,896	 628	 189	 13	 5,726
	
--	
--	 1,431	 221	 88	 12	 1,752
	
--	
--	 877	 115	 44	 11	 1,047
--	
--	 5,194	 11,533	 2,676	 107	 19,510
282	 7,677	 18,804	 18,381	 3,928	 341	 41,454
3.6	 100.0	 45.4	 44.3	 9.5	 0.8	 100.0
1985
Bumiputera	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total
	
3	 2,099	 42	 2	 2,146
	
1,560	 --	 --	 --	 1,560
	
5,041	 3,374	 841	 126	 9,382
	
3,996	 2,509	 657	 45	 7,207
	
6,454	 1,914	 468	 64	 8,900
	
3,652	 603	 253	 17	 4,525
	
2,284	 567	 154	 26	 3,031
	
363	 14	 14	 --	 391
	
488	 161	 44	 3	 696
	
6,034	 13,406	 3,108	 136	 22,684
	
29,875	 24,647	 5,581	 419	 60,522
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Bumiputera	 Chinese	 Indian	 Others	 Total
(%)	 49.4	 40.7	 9.2	 0.7	 100.0
Notes: 1. The breakdown of enrolment of Malaysian students in local private and overseas
institutions is not available for 1970.
2.Degree conferred by the University of Campbell, USL
3.Degree conferred by UKM and the University of Ohio, USL
4.Includes enrolment in off-campus courses.
5.Excludes enrolment of foreign students.
Sources: Compiled from Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985), Table 21.3, p.352; and Fifth Malaysia Plan
(1986-1990), Table 19-3, pp.490-491.
community, had increased rapidly. This is in large part attributed to
the provision under the amended. 7.rticle 153 - after the 1969 ethnic
conflict - whereby the King is empowered to 'give direction to any
university, college or other educational institutions at post
secondary level to reserve for Malays certain proportion of places as
the Yang di—Pertuan deems reasonable. The intention.., is to reserve
places in those selected courses of study where the number of Malays
are disproportionately sinai 1' (Emphases in the original. Malaysia
1971b:6). These measures were therefore taken to ensure that student
intake in tertiary institutions reflects the ethnic composition of the
larger society, and hence the instituting of the 'ethnic quota'. Thus
the student enrolment into the University of Malaya for the academic
years 1960/61 to 1969/70 by ethnicity (See Appendix X for a breakdown
of the University of Malaya Student Enrolment into Year One by
Faculty) contrasted very markedly with those after 1970 as shown by
Table 4.2 (Latest figures are not available). The number of irniputera
students in the pre-1970 period was substantially lower than those in
the years after that era. Their numbers however were still lower than
those of the non—Bumiputeras in overseas institutions in the post-1970
period.
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Apart from the increase in the number of Bumiputeras at the
tertiary level the period after 1970, there was also - as shown by
the data in Appendix XI a considerable increase comparatively
between 1970 arid 1975 in their numbers takirç professional courses, at
certificate and diploma levels, such as engineering; land and quantity
survey; architecture and town and city planning; statistics, computer
science and actuaries; accountancy; business; and administration and
law. This situation was especially made possible by the offering of
such courses at institutions like the MIT and MARA vocational
institutes. The number of Bunxiputera students taking such courses as
engineering and medicine at the degree level was also substantial.
4.3.3 Educational problems
Scholarships and education: Unequal access
An overemphasis placed on paper qualification by prospective
employers, especially the government, and also due to the high social
status given to tertiary, particularly university, education have led
to intense competition so much so that demand for local universities
(and colleges as well) spills over into those abroad. There were about
39,90812
 Malaysians studying abroad in 1980 while 20,764 sought degree
education in local universities and MIT in the same year. Mehmet
attributes this to what he calls 'credential ism', i . e. undue stress is
given to paper qualifications by prospective employers (1988:117; also
see Robinson 1981:184-185; 7\znam and McDonald 1989a :31); Dore would
call such a phenomenon a 'diploma disease' (in Cosin and Hales (eds)
1983:51-59).
This high demand for university education is largely due to, as
hinted earlier, the availability of scholarships. A survey of about 50
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per cent of the graduates of each of the five local universities
carried out in 1983 by the Institute of Advanced Studies of the
University of Malaya revealed that 'two out of every three students in
Malaysian universities were on government scholarships' (Mehmet
1988:118). The survey results also showed that almost four out of
every five scholarships were awarded to Malays. The Chinese share was
only 14.4 per cent, the Indian 4.3 per cent, and those from Sabah and
Sarawak 2.9 per cent (ibid. :119). The survey also indicated that no
fewer than 90 per cent of the 1982/83 graduates on scholarship were
under bond with the government, thus compelling them to work with the
government.
Another disturbing result of this survey is that government
scholarships were distributed in a manner that favoured heavily the
well-to-do. This unequal access to scholarships and hence university
education was found to be far greater among the Malays than the
non-Malays: 'For every chance that a poor (Malay) household has of
getting a government scholarship, the richest group has 21 chances,
compared to 13 and 10 chances for the richest Chinese and Indian
households respectively' (ibid. :123).
Such inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disparities in terms of
scholarship awards and educational opportunities in general have also
caused some disquiet among members of the Chinese community.13
Children of the poor plantation workers - particularly Indian— in
Peninsular Malaysia, too, are confronted by severe educational
problems. Marimuthu argues that these children 'have become an
educationally disadvantaged group. with the highest drop-out rates,
lowest achievement levels and attending the "poorest arid smallest"
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schools'
In conclusion, we could say that in its declared desire to
achieve socio-economic justice for Malaysians, particularly the
Bumiputeras. within the larger framework of forging national
integration and unity, the Malaysian government has to some degree
instead aggravated the socio-econoiuic and political situation of the
country. What is perhaps even more worrying is that the intra-ethnic
disparities, i.e. in this case, the Malay community, particularly in
crucial areas such as education, could spell grave danger to
Malaysia's ethnic relations because a socio-economic neglect of a
section of a community can be interpreted in ethnic terms, and thus
making 'nation-building' a formidable task.
Notes
1. Like many other countries under colonial rule, Malayan economy
was - arid still is, perhaps to a lesser degree, after
independence - crucial to the economic and political interests
of Britain and other western countries such as the United states
(Caldwell in Pmin and Caldwell (eds) 1977:242-249).
2. Brennan (in Higgott and Robison [eds] 1985:112) argues that
since the 1969 ethnic riots, the Malay fraction of the ruling
class (consisting of an alliance of the Malay aristocratic,
bureaucratic arid landlord classes) has been allied to
international capital in its drive to resolve its problems with
the Chinese capitalists. And since its legitimacy has always been
derived from its populist, nationalist arid ethnic appeal to the
Malay community, the fraction must be seen (at least officially)
as protecting the 'interests' of the Malay community and against
collusion with Chinese capital (ibid.). This Malay fraction must
therefore, in order to survive politically arid economically,
create and promote conditions favourable for international
capital accumulation within the social formation, thus giving
rise to an array of political and economic problems that is
associated with subeequent 'class formation and polarisation'
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(ibid.). The Chinese capital, on the other hand, is entangled in
a dilemma. Once closely associated with the Chinese capital, the
international capital, as indicated earlier, has now had to forge
alliance with the Malay hegemonic fraction in order to ensure
favourable economic and political treatment for the primary
purpose of economic exploits. Thus the Chinese capitalists are
compelled to compromise with the Malay fraction or send their
capital out of the Malaysian economy.
3. This period is particularly marked by the rapid growth of the
Malay bourgeoisie. For this observation, see for instance, M.H.
Lim (in Taylor and Turton (eds) 1988); Brennan (in Higgott and
Robison (eds) 1985); W.Y. Hua (1983); and Mehmet (1988:101-124).
4. Britain under the Thatcher government is said to be the
world's protagonist of this economic policy. Such an economic
strategy, i.e. privatisation, has inspired many other countries,
including those in the Third World, to try to adopt (Veljanovski
1988:xv-xvi).
5. One of the heavy industries projects is the so-called
'Malaysian Car', which involves the participation of the
State-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (Hicom)
together with the foreign partnership of Mitsubishi Corporation
and Mitsubishi Motor Corporation who essentially provided the
crucial automobile technology.
6. Similar educational objective was found in colonial Africa.
For an account of the educational situation in colonial Africa,
see Walter Rodney (1973:261-287).
7. S. Arasaratnam (1970:180) argues that English education had
enabled children of Indian middle- and upper-class parents to
improve themselves socio-economically and gain entry into the
elite stratum of Malayan society. He adds, 'From the outset this
opening was denied to the children of labourers, for both by
quality and the content of the education they received they were
isolated from the rest of society and ill-equipped to play any
role in the country's development.'
8. Priority was given to the war waged against the Malayan
communists and to economic development in the country.
9. A study conducted by Leong Yin thing (1981:388) demonstrated
however that Bahasa Malaysia as the country's national language
was not necessarily perceived as a unifying force by many
non-Malay students since they interpreted the mastering of the
language as merely a 'passport' to higher education and, by
extension, social mobility.
10. Islamic religious education continues to be made compulsory
for Muslims at the primary and secondary levels (and in
universities too). Non-Muslim students are taught moral education
and ethics during the period when their Muslim counterparts
attend classes in Islamic knowledge. Under the Fourth Malaysia
Plan (1981-1985), for instance, ten new Islamic secondary schools
were scheduled to be built, while a new Islamic Teacher Training
College was to be constructed in the state of Selangor.
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11. Manpower deve 1 opment is believed to be one of the main five
objectives common to most developing countries. See Richard Jolly
(1971) in Seers and Joy (eds), particularly pp.213-226.
12.This figure includes 19,515 students in degree courses, 4,953
in diploma courses, 5,263 in certificate courses and 10,177 in
post-secondary level education (Malaysia 1981b:350).
13. See for instance David Chua (in MCA 1988:65-75) for an MCA
view; Tan Seng Giaw (in DIP 1986:154-156) for a DP perspective
on this educational inequality. When confronted with criticisms
of unfair educational accessibility, a (Malay) Minister of
Education argued: 'We are trying to bring youngsters from the
rural areas into the centres... bring them to the universities...
send them overseas. But can we allow them to compete in normal
circumstances? Certainly not. You find a Malay third-grade pass
getting a scholarship to go overseas instead of a Chinese
first-grade. Conclusion: Facial discrimination. But we have no
choice but to do what we are doing. The Malay student who gets a
third-grade lives in the rural areas. If he was exposed to the
same facilities he might well get a Grade 1. That is what the
National (sic) Economic Policy is all about. This is what
discrimination is about. (Far Eastern Economic Review magazine
(23/6/78) quoted in Gullick and Gale (1986:232)' While this may
constitute a measure of 'positive discrimination' undertaken by
the government to help Malay students in education, the benefits
of such a State sponsorship tend to be enjoyed largely by, as
shown by the 1983 study of the Institute of Advanced Studies of
the University of Malaya, a small section of the Malay community,
namely the well-to-do, and by implication, the urban dwellers.
The problem of social injustice and inequality therefore remains.
14. For an account of the state of education in plantation
estates, see T. Marimuthu (in Husin Mi (ed) 1984:269-273). The
generally dismal socio-economic conditions of the Indian poor can
perhaps be attributed in part. to the apparent marginalization of
the Indian community as a whole in Malaysian society. As Aznam
and McDonald (1989b:32) observed, 'Once invariably included as
the third component in multi-racial Malaysia, today politicians
and the media speak of Malays and Chinese, with the Indians
almost ignored as a minority of "others".'
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CHAFfER V
SOURCE9 OF 'CULTURALL SIGNIFICANr KNOWLEEX3E' FOR SCHOOL STJDENTS
In general, schools are one of the social institutions to which
are accorded the role to transmit what is deemed by education experts
as 'culturally significant knowledge' to each new generation (Luke et
al. 1989:246). That a particular knowledge is considered significant
to be imparted to students relates closely to the question posed by
Basil Bernstein of who 'selects, classifies, distributes, transmits
and evaluates' this important knowledge, for to him this 'reflects
both the distribution of power and the principles of social control'
(in M.F.D. Young (ed) 1971:47). In Malaysia, the 'culturally
significant knowledge' that is embodied in school textbooks is by and
large defined by the State, i.e. the Ministry of Education,
particularly when it possesses as an overall objective a declared
desire to forge better ethnic relations among students in a
multiethnic Malaysia. And, apart from teachers, the transmitting
vehicle that is normally employed to convey this particular knowledge
is the textbook, which also happens to be central to the learning and
teaching processes in the country's formal education system. The
Report of the Cabinet Committee to Review the Implementation of
Education Policy of 1979 demonstrates the Malaysian government's
professed objective to instil a sense of national consciousness
through a common syllabus, in particular textbooks and other related
materials: 'Common Content Syllabus as put forward by the Razak Report
(1956) is regarded as an important basis of the national education
system to bring about national unity... This will assist the process
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of uniting the pupils of various races in this country besides
creating a common national identity. (Malaysia 1985:47)1 Given this
political reality, this chapter attempts to trace and identify the
sources responsible in defining, consciously or otherwise,
transmitting and making availalle what constitutes the 'culturally
significant knowledge' to schools and students in Malaysia. These are
the Textbook Bureau of the Ministry of Education; book publishers in
the public and private sectors; and finally teachers.
Textbook Bureau
The Bureau was established in 1967 (initially, only as a unit of
the Education Ministry's Educational Planning and Pesea.rch Division)
with the primary objective of 'ensuring and maintaining the quality
and standard of textbooks used in schools' (Malaysia 1981a:34) by the
assessment of textbooks. This evaluation is made by 'a selected group
of practising teachers or other educationists and teacher trainers who
possess some expertise on textbooks evaluation' (ibid.). The
evaluators will then recommend and distribute a list of approved
school textbooks to all schools, which in turn are required to choose
books only from this list. In addition, the Bureau has control over
the purchase and sale of textbooks as well as monitoring the price and
physical quality of the books. Equally important is its function to
see to it that the textbooks 'fulfill the needs and aspirations of the
Rukunegara (National Ideology), be written in good language and
presented according to effective learning principles. (Malaysia
1985:117-118)' Thus while welcoming writers and publishers (who are
registered with the Bureau) to contribute to textbook writing, the
Bureau's director, Hashim Mydin, nevertheless cautioned that 'the end
products must meet certain standard criteria' (in CPIP 1986:108). This
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Bureau constitutes a useful mechanism with which the government, in
particular the Education Ministry, can give some inputs into the
general guideline that governs in general the planning, writing and
publishing of those educational materials which it considers
beneficial to the well-being of the nation. This is where the
government, for example, can see to it that 'sensitive matters or
materials which are not suited for the multiracial and multireligious
society in Malaysia will not be found in textbooks' (New Straits Times
14/7/88). After all, as Deputy Education Minister Woon See Chin
asserted, 'This is in line with the Government's efforts to promote
racial unity and to stamp out racial polarisation. (ibid.)' In other
words, the government, through the Ministry of Education, is in a
position to define to a large extent what constitutes a 'culturally
significant knowledge' that should be transmitted to schoolchildren of
various ethnic backgrounds.
Another function of the Bureau is to implement the government's
Textbook Loan Scheme which was launched in 1975, a project that is
meant to help needy students to acquire textbooks. In addition, the
Bureau also cooperates and coordinates with the Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka (DBP, Language and Literary Agency) in matters pertaining to
book publishing and distribution.
The Bureau can give the impression of its evaluators working with
clear criteria to vet new textbooks and other related materials. But
experiences and grievances of publishers do not qualify that picture.
The apparent lack of clarity of the Bureau as a whole in what
constitutes good educational material makes the work of textbook
writers, editors and publishers somewhat hazardous. Edda de Silva,
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editorial manager of the Fajar Bakti, a Malaysian subeidiary of the
Oxford University Press, for example, commented that whatever
guideline there was from the Bureau was purely 'arbitrary' because
there weren't any firm or written rules. 'We "learn to know" the
guideline through our experiences with the Bureau,' she added
(Interview, Petaling Jaya 27/7/88). Publishing manager Chia Chor Seong
of Eastview Production Sdn. Bhd. too expressed the view that the
guideline (of the Bureau) was 'quite general' (Interview, Petal ing
Jaya, 21/9/88). These sentiments were also shared by Hail Shaari
Abdullah, vice-president of the Malaysian Book Publishers' Association
(which represents about 70 registered publishers) and also business
manager of the DBP, who suggested that the Bureau should let
publishers and editors know where they went wrong in the production of
a particular textbooks so as to avoid making the same mistakes in
future (Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 11/8/88). Besides, he added, this
would help publishers reduce costs of production. When asked further
why the Bureau concerned still (at least at the time of interviewing)
hadn't got a clearcut guideline, Haji Shaari responded: 'Perhaps this
goes to show that they're (the Bureau officials) still searching for
one. (ibid.)' This 'deficiency' notwithstanding, de Silva said that
the Bureau require all textbooks to be 'supportive' of government
policies, i.e. these policies cannot be criticised (Interview,
27/7/88). For instance, Malays should be depicted in textbooks as
acquiring comfortable and highly regarded professional jobs, a
reference to the government 's commitment to achieving the main
objectives of the New Economic Policy (NEP), in particular encouraging
more Malays to venture into the world of business and industry.
However, if, for example, the socio-economic position of many Chinese
new villagers has been neglected by the authorities concerned, which
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as to a large degree a valid account, one cannot record this
observation in the textbooks (ibid.; also see DAP 1966: 146-149).
National unity through education, as mentioned earlier, is the
overriding concern of government. This, according to de Silva, has
been translated by officials of the Bureau as giving emphasis to Malay
culture and Islamic religion (ibid.). 'Nothing negative about Malays'
should be shown in the textbooks, such as the poverty to be found in
the Malay community (ibid.) In addition, these texts should not
attempt to consciously or otherwise identify 'race with occupation or
race with wealth or poverty' elbid.), a deliberate step taken by the
government so as to destroy popular stereotypes such as the easy-going
character of Malays and the industrious nature of the Chinese.
Further, the Bureau stipulates that if a textbook discusses business
in Malaysia, it should not, for instance, use pictures or
illustrations showing a. row of only Chinese shops. Instead, the book
should attempt to use pictures that display shops owned or run by all
Malaysians irrespective of ethnicity. However, it cautions that when
it comes to those shops owned or operated by Chinese, no Chinese
characters (on signboards) are permitted (ibid.), which in many ways
is consonant with at least the practices of certain local government
authorities who imposed 'punitive advertisement fees' for the use of
Chinese and other languages on signboards (K. S. Lim 1986: 115-117).
Hence, while certain officials of the Bureau may not be too clear
about the guidelines for selecting materials for textbooks, they are
apparently certain about promoting government policies, particularly
one that encourages the depicting of Malays in a positive light. In
other words, 'school knowledge', to quote M. Apple (in de Castel 1 et
al. (eds) 1989:156) 'has complex connections to the larger political
economy'.
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Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka
This government agency was established in 1956 primarily as a
symbol of the Malay community's desire and aspirations to revitalise
and popularise the use of the Malay language, especially after it was
accorded the status of the country's national language, and also to
enable it to meet challenges in the realms of administration,
knowledge and modern culture. Given this underlying broad cultural
design, it is therefore to be expected that under the Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka Act of 1959 Section (5)%, the agency's main aims are:
(a)to promote and enrich the national language;
(b) to promote literary talents, particularly those in the
national language;
Cc) to print or publish or help in the printing or publishing of
books, pamphlets, and other types of literary materials written in
the national language and other languages;
Cd) to standardise spelling and pronunciation, and also to coin
appropriate terminologies in the national language; and
(e) to axrange and produce a dictionary in the national language
(Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 1967: 17).
In tune with the agency's overall objective, some of its major
publications have indeed become popular and highly regarded, such as
the monthly magazines of Dewan Masyarakat, Dewan Bahasa, Dewan
Sastera, Dewan Pe 1 ajar, and Dewan Siswa. Dewan Masyarakat commands a
large following among Malay-educated Malaysians in general and
students in upper secondary schools in particular, primarily because
the magazine provides materials which are considered useful to the
General Studies subject, coupled by the fact that quite often a few of
its articles have been extracted and used for the Form Six public
examination's General Studies paper. In addition, the magazine also
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provides information on current affairs and analyses of domestic
social issues and controversies although usually from a 'Malay
perspective'. Dewan Bahasa is a semi-academic magazine that is devoted
to the issues of and research in the Malay language, while Dewan
Sastera dedicates itself to matters of Malay literature and popular
culture. Dewan Pelajar and Dewan Siswa cater to the needs of primary
school and lower secondary school students, and teenagers
respectively.
The magazines aside, 1the DBP also, in cooperation and
coordination with the Ministry of Education, publishes textbooks for
primary school students, and academic books for upper secondary
schools, the local universities and other tertiary educational
institutions. As for the general public, the DBP publishes Malay
novels and other Malay literary works, which is in line with its
primary aim of promoting not only Malay language (which is Malaysia ' s
national language) but also 'national culture'. The following comment
of the then DBP director-general Datuk Hassan Ahmad attests to this
commitment:
A publisher has a moral responsibility to society and the
nation. It is important for him not only to understand but
also to be committed to his role in the implementation of such
policies as education, national culture and national language.
(New Straits Times 14/9/87.)
The above statement was a response to the prevailing situation in the
industry whereby there were people who became 'overnight publishers'
solely motivated by profit. This prompted him as well as other
concerned publishers to request the National Book Development Council
to 'draw up rules for book publishers in the country' so as to
ascertain the credentials, expertise and sincerity of future
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publishers (ibid.). 1 This perspective is also not far from one of the
professed aims of the Malaysian Book Publishers' Association: 'To help
to foster national consciousness through publishing' (Malaysian Book
Trade Directory, undated:52). This move to have stricter control over
who joins the industry is indeed a manifestation of the concern of
certain publishers of the need to protect the integrity of the
industry as a whole from the unscrupulous practices of certain
operators.
Private publishers	 1
As far as this industry is concerned, the bulk of the book trade
remains in the area of textbooks, guidebooks (or revision books) and
related educational materials. Since the Second World War, textbook
publishing constitutes about 70 per cent of the total annual book
production in Malaysia (The Star 10/10/88). There are at least three
major factors that contribute to this: One, the captive market of
schoolchildren; two, emphasis placed on the importance of public
examinations and the overall examination-oriented education system
(and hence the proliferation of guidebooks and also textbooks); and
finally, the lack of reading tradition in Malaysian society. Seen in
this light, one can appreciate why school textbooks have unleashed
competition among local book publishers. This competition is made even
stiffer with, under the encouragement of the NEP, the growing
participation of Malay book publishers. Haji Shaari of the DBP
reinforced this point when he said that textbooks and guidebooks
constitute 'a safe market' for most local publishers (Interview,
11/8/88). The lucrativeness of this market has inevitably caused
certain problems and ill-feelings between the major publishers (who
generally happen to be non-Malay and foreign-based) on the one hand
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and the smaller ones (Ma lays in general) on the other. This fierce
competitive spirit was displayed in the recent 'scramble' for the
Education Ministry's million-dollar World Bank project of providing
new books to schoolchi ldr-en. The Malay newspaper Watan (2/8/88), for
instance, expressed editorial concern over the small degree of
Bumiputera participation in the publishing industry. So far, it
argued, Bumiputera publishers managed only to secure less than 20 per
cent of the textbook market under the Education Ministry's Textbook
Loan Scheme, and only seven per cent of the Ministry's allocation
under the World Bank proiect Yahya Ismail, a writer and critic,
commented in his weekly column in the Malay weekly Mingquan Kota
(10/7/88) that the Education Ministry was not doing enough to help
Malay publishers who were too small in physical size and capital to
meet some of the requirements of its Textbook Bureau. For example, he
added, the Bureau insists that illustrations in books that were due
for assessment must be in full colour and with the text typeset and
printed, a process that could easily cost M$2,500 per book. A fee for
a book assessment by the Bureau is M$300. In addition, a publisher
whose books have been approved by the Bureau would need to conduct
his/her own sales promotion to all the schools in the country, apart
from the necessary giving away of complimentary copies to teachers,
headmasters and others. These problems faced by small publishers,
particularly the Bumiputeras, are further compounded by the
arbitrariness in the decision-making of the Textbook Bureau, which can
increase the costs of production. Given these financial and logistic
problems, Yahya Ismail suggested that the DBF should be given an
important role in supervising and coordinating the publication of
books among Bumiputera publishers, beside also marketing these
textbooks through its established national outlets.
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The operating pattern of publisher Shukran Jamil Zaini of Nurin
Enterprise perhaps would give us a rough idea of not only the kinds of
problem a small-size publisher faces but also how s/he attempts to
overcome such difficulties. Shukran uses his popular educational
magazine Akademik not only as an effective basis of his bisiness's
financial viability, but also as a useful (and economical as well)
vehicle to publicise and promote his new academic books to his readers
(Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 28/7/88). Chia thor Seong asserted that
Bumiputera book publishers had not been able to obtain a big slice of
the textbook market because primarily they lacked capital and
expertise. And, he added, because of the capital-intensive nature of
the industry the successful publishers were normally the ones who were
foreign-based (Interview, 21/9/88). Mr Chia said that certain
Bumiputera publishers had already suggested that in future the
Education Ministry should allocate certain quotas for them so as to
help them meet the NEP goals. As regards the World Bank project, he
noticed that certain publishing companies had been created to take
advantage of it, and would only last for that particular project. In
other words, these companies were not really serious about the quality
and future of the local publishing industry (ibid.), a concern that
was also echoed by Haji Shaari Aijdullah.
The lack of a clearcut and coherent guideline from the Textbook
Bureau has compelled some publishers to make their own house criteria
more 'adjustable' to the Bureau's general guideline. Mr. Chia, for
instance, said that his publishing company would consider favourably
materials which project a love for the country. In addition, his group
of editors would not accept anything that projects racial stereotypes,
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aligns itself with certain political parties, 'especially the
opposition', and possesses elements of advertisement (of certain
products) (Interview, 21/9/88). As a last resort, he or any of his
editors would consult the Bureau for some clarification if they still
could not find solutions to their editorial problems (ibid.). In
ordinary circumstances, the editors would consult each other or refer
to the original writer of the manuscript if and when a problem
surfaces, with the chief editor or editorial manager having the last
say. As one of his guiding princIples, publisher Shukran Jamil Zaini
(who publishes educational magazine Akademik and academic books) shuns
materials (for books or his magazine) which he himself deems 'too
critical' of the government (Interview, 28/7/88). Further, he would,
before accepting a certain material for publication either in book
form or for his magazine, attempt to study the general background
(like political orientation) of the writer concerned (ibid.). Thus
this suggests a possibility of academic standards in school textbooks
and guidebooks being sacrificed and the potential of them encouraging
critical thinking being curbed to some degree. This also relates to
the question of censorship which in turn concerns profitability (M.
Apple in de Castell et al. (eds) 1989:163). Publishers and editors
would be tempted to edit out from a text, if not withdrawing the whole
manuscript, what they would consider 'controversial' or 'dangerous',
particularly in an industry whose underlying motive is profit. Worse
still, a problem that is essentially professional and financial in
nature could in future be transformed by certain elements in the
industry into something ethnic.
Teachers
While teachers are in general not involved in the actual planning
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and production of texthooks and other related materials, they
nevertheless play a significant role in making available in the
classroom educational materials other than the prescribed textbooks.
In a small survey of 18 teachers of Malay, Chinese and Indian descent
(who either taught the subject of General Studies or History), many of
them revealed that they referred to materials other than the approved
or recommended textbooks. This they did because they felt that most of
these textbooks in themselves were not 'sufficient' or 'comprehensive
enough' or were a bit outdated. The reference materials were
newspapers such as New Straits Times, Berita Harian, and Utusan
Malaysia. The magazines took the form of Dewan Masyarakat, Dewan
Bahasa, Dewan Sastera, Akademik, Diskusi, Prestasi, Utusan Perquna,
Far Eastern Economic Review, Asiaweek, and Newsweek. As for books, a
few of the teachers referred to law and economics publications. It
should be noted here however that with the exception of the foreign
publications, the reference materials offered by the teachers could be
considered 'safe'. This situation can be attri1ited in part to the
fact that the Education Minister is empowered by law to, amongst other
things, regulate the use and purchase of books and apparatus in
educational institutions and to prohibit 'the use in any school or
other educational institution or any specified class of school or
institution of any book, the use of which appears undesirable
(emphasis added)' (Malaysia 1987:49).
Conclusion
We have therefore identified the major sources of 'cultural ly
significant knowledge', which primarily is embodied in the school
textbooks. The Textbook Bureau acts as a mechanism of 'quality'
control over school textbooks, no matter how obscure the terms of
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control are at times. However, this vagueness could have two
implications: On the one hand, a writer or editor could argue their
case successfully under this shroud of measured uncertainty. On the
other, this vagueness could provide the Bureau's officials ample room
to manoeuvre to their own advantage and preference if and when the
need arises, and it thus follows that this element of arbitrariness
and vagueness has the indirect effect of making editors and writers
tread so gingerly as to impose unhealthy self-censorship, 'playing it
safely'.
In general, many, if not most, of the private book publishers and
the DBP, to a lesser degree, depend a lot on the goodwill of the
government for their own survival. The DBP is obliged to follow the
policies of the government simply because it is a government body,
whilst the private publishers perceive their financial survival to
hinge on the lucrative market of school textbooks that is in turn
closely linked to expensive government educational projects. In other
words, market logic is likely to compel many publishers to sacrifice
to some degree their editorial and policy independence, if any, and
the overall quality of printed materials at the altar of profits. This
situation could be made possible and aggravated if and when the
government decides to re-write the rules of the competition, with the
Malay publishers being accorded certain percentage of the textbook
market, while the non-Malay publishers, big or small, are left to
fight it out within a relatively compressed financial space amongst
themselves.
The teachers are identified as one of the sources of 'culturally
significant knowledge' because most of them are in the crucial
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position to influence to some extent, select materials for and give
emphasis to certain aspects of that knowledge to their students. It
needs to be said here, though, that the bulk of the materials,
particularly the local ones, that form the reference materials of the
teachers are published by local newspaper and magazine companies whose
editorial and business judgments are by and large governed by the
provisions stipulated in the Publishing and Printing Presses Act
(1984). In other words, it is quite possible that many of the articles
in the newspapers and magazines on the whole reinforce what is already
said in the prescribed textbooks, instead of serving as an effective
avenue for alternative views for the students to be exposed to.2
(Perhaps this explains in part why certain newspaper materials or
items are extracted and reproduced by local publishers in their
textbooks and other reading materials.) On the other hand, foreign
publications, which incidentally also come under the purview of the
Publishing and Printing Presses Act (1984) and are mainly in English
and hence necessarily confined to those who are fluent in English, do
sometimes produce relatively critical messages about the
socio-economic and political affairs of the country.
Of course, all this is not to imply that the teachers would be
influential enough to 'infiltrate fully into the minds of the
students, just as it is ill-advised to suggest that the editorial and
bureaucratic controls in the Textbook Bureau and the editorial
preferences and financial dictates of the publishers that determine to
a large degree the contents of the textbooks would heavily influence
the minds of the school students concerned. Nonetheless, what is
required to be said here is that these are the forces at play which in
many ways determine what 'culturally significant knowledge' is
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available. It may have varying effects on students, particularly in
terms of ethnic and national consciousness.
Notes
1. The primary aims of this Council are to provide a general
policy for the development of book publishing in the country, to
coordinate efforts made by publishers to improve standards such as
conducting professional training among members, and to encourage
reading among the general public.
2. As an example of a publication trying to exercise some
editorial independence, a senior editor of one of the popular
magazines of the DBF was reprimanded and transferred 'within 24
hours' to a different department within the same agency in 1988
for publishing a satirical short story, 'Maharaja Beruk' (Monkey
King), which essentially criticised the leadership of the Mahathir
government (Mincquan Kota 18/9/88).
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CHAPTER VI
ANANALYSIS OF TEXIBJOKS
In this study, (a] five books pertaining to the subject of
General Studies (Perxjian Am) and Eb] four History textbooks have
been analysed. They are (in alphabetical order): (a) Rupert Enerson
(1987), N laysia. 5. tu Penqkajian Pemerintaiia.n Secara Lnqsunq dan
Tidak Lanqsuaq (Malaysia. A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule), Kuala
thmpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 7th Print; (b) D .G . E. Hall (1979),
Sejarah Asia Tenqr,rara (A History of South-East Asia), Kuala Lumpur:
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2nd Print; (C) Gilbert Khoo and Dorothy Lo
((1981), Asia Dalam Perub3han. Sejarab Tenqqara, Sela tan dan Tirnur
Asia (Asia in Transition. The History of South-East, South and East
Asia), Petaling Jaya: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia); (d) Atan
Long (1987), Penqaiian Am 2 (General Studies 2), Petal ing Jaya: Fajar
Bakti; (e) Ranjit Singh Malhi (1988), Keneqaraarn Malaysia, (The
Malaysian Nation), Petal ing Jaya: Federal Publications; (f) Aixi Hassan
Othinan, Razak Mamat & Mohd Yusof Abmad (1988), Pencrajian Am I (General
Studies 1), Petal ing Jaya: Longman; (g) Abu Hassan Othman, Razak Mamat
& Mohd Yusof Ahmad (1988), Penqajian Am 2 (General Studies 2),
Petaling Jaya: Longman Malaysia; (h) Mimi Kartini Saidi & Rahimah
Sal im (1988), Pelenqkap Din: Penqajian Am .STPM (Se 1 f-Preparatory:
General Studies S'rPM), Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications; (i) D.J.M.
Tate (1985), Sejarab Pembentukan Asia Tenqqara (The History of the
Formation of South-east Asia) (Jilid II), Petalirxj Jaya: Fajar Bakti,
4th Print. These books constitute a list of recommended readings that
is prescribed by the Education Ministry for students preparing
themselves for the local equivalent of the Higher School Certificate
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examination. This is an examination at a. pre-university level.
For the purpose of this study, two books from each of the two
sets (General Studies and History) are chosen to be included in the
thesis proper; the rest, whose characteristics and contents are
largely represented by these four books, are placed in the appendices.
Originals of translated materials are also placed in the appendices
and hence, 'Trans. Appnd.' in parenthesis is an abbreviat ion for
Translation Appendix.
The criterion used for selecting materials that are deemed
relevant to the study is: Texts which encompass those aspects of
culture, politics, economics, and/or science that relate to and affect
questions of fundamental liberties, race, ethnic identities and
stereotypes, ethnic relations, nationalistic sentiments and 'national
identity' of the major ethnic groups in Peninsular Malaysia, i.e.
Malay, Chinese and Indian.
In this study, the analysis of each of these texthooks comes
under three separate categories: the Cultural, the Political, and the
Economic (but not necessarily in this order).
(a] (i). Panjit Sirx:iti Malhi (1988), 	 Keneqaraan Maldysia_JThe
Malaysian Nation), PetalirKi Jaya, Federal Publications.
This 317-page (General Studies) book was written specially to
meet the needs of students who are future candidates of the Fonn Six
examination, the Peperiksaan Si iii Tirçgi Persekolahan Malaysia (PM,
or Malaysian Higher School Certificate Examination). This book
fundamentally touches on political matters only.
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The nalysis
ThE POLITIC1L
(a) A united Malaysian nation
In his discussion of the 'Nation' in Chapter 1, Malhi stresses
the importance of having Malaysians united. He feels that 'We need
to create a united people whose loyalty to the country is undivided
[p.4; Trans. Appnd. 3.1]' because the country, he asrt, is sti 11 in
the process of nation-building, and of creating a national culture as
well. This exhortation is made despite positive features which, he
says, Malaysia has as a nation: a definite territory, a population. an
orderly government, and sovereignty, and also possesses 'other
characteristics of a nation such as a constitution; an official
religion (Is lain); a national ideology (Rukune qara); and a national
language (Malaysian language) [p.4; emphases in the original; Appnd.
3.2]'. Malaysia, he adds, also has symbols of a nation, which 'are
the flag and the national anthem (Ne qaraKu) (p.41'. The importance of
the nation's characteristics is further reinforced by the chapter
summary on page 15 (pointer number 2) where Maihi exhibits Malaysia's
four characteristics of a nation: (a) a Federal constitution; (b) an
official religion (Islam); (c) a national language (Malaysian
language); and Cd) a national ideology (Rukuneqara). These
characteristics notwithstanding, Maihi 's apparent deep concern for
national unity is perhaps best exemplified by his allocating a whole
chapter to the subject of national unity in the book. This chapter
will be examined later.
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(b) Protection of citizens' basic riQtlts
(I) The Ma lays Ian Constitution
The subject of Malaysian constitution Is given a further boost
when Malhi discusses it on pages 4-5. Here the writer argues for the
importance of a constitution to a nation (pp.4-5): 'A constitution is
needed to create a political, economic arxl social framework that would
facilitate national unity and development. A constitution is also
important in order to avoid the aixise of power by the government and
also to protect the interests of all ethnic groups. [Trans. Appnd.
3.3]' The importance of this is later reminded by Malhi in the
chapter summary on page 15 where the reader is told (in pointer number
3) that 'A constitution is the supreme law that determines the type
of government a nation would have and also the kind of human rights
its citizens would acquire. All other laws must not come in conflict
with the constitution. [Trans. Appnd. 3.4]' This concept of the
'supremacy of the Malaysian constitution' appears again on page 22 in
the 'discursive questions' section where (in question no. 2) the
reader is asked, 'What is meant by "the constitution as the supreme
law"? (Trans. Appnd. 3.5]', and on page 48 where question no. 2 asks,
'What Is meant by the concept of "the supreme Federal Constitution"?
(Trans. Appnd. 3.6]'. In addition, the image of the constitution as
being a guarantee for and protection of human rights is reminded on
page 48 where question no. 3 asks, 'How far does the Federal
Constitution protect the basic rights of a citizen? (Trans. Appnd.
3.7]' At the same time. Maihi also reminds the reader that Malaysia's
constitution can be amended by at least two-thirds majority in
Parliament (p.5); and it is in this context that the 'homework
exercises' section on page 23 (no.2) should be approached, where the
reader is asked to discuss the following topic: 'A constitution is
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needed to be reviewed from time to time so as to adapt itself to new
developments or needs. [Trans. Appnd. 3.8]'
Maihi, in chapter 2 on Federal and State constitutions, also
asserts that (p.9) 'Malaysia and almost all western countries have a
government that is democratic in nature' [Trans. Apprid. 3.9]. He
subetantiates this claim on page 10 by saying that a democratic system
is based on the concept of 'government of the people, by the people
and for the people'. And one of the characteristics of a democratic
country that Maihi has listed &wn is that the country 'champions
the freedom, equality and rights of the people' ( p . 10; Trans. Appnd.
3.10].
	
This noble task of a democratic country is repeated in the
multiple-choice question no. 6 on page 20 where the reader is to make
a choice from the given list of possible answers: 'A democratic
country has the following characteristics: (i) dec]ision is based on a
majority vote; (ii) voting is conducted in confidence; (iii) the head
of government is a president; (iv) all members of the legislature are
appointed by the president; and (v) champions freedom, equality and
rights of the citizen [Trans. Appnd. 3.111.' The answers given to
this question by Maihi are (1), (ii) and (v). Two forms of reading
are open to the reader: The noble goals of the constitution (such as
protecting basic rights of the citizens, and the interests of the
ethnic groups in the country), as they are presented in the book, may
have the effect of giving the impression that all is well in the
country. On the other hand, the display of these constitutional
assurances as well as the required characteristics of a democratic
country may also serve as a reminder to the reader as to where
Malaysia, or rather the Malaysian government of the day, really stars
in relation to, for instance, the curbs imposed on certain furxIamental
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liberties as expressed in Othman et al. 's Penqaj ian ?un 1 and Penqajian
Mi 2 (the details of which will be discussed later).
(ii)The Judiciary
If the constitutional provision for the protection of the
interests of all ethnic groups and the basic rights of the individuals
as well as the Malaysian government's commitment to this
constitutional provision is not enough, Maihi's description of the
Malaysian Judiciary would help the reader feel more at ease. On the
Judiciary. Maihi states that(p.177) it is '... the protector of
basic human rights against any violation from either an individual or
government. To ensure that the Judiciary can perform its tasks
justly, it is somewhat independent of the controls of the legislative
and the executive. [Trans. Appnd. 3.121' This judicial role is
repeated on page 189 in the chapter summary no.1. The importance of
the independence of the Judiciary is again highlighted when Maihi
states that (p.178) it 'means that the judges can interpret laws and
administer justice according to their judgements without fear or
favour. This is necessary in order to guarantee the rule of law and
to protect basic human rights (Enphases in the original; Appnd.
3.13).' The judicial independence is further emphasised with the
presentation of the discursive question no.1 on page 195 which reads:
'What is meant by the independence of the Judiciary? (Trans. Appnd.
3.14]'
(iii)The Pan iainent
In addition to this judicial checks, Maihi also assures the
reader that the Pan iainent (p. 156) '... controls the Executive
through the approval of the annual 1xidget allocations and also enables
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the people to question actions of the government through their
representatives in Pan lament. [p.156; Trans. Appnd. 3.15]' In
addition to these checks, Malhi adds that the primary role of the
Upper House is to debate a particular bill passed by the Lower House
with greater detail and care. That the Constitution protects the
interests of all ethnic groups; the government of the day, by virtue
of it operating in a country 'democratic in nature'; and the Judiciary
is there to safeguard the basic rights of citizens may well stand out
and serve as a grim reminder of the importance of having these
freedoms promoted and protebted, particularly in view of the
restrictions already imposed on these fundamental liberties as shown
in Othman et al. 's two books and the discussion be low.
(c) Malays' Special Position and Riqhts
The assertion that the Malaysian constitution provides the
protection for the interests of all ethnic groups and the rights of
citizens experiences some kind of an ideological dissonance when it
comes to the discussion of special position of the Malays and of
national security - as has already been implied in Othman et al. 'S
two books. It is under the subject of fundamental liberties that a
portion of this constitutional provision is put to the test.
Equality, one of the eight fundamental liberties discussed by Malhi,
is the case in point. (The other seven are [p.33-4]: freedom of the
individual; freedom from slavery and forced labour; protection against
retrospective criminal laws and repeated legal proceedings; prevention
of banishment and freedom of movement; freedom of expression, assembly
and association; freedom of religion; and the right to property
ownership. This principle of fundamental liberties is mentioned again
in the chapter summary on page 42 (pointer no. 4].)
	
Malhi states
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that (p.33) every Malaysian citizen should be treated equally under
the law. He stresses that there should be no discrimination based on
religion, race, origin or place of birth. But at the same time he
also points out that an exception is made to this rule (p.34) as
provided for in the Malaysian constitution:
Article 153 provides the special treatment for the Malays
and other Bumiputeras in Sabah arid Sarawak in areas such as
the holding of public service posts, the granting of
scholarships and the issuance of permits and licences.
[Thans. Appnd. 3.16]
On this subject of speciaP position of the Malays and Bumiputeras
of Sabah arid Sarawak, Maihi reiterates on pages 39-40 the significance
of the give-and-take approach used and the 'political bargaining'
struck by leaders of the three major ethnic groups prior to Malaya's
independence in 1957 - all this in the name of maintaining political
stability arid unity in the country. Maihi thus writes (p.40):
Leaders of the Malays (who were represented by the
United Malays National Organisation - UMNO) had agreed to
the liberal citizenship conditions for non-Malays. Through
the principle of jus soil, automatic citizenship was
granted to all who were born in the Federation of Malaya on
or after Independence Day. As a way of repaying this
concession, the Chinese arid Indians who were respectively
represented by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) had acknowledged the
special position of the Malays who were left behind in the
economic and educational fields. [Enphasis in the original.
Thans. Appnd. 3.17]
The 'political bargain', therefore, constitutes the granting of
citizenship to the non-Malays in return for the provision of
privileges for the Malays. The question of the socio-economic problems
of the Malays, who are considered a numerical majority, is alluded to
in chapter 11 where the topic of national security is discussed.
Malhi begins by saying (p.223) that (economic) development arid
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national security are very much inter-related; one cannot do without
the other. He asserts, 'Without the assurance of security, national
development will be hindered. Conversely, uneven socio-economic
development that does not benefit the majority of the population can
jeopardise national security. [p.223; Trans. Appnd. 3.18]' This point
is repeated in the chapter summary (nos.1 and 2) on page 228; arid in
the discursive questions nos.1 and 2 on page 232. This therefore
underlines the importance given to the argument that special
privileges are crucial to the objective of helping Malays economically
arid hence, maintaining the ocial and political stability of the
country.
As mentioned earlier, the special rights of the Malays are
provided for by the Malaysian Constitution in Article 153 and, adds
Malhi (p .40), after the formation of Malaysia, these rights were
extended to the &uniputeras (the indigenous people) in Sabah and
Sarawak. This constitutional provision reappears, and is thus
emphasised, in the pointer no. 10 of the chapter suirunary on page 43
('Article 153 provides the special privileges of the Malays and the
bumiputeras in Sabah and Sarawak' (Trans. Apprid. 3.21]); in the
multiple-choice question no. 4 on page 45 ('Factors that were central
to the give-anj.-take approach employed between the races in order to
achieve Malaya's independence are: (i) the special position of the
Malays; (ii) the post of Prime Minister; (iii) citizenship; (iv) Malay
language (now Malaysian language); and (v) voting right in a general
election. (Trans. Apprid. 3.22]' The answer given is (i), (ii) and
(iv).); in the multiple-choice question no. 6 on page 46 ('Article 153
of the Malaysian Constitution provides: (a) Malay language (Malaysian
language) as the country's official language; (b) the special
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treatment for the Malays and other &uniputeras in Sabah and Sarawak in
the holding of public services posts arxl the granting of scholarships;
(C) Islam as the country's official religion; (d) the freedom of
speech, peaceful assembly and association; and (e) equality for all
under the law. [Trans. Appnd. 3.23] l The answer given is (b).); í
one of the discursive questions (no.4) on page 48 ('Why is our
constitution considered as the product of a give-and--take between the
races? Give examples. (Trans. Appnd. 3.241'); and finally in one of
the two 'homework' questions (no.2) on page 48 ('Make a study of the
give-and-take between the Malay and non-Malay races on several issues
such as citizenship, the special position of the Malays, Islam and the
sovereignty of the Malay rulers. [Trans. Appnd. 3.251'). The subject
of constitution as being a product of an inter-ethnic bargaining is
again mentioned in another discursive question section on pages 47-48.
Here question no. 1 asks, 'Why do we need to study the history of the
development of the country's constitution? [Trans. Appnd. 3.261'; and
no. 4 asks, 'Why is our constitution regarded as the product of an
inter-ethnic cooperation? Give examples. (Trans. Appnd. 3.27]'
As we can see, a lot of attention and emphases have been given to
the issue of the special position of the Malays and other &uniputeras
in Sabah and Sarawak. This important issue of special privileges of
the Malays should also be viewed in a wider perspective that
encompasses the royalty. The King, in chapter three where Maihi
studies the System of Malaysian Government, is said to be (p.55)
'responsible in protecting the special position of the Malays and the
Iximiputeras in Sabah and Samwak' (Trans. Appnd. 3.28]. This
constitutional provision is well protected so that should any
ameriments be made to it, it would require the consent of the
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Conference of (Malay) 1ulers of which the King is a member (p.57).
Thus, the principle of equality in Malaysia is tempered with the
questions of the soclo-economic backwardness of the Bumiputeras and of
national unity and political stability of the country. At this
juncture, it needs to be said that Malhi, as many Malay politicians
and a few non-Malay ones, argues for a narrower sense of equality,
that is, the need to help the needy Malays to gain equal access to
economic resources of the country so as to achieve social justice. The
barrage of reminders of and emphases on the importance and historical
significance of Article 153 f the Malaysian Constitution may have
reached saturation point so as to alienate the reader, particularly
the non-Ma lay one.
(d) Fundamental liberties
On freedom of expression, assembly and association (within the
fundamental liberties discussion), Maihi states that the Malaysian
Parliament can impose certain restrictions in the name of 'national
security, and public or moral order' (p.34). As an example, he points
out that it is an offence to question sensitive issues such as the
special privileges of the Malays and the use of the Malaysian language
as an official language. Not only do these restrictions affect the
ordinary Malaysians, Malaysian Members of Parliament, too, have their
parliamentary privileges curbed when it comes to 'sensitive issues'.
Malhi thus declares (p.159): '... Members of Parliament cannot
question the existence of certain sensitive issues such as the special
rights of the Malays, citizenship, the national language and the
suzerainty of the Malay nil ers. [Trans. Appnd. 3.29]' As regards
Malay special rights that are enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution
(as Article 153), although its underlying objective is to serve as a
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mechanism to help the Malays improve their economic standing and
'catch-up' with their non-Malay brethren through measures such as the
New Economic Policy, the life of this constitutional provision may not
necessarily be shortened once the majority of the Malays have attained
substantial economic achievement. The possibility of this
constitutional provision's longer life hinges on the existence of the
Sedition Act which prohibits discussion or questioning of 'sensitive
issues'.
(e) The Internal Security Act LISA)
In the name of protecting national security, due judicial process
is not adhered to in cases that come under the jurisdiction of the
powerful Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960. The ISA is employed by
the government, says Maihi (p.224), as one of the methods used to
combat a communist threat. He holds that (p.223) the process of
creating a united Malaysian society is compounded by the fact that the
majority of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) membership are Chinese
while the majority of the country's armed forces' personnel are Malay.
He warns that (p.224) the CPM is actively s preadinq its communist
ideoloqy and is receiving public support particularly through schools
and trade unions (emphases in the original). The ISA empowers the
authorities to do the following, as mentioned again in the
multiple-choice question no. 4 on page 231: 'nyone who is suspected
of possibly threatening the security of the nation can be detained
without trial for a particular period of time (Trans. Appnd. 3.30] i
The equation here is necessarily as follows: the ISA is primarily
meant to fight against a communist threat and the communist threat
only. The dangers of the communist threat are raised again in the
chapter summary numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6 on pages 228-229; four
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multiple-choice questions on pages 230-233; and two discursive
questions on pages 232-233. The reader, therefore, is reminded,
directly or otherwise, of the need arid importance of giving legitimacy
to this exception to the judicial norm that a person will not be
detained without trial for an indefinite period of time. The reader
here may be compelled to rethink the earlier claim about the
constitutional provisions, government's commitment and the Judiciary's
role to protect citizen's (irrespective of ethnic origin) rights arid
interests, characteristics that are deemed essential to be acquired in
the project of making Malaysiaa modern state.
(f) Religious freedom
On freedom of religion in the fundamental liberties discussion,
Malhi claims that everyone has the right to embrace arid practise
his/her own religion (p. 34). However, he cautions of another
exception to the rule: '... there is a law that restricts the
proselytisation of a (non-Islamic) religion among Muslims' [Trans.
Appnd. 3.31]. Put another way, any Malaysian lut the Muslim is at
liberty to embrace and practise whatever religion s/he so chooses.
This religious restriction on the Muslim ought to be viewed in a
social context that is compounded by the fact that almost all Malays
are Muslim. And therefore any attempt at converting Malays into
faiths other than Islam can necessarily be perceived as a threat to
the numerical and political strength of the Malay community (as the
analyses of other textbooks would illustrate), for constitutional ly a
Malay is, among other requirements arid by definition, necessarily a
Muslim. The Malay-Muslim reader may find solace and comfort from this
constitutional provision, while his/her non-Malay counterpart may not
necessarily cherish or share such a sentiment as it can be read as an
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undemocratic practice.
(g) Institutional assistance for Malays
In its endeavour to help Buiniputeras to improve their economic
standing, particularly in business enterprises, the Malaysian
government has created a number of federal statutory bodies primarily
for this purpose. On the topic of federal statutory bodies in chapter
four, Malhi lists down on page 85 some of the organisations which were
set up by the government. Three of these that are relevant to our
study and thus require mentiorning are the MaJlis nianah Rakyat (MJRA.
or the People's Trust Council), Perbadanan Pembarigunan Bandar (UDA, or
Urban Development Authority), and Pusat Daya Pengeluaran Negara (PDPN,
or National Productivity Centre). These are organisat ions which are
associated with the 'Bumiputera participation in the fields of
commerce and industry' (p.85). The importance of the UDA in assisting
Malays in commercial activities is emphasised in the presentation of
multiple-choice question no. 11 on page 98.
Related to the government's attempt to help speed up &imiputeras'
participation in commerce and industry is the federal agency,
Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU). On page 128, two of the main
functions of the Unit are stated as: to monitor certain government
agencies and public enterprises such as the HICOM (Heavy Industries
Corporation of Malaysia) and Pernas (National Corporation) so as to
see to it that they run along the lines laid out by the New Economic
Policy objectives; and to help upgrade Bumiputeras' participation in
commerce and industry through training schemes and other ways
(Trans.). The importance of this Unit is again highlighted in the
chapter summary (no.3) on page 130; in the multiple-choice questions
127
no. 6 and 9 on pages 133-134; and in the 'discursive question' section
on page 134 (no.3). The State once again is seen playing an active
interventionist role to help encourage the development of a Malay
entrepreneurial class through the activities of the public enterprises
(Bruce Gale, 1984). The emphasis is thus laid on the kinds of
governmental help, in this case those coming from public agencies. The
silence on any kind of help to needy non-Malays, at least in this
book, is deafening.
(h) National laruage
With regard to the national language, Maihi writes that the Ma lay
language's status as Malaysia's national language was written into the
Malaysian constitution under Article 152. However, he does note that
(p.40) '... no one should be prohibited or prevented from using
(otherwise than for official purposes) or from teaching or learning
any other language' [Trans. Appiil. 3.32]. Anyone found questioning
this constitutional provision can be charged under the Sedition Act
1984. In other words, constitutionally there is a safeguard for the
use of ethnic languages other than the national language. The legal
status of the Malay language as the national language is, however, the
only aspect of this constitutional provision that gains more attention
and is emphasised, as in the case of pointer no. 11 of the chapter
summary on page 43, and again mentioned in the multiple-choice
question no. 11 on page 47. Given the legal and official position
and the cultural value of the Malay language in the country and the
rest of the Southeast Asian region, it is conceivable that the
language has become part of Malaysia's foreign policy and regional
cooperation as well. Maihi states that (pp.253-254)	 the
Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia Language Council, formed on 4th November
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1985, aims to spread the use and upgrade the role of the national
(Malay) language of member states; and to increase solidarity between
member states. In the summary section, two pointers (nos.22 and 23)
are presented on page 256 regarding the language council concerned.
The importance of the national language has, as we have seen, also
been touched upon by Penqajian m 1, thereby adding to the emphasis
given here, and consequently pushing the other vernaculars on the
periphery.
(1) National unity
Maihi dedicates one whole chapter (10) on the question of
National Unity, where he begins with a powerful quotation (from local
sociologist Chew Hock Thye) on page 199: 'Malaysia is not the property
of any one race, bit a joint property of all races and all Malaysian
citizens. (Trans. Appnd. 3.33])' The quotation should serve as a
useful reminder to the reader for it implicitly says that as a citizen
of the country every Malaysian deserves equal treatment and rights
under the law, as is already pointed out earlier by Maihi. The first
paragraph of the chapter emphasises the importance of national unity
(p.199):
National unity is the foundation of the effort of b.iilding
a Malaysian nation that is strong, united, stable, just and
progressive. Unity is also important in ensuring long term
stability and security of the nation. Without unity, our
nation will be exposed to the threats of race riots such as
the one that occurred on 13th May 1969 arid external
aggression... We, as Malaysian citizens, should help and
support efforts made by the Government in fostering unity
[Trans. Appnd. 3.34].
The reader's attention should also be drawn to the writer's
conceptualisation of unity. Malhi says that (p.199) 'Unity can be
meant as one process of uniting the entire society and nation so that
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every member of the society can form one identity and shared values
and also having the feeling of love for and pride in the fatherland
tEnphasis in the original; Appnd. 3.35].'
This endeavour to form a Malaysian identity and shared values
1-ings us to the government 'S policy of infusing Islamic values into
its administration. In chapter 14 where government policies are
examined, Malhi begins by stating, among other things, that (p.285)
'The infusion of Islamic Values policy is not meant to Islamise the
non-Muslims. The government hopes that all races in Malaysia would be
able to appreciate and practise noble Islamic values which are good.
and do not conflict with the teachings of other religions... The
Islamic values that can be absorbed by all races are trust, justice,
discipline, cleanliness, honesty, the spirit of cooperation,
neighbourliness, hard work, racial harmony, consideration and
selflessness. ['frans. Appnd. 3.36]' This point about Islamic values
is repeated in the chapter summary no.11 on page 289; the
multiple-choice question number 4 on page 292; the discursive question
no.4 on page 294; and the 'homework' question no.2 (iii) on page 295.
The claim that these values are Islamic and hence merit their adoption
by all Malaysians irrespective of ethnic origins and faiths may
alienate the non-Muslim readers for these values are also espoused by
other religions that are found in Malaysia. In other words, these
shared values that are iitherently positive and are not exclusive to
Islam, when approached in this fashion, might have a disruptive effect
on the multiethnic and multireligious Malaysia. Mutually positive
values of all these religious traditions, could have been stressed and
promoted - as have been indirectly insisted by Malhi in the 'homework
exercise' section (p.22°). Malhi also suggests in this chapter that
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unity can be achieved in two main ways, integration and assimilation.
Maihi adds that (p.199-200) elements of integration, a process of
forming one national identity (emphasis in the original) among
disparate groups, can be found in the realms of regional, economic,
cultural, social, educational and political integration. On
assimilation, he cautions that (p.200), given the context of the
nation, total assimilation is rather difficult because of religious
differences and strong ethnic feelings that can pose a major obetacle
to inter-marriages. The non-Malay reader may tend to agree with the
dangers of assimilation, and as a result favour integration.
On problems of unity in the Malaysian society, Malbi lists the
following factors (pp.200-203): (a) religious and cultural
differences; (b) the British divide-and-nile policy; (c) separate
educational system; (d) separate economic activities; (e) ethnic
associations; and (f) the Japanese Occupation. Having said this, Maihi
then touches on (as is shown in the following) several factors which,
according to him, constitute the solutions to these problems of unity.
What is significant here is that by pointing out what are deemed to be
problems of unity and later offering their 'solutions,' Maihi has in
effect given the reader the impression that these solutions -
especially if they are then repeated, and thus reinforced, in other
forms - are not only the official, and hence rational, ones, bit also
quite 'natural'. He has therefore defined the parameters of discussion
on this issue of unity, thereby excluding alternative and perhaps more
effective solutions to the problems. In other words, as far as the
book is concerned what has been said in this chapter about national
unity constitutes the 'culturally significant knowledge' (Luke, de
Castell and Luke in de Castell et al. (ads) 1989:246). In the
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'homework exercise' section ( p . 220), Maihi does ask the reader to make
a study of the cultural coinmonalities between the Malays, Chinese arxi.
Indians - instead of merely focusing on their religious and cultural
differences. And as for the steps taken by the Government, Maihi
provides the following (pp. 203-213): (a) Pukunegara (the national
ideology that contains five principles: U) Belief in God; (ii)
Loyalty to King and Country; (iii) Upholding the Constitution; (iv)
Rule of Law; and (v) Good Behaviour and Morality [Trans.]); (b) New
Economic Policy (NEP); (c) National Education Policy; (d) National
Culture Policy; (e) National Language; (f) National Unity Department;
(g) the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) party; and (h)
regional integration. All of these remedial measures that have been
taken by the Government are again mentioned in the chapter summary
no.5 on pages 213-215. There are at least two of the proposed
'remedies' which are problematic: national culture policy and Barisan
Nasional party. The first is a policy that is still controversial and
potentially divisive, while the second one in itself can be and has
been, on a number of occasions, a source of ethnic tension and
disunity.
The re-emergence of the following in the 'multiple-choice
questions' section (pp.216-219) has the effect of emphasising their
importance: Rukunectara (nos .2 and 3); the NEP (nos .4 and 6); the
National Education Policy (nos. 8 and 9); the National Culture Policy
(no.7); and the National Unity Department (no. 10). And the subject of
Rukunecrara is again mentioned on page 220 in discursive question no.3;
National Culture Policy and the NEP in discursive question no.5; and
regional integration in discursive question no.6. Malhi, in the
chapter (four) on the 'Administrative Structure of the Federal
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Government' • states that (p.81) the National Unity Department is one
of the nine government agencies arid public enterprises which are
directly responsible to the Prime Minister's Department. This may
imply, rightly or wrongiy, that the Prime Minister's Department places
great importance to the question of national unity.1
(j) The Monarchy
Under the chapter (3) on the 'System of Government and Malaysian
Administration', Maihi, like Othman et al. 's two books, touches on the
subject of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or the King of Malaysia
(pp.53-55). Here the King is sketched as a 'symbol of sovereignty and
national unity. [p.54; Trans. Apprid. 3.37]' The King is also described
on page 145 as the head of the Islamic religion in states where there
are no Malay rulers. In states where there are Malay rulers, the
latter are the heads of Islam in their respective states. The role of
the King in the framework of parliamentary system is also examined on
pages 156 and 163. Arid this point is further emphasised in the chapter
summary no. 8 on page 167 where it says, 'Bills that are passed by the
Dewan Rakyat (Lower House) arid the Dewan Neqara (Upper House) need the
consent (except that which is provided for in Article 66) of the King
before they are made laws (Trans. Apprid. 3.38).' Apart from this, the
King, as already mentioned earlier, is also said to be (p.55)
'responsible in protecting the special position of the Malays and the
Bumiputeras in Sabah arid Sarawak. [Trans. Appnd. 3.39]' This
constitutional provision is well guarded so that should any change be
made to it, it would require the consent of the Conference of (Malay)
Rulers of which the King is a member (p.57).
The significance of the King and the Conference of Rulers is
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amplified by its repetitive mention on page 72 where discursive
question no. 3 asks, 'What are the functions of the Conference of
Rulers [Trans. Appnd. 3.40]?' and in 'homework' question no. 2 (on the
same page) which reads, 'Make a study of the importance arid role of
the Conference of Rulers in the Malaysian system of government [Trans.
Appnd. 3.41] •1 The significance of the Conference of Rulers is once
again highlighted on page 111 where it is portrayed as the important
coordinating mechanism between the federal arid state governments.
Maihi adds, 'This Conference of Rulers can discuss any matters
concerning national policies. ' Malay religious and custom matters can
be solved by it. ny changes to the Constitution arid state boundaries
require its consent. [&phasis in the original; Appnd. 3.42]' Pnother
role of the King and the Conference of Rulers is that the former is
responsible in appointing Malaysia's judges after receiving the advice
of the Prime Minister who in turn has already discussed with the
Conference of Rulers (p.l'78). The legal, socio-cultural and political
standing of the Malay rulers are given more importance and emphasis by
this chapter particularly in areas that concern the interests and
welfare of the Malays and Muslims. Given such a prominence, the
institution of Malay royalty may be easily perceived by the non-Malay
reader as really the symbol of unity and security for Malays, arid not
all Malaysians.
Sentence phrasing and use of terms, themes and concepts
On page 40, Malhi writes:	 'Through the principle of jus soli,
automatic citizenshi p was granted to all who were born in the
Federation of Malaya on or after Independence Day. To reciprocate
this concession, the Chinese arid Indians who were represented by the
Malayan chinese ,ssociation (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Corress
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(MIC) had acknowledged the special position of the Ma lays who had been
left behind in areas of economy and education. [nphasis in the
original; Appnd. 3.43]' The use of the phrase 'the Chinese and
Indians who were represented by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)...' gives the impression that,
first, all Chinese and Indians were represented by these two
respective political organisations and secondly, all of the members of
these two ethnic groups had agreed to this 'political bargain', which
in fact was not the case. There were people in these two groups who
disagreed with this pol itical arrangement for they argued that this
would contravene the principle of equality for all the citizens of the
country.
In his discussion of national unity and measures taken to help
foster good ethnic relations, Malhi cites the ruling Barisan Nasional
party as one of the means to achieve ethnic unity in the country,
which is a debatable contention. He states: 'It can't be denied that
Barisan Nasional has contributed to political and national unity.
Through Barisan Nasional, social and national problems can be solved
via consultation, understanding and tolerance. [Trans. Appnd. 3.44]'
Apart from it being a contentious statement as argued elsewhere, the
use of the phrase, 'It can't be denied that...' is not only
questionable but also has the effect of 'bulldozing' one's idea onto
the reader without him/her realising it.
Note
1. It needs to be pointed out here, though, that the National
Unity (NU) Department started out as National Unity Ministry in
1972. However, in 1974 its status was demoted to National Unity
Board, and in 1980 it changed to National Unity Department in the
Prime Minister's Department (NU Department's undated pamphlet).
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(ii) Mimi Kartini Saidi & Rahiinah Salim (1988). Pelenqkap Din:
Penq'ajian Am STPM (Self-Preparatory: General Studies PM), Kuala
thmpur, Federal Publications.
This 306-page book, which serves to help guide the students at
the Form Six level in preparing themselves for their General Studies
examination paper at the end of their two-year' studies, is divided
into four sections: (1] 'Introduction' (pp.3-43); [2] 'Excerpted
Articles for Exercises' (pp.47-201); [3] 'Change of Communication
Form' (pp . 205-280); and [4] 'Problem Solving' ( pp . 283-296).
The Analysis
ThE CUIJPJIAL
(a) National lanquae
Sample question 2 (pp.28-30) in Chapter 3 (on Sample Questions
and 'A Guide to Preparing the Framework of An Essay') reads, 'Explain
the problems of the lack of children's reading books particularly
those in the national language, and also suggest measures to overcome
them. [Trans. Appnd. 4.1]' The given introduction of the essay's
sample framework says that there is not only a lack of children's
books as compared with those for adults, ixit also insufficient
children's books in the national language as compared with those in
other languages. The essay concludes that writers and publishers of
children's books should cooperate with each other in improving the
book situation, whilst at the same time it proposes that schools and
the government should encourage the publishing of more of those books
in the national language. The writer's concern with the lack of
children's books and particularly those in the national language seems
genuine given the notion that this would be one of the ways of
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popularising the national language. The reader may also connect this
concern for more use of the national language in children's reading
materials with the histogram (p.223) in the Prose to Graphics' part,
which displays the distrib.ition of marks in Bahasa Malaysia (national
language) of Form Three students. It contends that there are still a
number of students who have failed their Bahasa Malaysia paper quite
miserably. The issue of the use of the national language emerges again
in Exercise 1 (pp.261-262). under the 'Exercises for the transition
from Prose to Graphics'. Here data of a census conducted on 7,596
government and government-aided schools in Malaysia in 1983-4 shows,
among others, that the teacher-student ratio is not good. It is also
here that the lack of the mastery of the national language is raised.
The information expresses concern over the fact that of the 72 of
students in the '10-year and above' age group who are literate, 'only
54 can master the Malaysian language, that is, Malaysia's national
language' [p.261; Trans. Appnd. 4.21.
The question of national language does occupy a lot of the book
writers' attention. Exercise 2 (pp.92-94) is on the text entitled,
'Bahasa Menunjukkan Bangsa' (Language Reflects A Race/Nation). The
writer of this extract holds that language in the old Malay society
used to be an indicator of a person's social conduct and etiquette.
He acknowledges however that development arid changes in modern times
may have made this an inaccurate gauge. He also perceives language as
an identity of a nation. Is it really true that a language reflects
the people's spirit, thinking, woridview, etc.? he asks. He says, yes
and no. Yes, he states, in the case of Indonesia, for instance, where
Indonesians from all over the country ' s vast regions not only
communicate through the Indonesian language kut are also made to
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'feel' Indonesian by the use of their national language. However,
language is not a reflection of a nation of people in the case of, for
example, the Philippines where the nationalist sentiments of the
people are not reflected in Tagalog, their national language. This is
because, argues the writer, Filipinos still need English language to
communicate among themselves. In the case of Malaysia, he asserts
that the country is in the process of not only making its national
language a tool of inter-ethnic communication 1it also a language of
nationalism. All of the five objective questions that follow the
article focus arid lay emphasis on the importance of a national
language, particularly Malaysia's national language (pp.95-96):
Question 1 concerns the notion of 'language reflects a race/nation' in
Malay society; Question 2 is about the idea of slogan in Indonesian
society; Question 3 seeks out the reader's understanding of the term
'state language'; Question 4 tries to find out the reader's grasp of
the term 'national language'; and Question 5 seeks the reader's
knowledge of activities that have been conducted to make Malay
language as Malaysia's national language.
As mentioned elsewhere, the issue of language has been
controversial in multiethnic Malaysia so that, in the wake of the
ethnic conflict of 1969, the status of the Malay language as the
national language and at the same time the position of other
vernacular languages, protected arid written into the Malaysian
constitution in Article 152, have been shunt from the arena of public
debate by an amendment to the Sedition Act of 1948. The emphasis
given by this arid the other General Studies books on the issue of
national language as well as the constitutional arid legal protection
accorded to the language itself reflects a conscious desire on the
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part of the government and the book writers to promote and project the
Malay language as Malaysia's national language. This project is thus a
constitutional and historical imperative in the long-tenn objective of
the State to attain what is seen to be the coveted status of a
developed, modern polity.
The issue of language is still pursued as illustrated by the
extracted article in Exercise 3 (pp.96-100), entitled 'Interpretasi
dan Bahasa Uridang-undang' (Interpretation arid Legal Language), which
basically calls for a vigorous effort to translate laws and statutes
in Malaysia which were originally written in English. While
recognising the many difficulties, particularly technical ones, in
translating legal materials, the writer nevertheless argues for the
utmost importance of translating legal works into Malay language by
virtue of its official status as Malaysia's national language. It is
therefore less of a surprise that all of the five objective questions
following the extract concern themselves with the problems associated
with translating legal works in Malaysia (pp.98-100): Question 1
revolves around the concern about the lack of interest of the local
intellectuals in writing law books; Question 2 is about a linguist who
cannot translate legal texts into the national language; Question 3
concerns legal experts who have less interest in translating legal
texts; Question 4 seeks out the reader's ability to ascertain who
would be the best to do the translation work; arid Question 5 asks the
reader to spell out factors that cause the dearth of legal texts in
the national language. This is therefore presented as one area where
proponents of the national language would like to see more use of the
language. This is also one step towards making the status of the
national language more meaningful. As we can see, since the beginning
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of this cultural section heavy emphasis has been given to the
political, legal, social and, cultural significance of Malaysia's
national language. Not only that, this subject is also treated at
great length in Peixiai ian Am 1 (Othman et al.). Keneqaraan Malaysia
(Maihi) and Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long) which in essence give support to
the national language, thus making this emphasis more pronounced. In
contrast, nothing much, if at all, has been said in this book on the
other aspect of Article 152 of the Malaysian constitution, i.e. the
status and uses of other vernacular languages. Such a degree of
emphasis on the national language could well be interpreted as
marginal izing and down-grading the legitimate position of other
vernacul ars.
(b) Racism
The issue of racism is discussed in Exercise 7 (pp.70-74) in
Section 2 where there is an extract from a UNESCO publication, Kurier,
entitled, 'Faham Perkauman Pada Han mi' (Racism Today). The article
begins (p.70):
If all of the writings that support racism were to be
summarised, it will be found that in general the content of
those writings would fall into three categories of
statement: first, the notion of the original or genuine
race; second, that original race is biologically superior
and thus that particular racial group is also
psychologically and culturally superior; and third, this
superiority legitimises its dominance and socio-historical
privileges (over others) [Trans. Appnd. 4.3].
The article asserts that recent scientific study reveals that the
above claims are untrue. Nevertheless, it cautions, these myths still
prevail and persevere because of the social situation in which one
group has to interact with the others which the former considers
different. The claim of dominance of the 'superior group' over the
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' inferior group' is, it emphasises, a mere ideological tool of the
former to take control over resources aval lable to both groups and
hence, to exploit the latter.
The cautionary note of the writer of the above article is
repeated in the objective questions that follow. Question 1 (p.73)
says (in its given answer) that the gist of the article is that racism
is formed in order to 'show' the uniqueness of a particular race of
people.
Question 3 [p.73; Trans. Appnd. 4.4] reads:
The writer tries to illustrate that racism is a device to
legitimise aggression and. to grant privileges. The real meaning
to all this is
a. to enable a particular race to obtain privileges.
b. to control other races.
c. to gain control over material benefits from other races.
d. to achieve security and survival.
e. to ensure the security of a particular society.
The answer given is (bY.
And Question 4 (p.73; Trans. Appnd. 4.5] reads:
According to the writer, in order to survive a human being must
do the following. Which of the following is not relevant to the
context of the extract? (Enphasis in the original.)
a. to be aggressive.
b. to defend one's rights.
c. to act in a manner of aggression.
d. to cooperate.
e. to adopt racism.
The answer given is (d), because it does not relate to the
example of an aggressive and exploitative human environment as
illustrated by this extract.
The extract and. its multiple-choice questions above should serve
as an eye-opener to the reader in a society where ethnicity becomes
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politically, culturally and economically significant. Bat more than
that, this constitutes one of the positive portions of the book in
that its writers have chosen an extract that is constructive in
helping to generate an understanding and appreciation of non-racist
attitude and behaviour in a multiethnic society. This certainly
contrasts with the negative approach of Peraiian m 1 (Othman et a J..)
which implicitly glorifies so-called racial differences. In addition,
this also contrasts with the 'exclusive' tendency projected in the
article in A. Long that calls for the cultural 'purification' of Malay
songs. Many readers, Malay or iion-Malay, may be able to appreciate and
even promote this critical view of racism in so far as s/he does not
succumb to some strong pressure from her/his ethnic community to
conform to its own dictates and narrow interests, apart from the
potential 'fear' of what constitutes the preferred view of the
exanilnation authorities regarding race-related issues.
(c) National identity
The extracted article in Exercise 8 (pp. 74-78), entitled
'Pewuiudan Keperibadian Nasional' (The Creation of a National
Identity), is, as the title suggests, essentially about Malaysia's
desire and attempt in having its own national identity. th Chot Cha
than, the writer of the original article, expresses the importance for
Malaysia to have its own national identity, especially in the face of
what he calls 'cultural imperialism' of the British colonial power
whose legacy he feels is still felt today in many areas of Malaysian
life such as education. He writes (p.74),
Among the important features of a national identity of
a Malaysian nation is, having the pride of being and
considering oneself as a Malaysian race that is perceived
to have a joint possession of symbols of independence,
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language, arts, history and aspirations; living under the
guidance of the Rukuneqara; possessing the sentiment of a
Malaysian nation that lives harmoniously in an independent
and sovereign country; and having the love for and loyalty
towards the nation, king and country. [Trans. Appnd. 4.6]
In addition, the writer asks what Malaysians have achieved in
creating and assessing the features of a national identity. His
response is (p.75): 'There is still a certain group that practises
separate behavioural system, cultural and social values, and social
organisations that at times come in conflict with the national
aspirations [Trans. Apprid. 47].' Readers at a glance may wonder
which group the writer is referring to. A hint can perhaps be found
from the writer's further statements below.
Given this perceived unsatisfactory achievement in the effort to
create a national identity, the writer suggests a number of measures,
one of which is to intensify the introduction of cultural activities
that are based on elements of national culture in schools,
'particularly in those schools which have many non-Malay students
[p.76; Trans. Appnd. 4.8]' (emphasis added). He adds (p.76), 'In this
matter, it is most appropriate of the Ministry of Education to
establish a Malaysian Schools Cultural Council on 16 July 1984, which
can give guidance to headmasters regarding cultural activities in
schools so as to ensure that they are consonant with the national
culture. [nphas is added. Trans. Appnd. 4.9]'
The writer also suggests that (p.76-7) 'The Ministry of Education
should direct all schools, particularly those secondary schools that
are huge and with students of various ethnic backqround to hold
special gatherings in schools in conjunction with the National Day
every year. In this gathering, speeches whose themes revolve around
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love for the country and to remember the nationalist figures. to sing
patriotic songs, to declare one's loyalty to king and country, and the
staging of short dramas that praise the beauty of the country. This is
one effective step to forge the love for the country, nationalistic
feeling and features of a Malaysian national identity. (Enphasis
added; Trans. Appnd. 4.10]' As in the previous paragraph, the special
reference to schools which are of 'various ethnic background' points
to the writer's apparent concern about non-Malay cultural activities
that are seen to be at variance with the main principles of the
proposed national culture. And 'hence, he points out the need to give
special attention to schools having students from different ethnic
groups in inculcating the spirit of nationalism as well as elements of
the national culture. 2 Thus, at this juncture, the reader can not
only identify the 'separatist' group that the writer tries to imply,
but also infer that the 'national identity' that the writer promotes
is one that is based on the national culture that is defined by the
government, i . e. Malay-based. And if one were to take this definition
of Malaysia' s national culture, then all the other General Studies
book (except perhaps Maihi's) that have discussed extensively the
subject of national culture can be said to have been involved in the
construction of this kind of national identity. A non-Malay reader,
while possibly appreciating the need 'to have a joint possession of
symbols of independence, language, arts, history and aspirations'. may
feel alienated by this insinuation from the text. Even here, too,
crucial questions could be raised about 'whose' symbols the writer is
talking about.
The writer adds that (pp.77-78) steps should also be taken to
continuously promote the national identity in the larger society. 'In
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this regard, RTM (Radio-Television Malaysia) and '1V3 (private
television station) can make important and effective contributions.
PTM and TV3 should provide a lot of local fares of high quality
regarding local history, memoirs of nationalists, the beauty of
Malaysia, dramas with nationalistic themes, patriotic songs and
positive sayings. [Trans. Appnd. 4.11]' Taking the cue from his
previous statements above, 'important and effective contributions'
would necessarily mean the mass cajoling of the people to accept the
dominant Malay elements of the national culture. This 'mass cajoling'
notwithstanding, students in particular and teenagers in general may
just find themselves instead easily 'lured' to the attractions of the
popular culture such as Western and local pop songs, 'commercial-type'
movies and videos, etc.
One of the two discursive questions that follow immediately after
this extract reads (p.78), 'A national identity and culture isn't
possible to be formed in most multiracial societies [Trans. Appnd.
4.12].' Given the 'preferred view' of the above writer and the
education authorities in general, readers may find theinse ives
consciously or otherwise reaching for the expected conclusion: that a
'national identity and culture' can be established in a multiethnic
society.
The concern for Malaysia's national identity is also reflected in
the objective questions following the extracted article. The problem
of achieving this goal is repeated in Question 2 which reads (p.79):
In the writer's opinion Malaysia's national identity has not been
formed yet because
a. there are different behavioural characteristics in the
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Malaysian society.
b. it needs time, for national identity cannot be formed within a
short space of time.
c. foreign culture still has a strong influence within Malaysian
society.
d. of the cool attitude of some Malay leaders towards the idea of
creating a national identity.
e. all of the aixve. (Trans. Appnd. 4.13]
The answer given is (b).
Such a great emphasis given on and concern for the subject of
'national identity' by the book writers - who express, implicitly or
otherwise, their support for such an ideological construction as well
as cautioning the reader of certain opposition to this project -
ref lects the important observation of Anthony Smith (1988:206):
Creating nations is a recurrent activity, which has to be
renewed periodically. It is one that involves ceaseless
re-interpretations, rethscoveries and reconstructions;
each generation must re-fashion national institutions and
stratification systems in the light of the myths,
memories, values and symbols of the 'past', which can best
minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant
social groups and institutions. Hence, that activity of
rediscovery and re-interpretation is never complete and
never simple; it is the product of dialogues between the
major social groups and institutions within the boundaries
of the 'nation', and it answers to their perceived ideals
and interests.
(d) Malay cultural heritage
'Memelihara Pusaka Budaya' (Protecting Cultural Heritage) is an
article on which Exercise 7 (pp.111-114) is based. The article, as its
title suggests, discusses the importance and techniques of protecting
and maintaining cultural artefacts that may take the form of
architecture, historical sites and documents, etc. The significance
of this article can only be felt and appreciated after the reader has
read a few of the articles mentioned below that basically discuss arid
highlight certain aspects of Malay cultural heritage.
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(e) Malay culture
(i) Naming names
Exercise 9 (pp.80-82) revolves around an article about 'Menamakan
Nama' (Naming Names) of babies. As its title suggests, the article
focuses on the social practice of the Malay community in naming new
born babes. For instance, the writers say that some Malay parents,
when attempting to name their offspring, would be guided by their
Islamic faith, in terms of the names of prophets and Arabic names in
general . The practice of naming names, they add, changes with the
passage of time. Similarly, the Indian community would normally refer
to its religious leaders before giving names to new born babies.
The writers do stress however the need to exercise caution when
christening offspring in a multiethnic society like Malaysia. 	 They
argue that certain names may mean different things to different ethnic
groups, which in certain cases could only elicit laughter. They give
an example of a fictitious Chinese name that was originally concocted
by a famous Malay journalist, Ishak Haji Mohamad - Tong Sam Pah
(literally meaning, in Malay, dustbin). At this point, it should be
said that a non-Malay reader may suspect that the use of such a
'Chinese name' could be more than mere coincidence: an act of mischief
on the part of the book writers. As it is, there is no mention here of
a Chinese way of naming names. The article however concludes that for
the more liberal, the response to all this is simply: what 's in a
name?
While there is an apparent attempt (as exemplified above), albeit
somewhat limited, to include the practices of naming names among all
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the major ethnic groups in the article, all of the five objective
questions that follow it (pp.83-84) relates to things Malay only:
Question 1 relates to the tracing of the origins of traditional Malay
names; Question 2 is about the Malay name 'Damak' that is normally
associated with certain human attributes; Question 3 is on certain
Malay names that do not originate from Peninsular Malaysia; Question 4
concerns the social status that is attached to a particular Malay
name; and Question 5 is regarding certain Malay names that take into
consideration certain factors that would determine the former's
suitability. Though some may argue that the Malay practice of naming
names is a trivial matter, its inclusion in this book nevertheless
registers the apparent perception on the part of the book writers that
aspects of Malay culture need to be highlighted in light of the
government's attempt at forming a national culture that is based on
Malay culture. Here the non-Malay reader would not be happy with the
marginalizing of certain aspects of her/his own culture.
(ii) Malay aesthetics
E<ercise 8 (pp.114-118) focuses on 'Prinsip-prinsip Seni Dalam
Estetika Melayu' (The Principles of Fine ,rts in Malay Aesthetics).
The principles examined by the writer are what he terms as 'Prinsip
Berhalus' (Principle of Fineness) (The concern here is towards the
fineness and precision of the object of art.]; 'Prinsip Berguna'
(Principle of Utility) (The emphasis here is for the object of art to
be functional as well as aesthetic.]; 'Prinsip Bersatu' (Principle of
Unity) (The stress is on the holistic approach towards the object of
art.]; 'Prinsip Berlawan' (Principle of Conflict) (Attention is also
given to the tension that embothes the object of art.]; and 'Prinsip
Berlambang' (Principle of the Symbolic) [An object of art, apart from
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beirç functional, is also symbolic in nature.]. Following this
article are five objective questions (pp.118-119), all of whom focus
on aspects of Malay culture and arts: Question 1 on Malay concept of
fine arts; Question 2 on the use of symbols in Malay fine arts;
Question 3 on the Malay 'Principle of Fineness'; Question 4 on the
(Malay) 'Principle of Egalitarianism'; and Question 5 on a particular
characteristic of the Malays. Thus the stress here is on Malay arts.
(iii) Malay traditional theatre
The article in Exercise 9 pp.119-123), 'Teater Tradisional Asia
Tenggara - Wayang Kul it' (Southeast Asian Traditional Theatre - the
Shadow Play), discusses one particular form of a traditional theatre,
the Shadow Play, which has been popular in Southeast Asian region,
particularly Indonesia, Malaysia (known as 'Wayang Kul it', for both
countries), Thai land ('Narç Tal lur') and Cambodia ('Ayang'). The
writer holds that theatre in Southeast Asia, whose area encompasses
Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Peninsular Malaysia, Indonesia and
the Philippines, used to be considered by archaeologists, art and
theatre experts as part of the larger group of the Indian theatre.
Given such a cultural history, it is perhaps no surprise that the
Shadow Play is said to be very much influenced by elements in the
Hindu culture and religion, in particular the epic of Ramayana and
Mahabrata. This Indian cultural influence underlines the general
theme of the ensuing objective questions (pp.122-123): number 1 (asks
which aspects of the Shadow Play have an Indian influence); 2 (asks
what is meant by the term 'larger India' in Southeast Asian
archaeology and history); arid 5 (the reader is asked to associate the
character 'Pak Dogol' in the Malaysian Shadow Play with that found in
the Hindu-Buddhist epic). It is therefore implied here that certain
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J-li.ndu/Indian cultural elements have been incorporated into Malay
traditional theatre.
(iv) Malay literature
The part on 'Creative Literary Works' (pp.169-201) exhibits only
materials written by Malay writers. Apart from Exercise 2
(pp.173-176), which is based on an article about a well-known Malay
journalist/writer, Ishak Haji Mohamad, or popularly known as 'Pak
Sako', the rest of the part is allocated to nine creative works
ranging from extracts of Malay hort stories, to novels and to poems.
Pak Sako in Exercise 2 is sketched as a journalist who was actively
involved in the Malayan independence movement as well as being a
writer critical of the colonial British power and concerned with the
economic and political welfare of the Malay community. Pak Sako was
also an active member of the Kesatuan Mela yu Sinqapura (Singapore
Malay Association), an organisation which 'ref lected the Singapore
Malay community's aspirations to champion the interests of the Malay
race, and be free from the control of the "elitist" lrab-Indian Muslim
leadership' (p.174; Thans. Appnd. 4.14]. The importance of Pak Sako as
a writer, journalist and Malay nationalist is reflected in all of the
five objective questions (pp.175-176) that are presented at the end of
the article. While the non-Malay reader may appreciate the
contribution of Pak Sako to the Malayan independence movement, s/he
may be pressed to find out whether there was any equivalent figure in
the non-Malay communities. Even if there was none, which may not be
the case, it would be educational that that be stated in this book -
but only as a historical fact and not as something to instigate
ethnocentrism with.
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The other nine works selected in this section are: the Malay
novel, Krisis (Crisis), by Alias All; the novel Merah Kuninq Biru (Red
Yellow Blue) by Awang Had Sal 1 eh; poem 'Kedewasaan' (Adulthood) by A.
Razak Jaafar; short story 'Terjebak' (Trapped), by A. Razak Jaafar;
poem 'Saiak Adalah Sajak' (A Poem Is A Poem) by Nawawee Mohamad; short
story 'Jiran' (Neighbour) by Razak Mamat; Indonesian short story 'Om
Pimpah'; short story 'Pulang' (Return) by Maarof Sa 'ad; and short
story 'Wulan Perkasa' (Gladiator Wulan) by S.M. Noor.
The Malay short story 'Jiran' (Neighbour) (pp.188-191) deserves
our attention. It is a story of an old and poor Chinese lady (a Muslim
convert) who, in trying to be a good neighbour, visited her
Malay-Muslim neighbour on the eve of the Islamic new year's
celebration. Her visit was made with the intention of giving money to
the neighbour's children as a form of gifts (here the writer, in
attempting to establish the fact that the old lady is Chinese, uses
the Chinese term aixipow) in view of the festive occasion. The story
thus projects a case of neighbourly act between an old Chinese lady
and her Malay neighbour, and this point is repeated in the following
multiple-choice question no. 3 ('The old lady gently smiled and with
affection. Why?' The answer given is: 'This is a normal practice
when two neighbours meet.' [Trans. Appnd. 4.15]) However, in the
objective question no.5 (pp.190-i), the short story writer as well as
the writers of the book are inclined to establish the fact that 'the
old lady is not Malay' (emphasis added); she is a Muslim convert. It
seems from here that human compassion, love and understanding are
still subordinated to one's ethnic origin. Put another way, a Chinese
person who embraces Islam may not necessarily be perceived as Malay by
some Malays, despite the Malaysian constitutional definition, because
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of suspicion between sections of the two ethnic groups. More
appreciation of this human and neighbourly deed may have been invested.
by the reader in the old lady than in the fact that the book writers
include such material in the book. To conclude, like A. Long who
employs only Malay cultural contents, the writers of this book have
primarily culled local literary works from the Malay world, excluding
those of the non-Ma 1 ays.
(f) Islam
(i) Islamic literature
Exercise 10 (pp.l23-l26) is based on an article originally
written by Kassim lthinad, 'Kritikan Sastera Islam' (The Critique of
Islamic Literature), in the Malay monthly Dewan Sastera. It discusses
factors involved in criticism - the problems of values and assessment,
including interpretation and explanation. He said that Islamic
literary criticism should consider three factors: (a) literary
tradition and convention; the literary work's socio-economnic,
political, social, intellectual, moral and spiritual statement; and
the writer's personality, which includes his/her education,
experience, thoughts, ambition and woridview. The inclusion of this
article is not inappropriate, for the question of Islam in Malay
literature attracts a lot of attention among literary figures arid
intellectuals, particularly the Malay ones, in the context of Islamic
resurgence in Malaysia. 4
 The significance of this issue is further
boosted by the fact that Islamic elements are regarded as one of the
major components of the proposed national culture, and also the fact
that all the other General Studies books analysed, too, have touched
on aspects of Islam.
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(ii)Islamic approach to knowledge
The article in Exercise 10 (pp.84-87), entitled 'Etika
Penibelajaran' (The Ethics of Learning), argues for an Is laniic approach
towards the notion and practice of knowledge-acquisition. Knowledge
here is perceived as being connected to human and social
responsibilities arid thus the role of the teacher is more ethical than
technical in nature. It asserts that Islam places great importance on
knowledge that benefits the society at large in spiritual,
intellectual and material terms and not merely pursuing knowledge for
its own sake. Islam, it adds, also gives importance to teachers who
not only provide knowledge to the learner but also set a good example
for others to follow.
(iii)Islamic law
In the 'Comprehension exercises' drawn up under the 'Humanities'
rubric, Exercise 1 (pp.89-91) addresses itself to an article written
by Siddiq Fadhil, 'Perundangan Islam' (Islamic Law), in the Malay
daily Berita Harian. This article, which is then re-titled for the
book as 'Perundangan Islam di Alan Melayu' (Islamic Law in the Malay
World), argues for the rapid implementation of Islamic law in
Malaysia. The writer begins (p.89),
The demand for the implementation of Islamic law is a
justified demand and valid in order to reinstate the
Islamic law to its rightful place as the original law of
the Malay States, as had been acknowledged by the court
which acted as the executioner and interpreter through the
decisions it made in the following cases concerned: [Trans.
Appnd. 4.16]
The article then quotes three major court cases in 1927, 1939 and 1982
which essentially acknowledged that Islamic law is 'the law of the
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land'. It must be pointed out here that the act of changing the title
of the article from 'Islamic Law' to 'Islamic law in the Malay World'
has the effect of establishing close ties between Islam and a cultural
region that is still seen as 'Malay', as opposed to Islam and
(multiethnic and multireligious) Malaysia. This may also project an
impression, real or imagined, in the reader of an attempt to
'ethnicise' a universal religion such as Islam.
The writer concludes that the constitutional provision that
'Islam is the religion of 'the Federation [Trans.]' must be
strengthened by having more provisions in the constitution so as to
produce the effect of making Islamic teachings the primary legal and
guiding sources in the legislative processes of the Parliament arid the
state assemblies in the country. The discursive question and the
objective questions following the above article would remind the
reader of the stress given to Islamic law in the country. The
discursive question (p.91) reads, 'Is Malaysia an Islamic country?
What are the characteristics that can help identify whether a country
is Islamic or not? [Trans. Appnd. 4.17]' The objective question 1
(p.91) reads, 'Why does the writer present three sample cases for the
reader's perusal right at the start of the extract?' The answer given
is: 'To determine that the judges recognised Islamic law as the
foundation of the country's law. [Trans. Appnd. 4.18]' Question 2
(pp.91-92) is rather more insistent on the notion of Islam being the
'law of the land': 'What is the strong proof to demonstrate that Islam
is the "law of the land" in Malaysia?' The answer given is: 'The
existence of Islamic influence in the governance of the Malay states.
[Trans. Appnth 4.19]' And the last objective question (no.5; p.92) on
this subject clearly emphasises the writer's concern:
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What is the primary message of the writer in this article?
a. Islam should be made the foundation of the nation's
legislation.
b. Western ideas must be obstructed in the attempt to create an
Islamic law.
c. Malaysia must be governed according to Islamic laws.
d. Islam should always be recognised as the religion of the
Federation.
e. Government policies must be based on the Quran and Sunnah
(Thans. Appnd. 4.20].
The answer given for the aix,ve question is (a), reflecting a bias in
the selection of the article itself.
-I
The above article, discursive question, multiple-choice questions
1, 2 and 5 all strongly argue for the implementation of Islamic law in
Malaysia, a proposition that finds itself not in discord with the
emphases that have been lain in the other General Studies books
analysed. Besides, such an argument comes closer towards fulfilling -
as the other books would attest - one of the requirements of the
national culture proposal, i . e. Is lam is one of its main components;
this also constitutes a part of the government's commitment to inject
certain Islamic values into its administration.5 Against this
backdrop, it is thus to be expected that in the main the non-4alay
non-Muslim reader would be apprehensive reading such materials that
have a heavy Islamic slant.
The above extracts, starting from the one on Malay fine arts
onward, show a heavy concentration and emphasis on Malay and also
Islamic cultural artefacts and literary works that implies - with the
one exception of the discussion on the Hindu-based Shadow Play - a
neglect of cultural materials from the Chinese and Indian communities.
This gap lends credence to the view that only Malay literature (or
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literature in Malay) is considered as Malaysian literature as is
pointed out in A. Long. Whilst the extracts concerned may be
educational to the curious, the heavy emphasis on Malay cultural
materials to the exclusion or marginalization of things non-Malay,
which also occurs in the other General Studies books (except Malhi),
may alienate the non-Ma lay reader. 6 This omission certainly runs
against the spirit of the 'Racism' article earlier, which promotes the
notion of coexistence between ethnic groups in society.
ThE POLITICAL
(a) The Opposition
The subject of the Opposition in Malaysia is examined in sample
question 4 (pp.31-32) which reads, 'Why has the government created the
post of the Opposition leader in Parliament? What is the role of the
Opposition in Parliament? [Trans. Appnd. 4.21]' In the introduction of
the essay's skeletal framework, in responding to the above question,
the writers state (p.31):
A democratic system needs a government that governs through
discussion. Discussion is the very fouiilation of the
formation and exchange of opinions, even though the
discussion is done in a coffee shop or more importantly at
the level of Parliament. Thus, in a Parliament that
functions as a hall of discussion at a higher level, the
opinion of the Government must be reviewed and debated so
that the people would know more of the governing process.
This is the responsibility of the Opposition! [Trans.
Appnd. 4.22]
The essay concludes with this positive note (p.32): 'Even though
in the eyes of the government Opposition members in Parliament are
considered as an irresponsible group, the role they play is very
necessary, particularly in making the democratic process more
interesting and more effective. (Trans. Appnd. 4.23)' First of all,
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the inclusion of a topic on the Opposition in Malaysia's parliamentary
system is significant, given the fact that no other General Studies
books analysed have broached this important subject. For this promotes
the notion of legitimate political opposition and dissent in the
reader's mind, especially when s/he is told in this book and Peraiian
Am 1 that Malaysia is embarking on a controversial project of forging
a national culture. This is an enterprise that requires, in the words
of Anthony Smith (1988:206), continuous 'dialogues' between prominent
social groups. Besides, the concept of the Opposition as envisaged by
this book sits well within the wider framework of fundamental
liberties or basic freedoms that are highlighted in Othman et al.
(both books), Maihi and A. Long.
THE ECONOMIC
(a) Socio-economic justice
The guide essay 4 in Section 1 (p.42) is responding to an essay
topic that reads: 'The social chaos of a society originates from its
own economic instability. Discuss. [Trans. Appnd. 4.24]' The thrust of
the essay is generally summarised by its second paragraph (p.42): 'If
the economic position of a society is unstable, this will indirectly
create social problems which in turn threaten the security of the
society. [Trans. Appnd. 4.25]' The economic well-being of a society is
indeed central to the concern of this essay, and this also parallels
with the sentiments of writers of the previous books. Othman et al.
(Penqajian Am 2) and Malhi (Keneqaraan Malaysia), who turn their
attention to the problems of poverty, particularly among the majority
of the Malays. In other words, what is essentially referred to is the
economic welfare of the Malays. And as far as this book is concerned,
the central message of the above essay is given substance by the
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following exercises in the book.
(I) Institutional assistance
The Malaysian government has taken a number of steps to ensure
that soclo-economic development benefits the people. Exercise 13
(pp.277-278), under the 'Exercises to change from Prose to the
Graphics', is based on a piece of information that discusses one of
the steps taken by the Malaysian government to help develop the
(predominantly Malay) rural sector of the peninsular economy. This is
done through the setting up of cooperative called Pusat Peinbanqunan
Keluara (Family Development Centre). Through the centre - and there
were, by 1985, 179 such centres - aid is given to the farmers and
their agric.xltural produce collected and marketed. The non-Malay
reader, especially Chinese, would feel that such governmental
assistance is immense especially in contrast with the lack of
political and economic willpower on the part of the government to
assist, for instance, (Chinese) dwellers of New Villages 7 - as is
also demonstrated by the conspicuous neglect of all the General
Studies books (except Penqajian Pan 1, which doesn't cover economic
matters) in projecting and discussing poverty of the non-Malays.
(ii) Malays in the corporate sector
Apart from Malays' economic activities in the agricultural sector
of the Malaysian economy, the Malaysian government is also concerned
with Malays' participation, or lack of participation, in the business
sector. Exercise 3 (pp.263-264) of the 'Prose to Graphics' part is
about the New Economic Policy, particularly its second objective, i.e.
to upgrade Bumiputeras' participation in the national assets
acquisition. It expresses concern over the slow rate of Bumiputera
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acquisition vis-a-vis that of the non-Malays. Thus, it comments
(p.264):
In 1985 shares acquisition in limited companies
increased to M$76,000 million, where Bumiputeras'
acquisition increased by 17.8% of the national total.
Other Malaysian people acquired 56.7% whilst acquisition
from foreigners tumbled to 25.5%. Fom the information
given, the (economic) growth achieved by the Bumiputeras is
rather too slow, i . e., only 5.3%, while the growth of other
races is 12.1%. (Trans. Appnd. 4.26]
It also adds that based on the Buiniputeras' achievement from 1980 to
1985, it is certain that by 190 (when the NEP expires) the 30% (of
the entire national assets/capital accumulation) target would not be
attained. The discursive question following immediately after this
exercise perhaps expresses the kind of action that some Malays would
like to take in the event of the NEP target not being achieved
(p.264): 'The NEP needs to be extended well beyond its deadline year
of 1990 because the Bumiputera assets acquisition in several sectors
is still below its targeted 30%. [Trans. Appnd. 4.271' As mentioned
elsewhere, the prospect of the targeted 30% not being met by 1990 is
quite likely because the whole Policy was built on the premise that
the Malays would get a bigger share of income and wealth through the
country's increasing economic activities, and not from a
redistribution of income and wealth. 6 If this economic goal is
pursued relentlessly and in a fashion that necessarily neglects the
poor, the Malays in particular, while concentrating on - as the
following exercises below would show - building Malay middle class
and a small group of Malay capitalists, the previous essay topic may
just be a self-fulfilling prophesy: 'The social chaos of a. society
originates from its own economic instability.' In this respect, the
non-Malay reader would be made to feel uncomfortable.
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(iii) Social mobility of the Malays
The following exercise is a reflection of the Malaysian
government's long-term objective to not only upgrade the
socio-economic status of the Malays, but also to ensure a greater
Malay mobility into the upper social and economic strata of Malaysian
society. Exercise 6 (pp.267-268) focuses on the categorisation of
people in Peninsular Malaysia in 1968 by social classes - upper,
middle and lower classes, and these in turn are further sub-divided
into ethnic groups. Hence, tie given statistics show that of the
30,742 upper class families surveyed. 15.5 are Malay, 57.9 Chinese,
16.2 Indian, and 10.4 the 'Others'. In the middle class category,
31 are Malay, 47. 8 Chinese, 14. 9? Indian, and 6. 3 'Others'.
Finally, of the 1,900,056 lower class families surveyed, 50.3 are
Malay, 34.7 Chinese, 12 .8 Indian, and 2. 2 'Others'. And of the
1,000,581 Malay families surveyed, 0.5 are in upper class, 5.8 in
middle class, and 93.7 in lower class. Of the 755,834 Chinese
families, 2.3 are in upper class, 11.9 in middle class, and 85.8 in
lower class. Finally, of the 270,291 Indian families, 1.6 are in
upper class, 9.1 in middle class, and 89.3 in lower class. The
exercise (p.268) following this underlines the apparent concern of the
book writers: 'Present a chart showing: (a) the distribution of races
within each of the social classes in Malaysia; and (b) distribution of
social classes within each of the races in Malaysia as given in the
extract above. [Trans. Appixl. 4.28]' The given statistics show that
the Malays were by and large economically behind the other etbnic
groups. It nonetheless also illustrates that poverty haunts the
non-Ma lays as well. However, it should be noted that the survey was
conducted in 1968, a year before the explosive 1969 riots and the
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formulating of the New Economic Policy. Generally speaking, the
socio-economic position of the Malays - particularly those in the
middle and upper classes - would have improved substantially over
that of 1968. This thus begs the question as to why old data were
used for this exercise. A non-Malay reader, especially if well-read
arid/or socially conscious, would interpret such use of dated
information as an act of legitimising further unconditional economic
assistance to the Malays, or simply a mischievous deed. In addition,
if we were to go by the kiris of 'economic' questions that have been
raised above, the reader may coiiclude that the socio-economic welfare
of the Bunuiputeras generally determines the social and political
stability of the Malaysian society, and that this seems to be the only
concern of this and other General Studies books except Pengaiian Pan 1
(as opposed to worrying about the general welfare of other ethnic
groups in the country as well). Again, all this then would really
provide substance to the essay topic given earlier: 'The social chaos
of a society originates from its own economic instability' as poverty
of the non-Malays doesn't seem to be properly arid effectively tackled.
The non-Malay reader is likely to be disheartened by this prospect.
(c) The glory of the Melaka empire
Exercise 14 (pp.258-259) of the 'Graphics to Prose' section shows
a chart of the then Melaka (Malacca) empire and its trading partners
in Asia and Middle East. The glory of Melaka at this time was
connected to the significant role of the Malay legerry hero, Hang
Tush. Here the reader is asked to show the strength of this Melaka
empire in terms of its trading position arid the role played by Hang
Tush in this commercial arid political achievement. This exercise
represents the writers' conscious selection of that part of Malay
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history which portrays the commercial and political attainment of a
Malay empire and its Malay warrior, Hang Tuah. In the context of this
book, this particular exercise (in relation to other exercises that
concern the socio-economic and political position of the Malays) could
be interpreted as the writers' way of saying that such economic and
political glory of the Malays can, or should, be at least sustained in
modern Malaysia. Put another way, the inclusion of this material
could be perceived as, in the words of 1aymond Williams (1978:116), 'a
deliberately selective and connecting process which offers a
historical and cultural ratifiation of a contemporary order'. As it
is, the other General Studies books except Pengajian m 1 have already
pushed for the socio-economic improvement and modernization of the
Ma lays.
Phrasing of sentences and use of terms
In the 'Comprehension exercises' drawn up under the 'Humanities'
rubric of the book, Exercise 1 (pp.89-91) addresses itself to an
extract, 'Perundangan Islam di Alam Melayu' (Islamic Law in the Malay
World), which argues for the rapid implementation of Islamic law in
Malaysia. The writer begins (p.89),
The demand for the implementation of Islamic law is a
justified demand and valid in order to reinstate the
Islamic law to its rightful place as the original law of
the Malay States, as had been acknowledged by the court
which acted as the executioner and interpreter through the
decisions it made in the following cases concerned...
(Trans. Appnd. 4.16]
The article then quotes three major court cases in 1927, 1939 and 1982
which essentially acknowledged that Islamic law is 'the law of the
land'.
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Phrases which are used above, such as 'a justified demand and
valid...' and 'that Islamic law... "the law of the land" possess a
'commanding' tone so that it leaves little room for alternative
explanation that may not necessarily reach similar conclusion.
Besides, such phrasing gives the impression of them being
'commonsensical' in the Gramscian sense (Forgacs (ed) 1988:421). This
text, extracted in this manner, seems to have deviated from its
original intent (of displaying a view) to one that presents the
popular Islamicist view, particularly when it is already preceded by
an extract that discusses an Is1ain-related matter on pages 84-88.
Summary
On the cultural side, the book places heavy emphasis on aspects
of Malay culture and Islamic tradition, covering discussions of
various aspects of the national language (whose significance is
reinforced via discursive and objective questions format); Malay
practice of naming; Malay aesthetics; Malay traditional theatre; Malay
literature; Islamic literature; Islamic approach to knowledge; and
Islamic law. This and the fact that no attempt is made to introduce to
the reader materials on other ethnic cultures make it very jarring for
the book to include an article that is clearly critical of racism.
Even the discussion on national identity that is given a lengthy
treatment veers towards the importance of Malay culture. The
'commanding' tone that prevails in the discussion of Islamic law in
Malaysia has an effect of making its argument sound 'natural', and
hence conclusive.
Like the cultural, the economic aspect of the book is also
dominated by overwhelming concern for Malay economic welfare - to the
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neglect of any mention of the socio-economic standing of non-Malays.
The book writers' focus on what they see as socio-economic justice for
the Malays revolve around issues - which are treated in detail -
such as institutIonal assistance for Malays; Malay involvement in the
corporate sector; and social mobility of Malays. The past economic
glory of the Melaka empire also has the potential of being an economic
incentive for Malays.
On the political side, the book only has one topic of discussion.
This is, rather refreshingly, the Opposition in Malaysia, which the
writers portray as an essential element in a parliamentary democracy
where criticism, dissent and debate are supposed to be legitimate
rights. Thus, like the racism piece this Opposition article presents
an inconsistency to the general thrust of the whole book, which is
Malay-biased, ethnocentric arid exclusive of other viewpoints. Although
in the minority, these articles nonetheless can potentially be an
eye-opener.
Notes
1. For a fuller discussion on the position of the national
language, see Thn Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim [1987:440-521, and
also Abmad Mohamed Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned [1985:199-203].
2. Former MCA president Lee San Choon, for instance, whilst
conceding that Chinese culture would not play an important role in
the formation of the national culture, said that 'Chinese cultural
traditions were old arid could not be changed or condemned into
oblivion overnight. (toted in Mime and Mauzy 1980:367)' He even
suggested that a Chinese Malaysian culture centre be set up to
promote Chinese culture.
3. Syed Aiwi Sheikh Al-Hadi 's book [1986], one of the Form Six's
reference books for the General Studies subject, discusses the
Malay practice of naming names in some detail, particularly on
pages 15-17.
4. For a discussion of Malay literature arid Islam see, for
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instance, Ismail Hussein (ed) (1986).
5. The greater push for Islamisation in Malaysia is also due to
the immense influence religion has over the life of Malays as a
whole, triggered off in particular by the recent Islamic
resurgence. (See Abdullah Taib and Mohamed Yusoff Isinail [in
H.Osman-Rani arid E.K. Fisk 1983:124-125] for an account of how
pervasive Islamic influence has been on Malay cultural and
political life. See also Tun Mohained Suffian bin Hashim
(1987:343-349) for a detailed account of Islam's position in the
Malaysian constitution and politico-legal system. See lthmad
I1-ahim (in Tun Mohamed Suff Ian et al. (eds) 1987:49-78) for a
detailed discussion of the position of Islam in the Malaysian
constitution.) The Islamic policy has found expression in several
projects such as the Islamic Bank, Islamic insurance company, arid
Islamic university. Official assurances that the constitutional
rights of the non-Muslims will be safeguarded at times have failed
to allay non-Muslims' fears (Barraclough 1988:40).
6. Faced with this unpleasant prospect it is perhaps not difficult
to understand why non-Malay individuals and organisations such as
the Chinese-based Gerakan political party argued that content
should be used 'as the criteria for evaluation and not the
language. All literary works which reflect Malaysian reality and
manifest the feelings and thoughts of Malaysians with characters
and background which are distinctively Malaysian - no matter
which language is used for writing - should be accepted as
Malaysian literature' (1983:65). Similar argument had been put
across by several Indian cultural and religious organisations.
While agreeing that Malaysian literature should not be the
preserve of Malay writers, Chandra Muzaf far (in PICAS 1984:63),
however, suggested that Indian writers should make an attempt to
translate their works into the national language so as to ensure a
larger Malaysian audience, and also as a way of making known to
the larger Malaysian society of the socio-economic problems faced
by the Indian poor. Some 10 major Indian cultural arid religious
organisations had submitted a memorandum on national culture to
the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in April 1984. For
details of the memorandum see, for instance, Kua Kia Soong (ed)
(1985:303-321) -
7. Chua Jui Meng (MCA 1988:92) maintains that none of the
government agencies 'deal with New Villages or list them as a
target group for development'. He claimed that the New Villages
were always depicted as being more advanced than the traditional
Malay villages so as to provide justification for the 'pouring of
funds' into these Malay villages.
8. See Benjamin Higgins (in H.Osman-Pani & E.K. Fisk (eds)
1983:175). See also Alxtullah Taib and Mohamed Yusoff Ismail (ibid
1983:141-142) for a positive assessment of the NEP. The recession
of the late '70s and early '80s, however, dealt a big blow to
these economic aspirations, for this meant that certain economic
opportunities of the non-Malays will have to make way for the
Malays. That the NEP target may not be met had driven certain
government leaders to express the government's desire to maintain
the dual objectives of the Policy after 1990 if, as Deputy Prime
Minister Ghafar Baba was quoted as saying, 'racial imbalances are
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still evident in the economy' (The Star 9/9/1988), which
subsequently created anxieties anior certain sectors of the
Chinese arid Indian communities about their political and economic
future in the country. The MCA president Ling Liong 51k, for
instance, expressed the need of all parties concerned to be
consulted before a post-1990 economic programme is formulated (
Star 2/10/1988).
General conclusion
If the number of cultural materials used is an indicator, then
all of these Pengajian Am or General Studies books - with the
exception of Maihi's - place a high priority on culture, in
particular Malay culture and Islamic tradition. If there is an attempt
to soften this Malay arid Islamic emphasis and also promote a liberal
and multicultural approach towards education and cultural life in
Malaysia, which there is, as in the case of the book Pengajian Am 2 by
Othman et al., the impact is negligible, in a sea of Malay-centric
materials within this book and in the total impact of the books
analysed. On the other hand, the presentation of these materials can
possibly place other materials in a critical light. At any rate, the
heavy emphasis on Malay and Islamic materials - and, by implication,
the marginalization or exclusion of non-Malay materials - seems to
suggest that all these books are influenced directly or otherwise by
the government's desire to form a national culture that is Malay- and
Islamic-based. An inclusion of non-Malay cultural items, therefore, as
is found in Penqajian Am 1 (i.e. Chinese tea ceremony), can only be
seen as mere tokenism. And the attempt at a multiethnic approach in
Penqajian Am 1 and Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long) only takes the form of
multiple-choice questions where characters from various ethnic origins
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are employed. This means superficiality as such characters cannot
develop meaningfully within the limited format of multiple-choice
questions. If multiethnicity receives scant treatment, racism however
gets ample handling and is raised in two ways: the ones in Penqajian
Am 1 and Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long) emphasise, if not glorify, it; while
the one in Pelenqkap Din: Periqajian Am STPM (PDPA) is critical of it.
In fact, the critical view of racism in PDPA could help the reader see
the rest of the Malay-bias content of the book - if not other books
aswell—inanewligl-it.
National language, which is invariably drawn as the medium of
inter-ethnic communication, also occupies the attention of all books
except Penqajian Am 2 (Othman et al.). Most of the time the language
is largely promoted for its unity role. Only once is it portrayed -
in A. Long's book - as a rich and dynamic language endowed with the
capacity of absorbing elements of other languages. Constitutional
provision for the use and learning of other ethnic languages is
down-played in all of the books.
Basic freedoms or fundamental liberties occupy the attention of
all books but PDPA. Nevertheless, most of these books give the
impression that such freedoms need to be sacrificed or compromised in
the name of trying to preserve 'national unity' and 'political
stability' without presenting an opportunity for alternative
interpretations, such as political expediency for the parties
concerned. It is in this context that the controversial Internal
Security Act is mentioned in Malhi's book. The inclusion in PDPA of
the importance of the Opposition in the functioning of a parliamentary
democracy would help pave the way to an alternative reading. At this
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juncture it is worth notirg that national unity seems to catch the
interest of only two books: Othman et al. provide a detailed
discussion while Maihi gives a whole chapter to it. Maihi does more
than that. He goes to great lengths in presenting a political
framework - the Malaysian Constitution, the Judiciary arid the
Parliament - to the reader to suggest to him/her that this
arrangement exists to, at least theoretically, protect his/her basic
rights. Ethnic Malay nationalism prevails in Penqajian Am 1 and
Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long) while Malay political supremacy/'numbers
game' finds its place in Penqa3 ian Am 2 and Peitrajian Am 2 (A. Long).
Monarchy or Malay royalty, which is normally sketched as more a Malay
rather than Malaysian symbol, appears in all books but PDPA and A.
Long's Penqajian Am 2.
Economically, all but Penqa.iian Am 1 display a common and deep
concern for Malay economic problems. In this connection, it is
significant that only Maihi finds it necessary and appropriate to
present a historical context to the special position arid privileges of
Malays whereas the other writers (who incidentally are all Malays)
appear to have taken this constitutional provision for granted.
Although Malay poverty as raised by these books is undoubtedly a
reality, heavy stress on the ethnic definition of poverty to the
neglect or exclusion by the books of the economic well-being of the
poor and needy in the Chinese and Indian communities is revealing. The
concern about the economic welfare of Malays is pushed in such a
manner that it gives the impression that these books perceive poverty
only along ethnic lines. Or that only the Malay community faces
poverty.
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The projection of things Malay is done by a few means. One,
aspects of Malay culture or political interest are promoted overtly
through extracts that possess such tendencies. Two, promotion in
chapter summaries, discursive questions, and multiple-choice
questions. The second method -ings us to the point raised by Luke,
de Castell and Luke. They argue that writers of textbooks by
'intentional sectioning and punctuating of information reinforce the
apparently "neutral" character of the information, and serve distinct
instructional ends'. The manner of framing and the choice of content
to be framed tendentiously p-eserve 'the very words' of the writer
(1989: 250). However, different meanings could emanate from such
conscious framing, meanings which, taken out of context, may deviate
to some degree from the ones intended by their original authors.
Thus, an inclusion of a certain aspect of a say, Chinese culture in a
multiple-choice question - as opposed to an elaborate discussion in
an extracted article - could have the effect of making such a
cultural element a frivolous thing, apart from demonstrating the
disinterested attitude of the book writer(s) towards that particular
subject. In contrast, a Malay cultural aspect that appears in a
multiple-choice question could mean a heavy emphasis and reminder if
it has already appeared in an article prior to it. Certain phrases
and terms used in these books usually have the potential of making
themselves sound 'commonsensical' or 'natural' so as to discourage
questioning or debate. In addition, it is significant that the
frequent use of extracted materials from Malay newspapers, magazines,
etc. which basically cater to Malay audience and interests is also a
contributory factor towards the heavy Malay emphasis in the textbooks
examined.
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Nonetheless, there are certain contradictions and inconsistencies
within and between the texts that could provide some space for
alternative interpretations by the student-reader. For instance, in
the case of the article (in A. Long's book) about the Malay
fishermen's lot where the writer questions the structural problems
that have been plaguing the Malay poor - even after so many years of
independence and government aid. Other examples are the celebration by
the writer of what he considers the dynamism of the Malay language to
abeorb other languages as well as the capacity of certain traditional
Malay dances to abuorb foreign' cultural elements but at the same time
calls for a cultural purification of Malay songs. There is also the
uneasy tension between the particularism of Malay nationalism and the
universalism of Islam. Then there is the juxtaposition of the
essential basic freedoms and the 'necessity' to curb freedoms. One can
also recall, as mentioned earlier, the celebration of racism and, in
another article, a condemnation of it.
A reader who comes from a particular ethnic group that
collectively perceives itself as being politically and culturally, if
not also economically, marginalized, may feel disheartened, uneasy or
incensed after reading these textbooks. Unless this deficiency finds
its remedy, a common content school syllabus under the present
education policy that was hailed to be one of the State instruments to
help generate good ethnic relations, would instead find itself to be
an effective tool for social tension arid disunity. Given the
multiethnic nature of the present Malaysian society, the contents of
the textbooks analysed can only be construed in general as
constructing a 'Malaysian identity' that is heavily Malay-biased. At
the same time, these books - through the continuous process of
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marginalizing and excluding non-Malay political, cultural aM economic
interests - can inadvertently or potential ly produce a sort of
separation of 'national identities'. In other words, the primary
objective of fostering good ethnic relations in the country, in
particular among students, would then have been defeated.
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(b] (1) Rupert Enerson (1987), Malaysia. .Satu Penqkajian Pernerintahan
Secar-a Lnqsu.nq dan Tidak Lanqsunc (Malaysia. A Study in Direct and
Indirect Rule), Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, (7th Print).
This 640-page book, which constitutes one of the history
textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education for Form Six
students, is a Malay translation of the author's English version,
Malaysia. A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule. 2- It should be noted
that the term 'Malaysia' in this book refers to 'both British Malaya
and the Netherlands Indies, which are also known as Indonesia' (p. 12).
The Analysis
Sections of the book that were selected for the analysis are
Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10.
IHE ECONOMIC
(a) British colonialism: a shared history of the Malaysian people
In the first chapter on 'The Setting of the Problem', Enerson
points out, amongst other things, that western imperialist powers had
one primary and significant role to play in their colonies: to create
conditions that benefited their economic interests (p.1). This
therefore provides the historical background towards understanding
the political, socio-economic and cultural problems that a multiethnic
British Malaya (now Peninsular Malaysia) had, and still has, to
confront. In other words, a Third World country like Malaysia that
experienced Western imperialism 2 has the potential to provide its
peoples some sense of a shared history, 3
 a collective history of
subjection to economic exploitation, political manipulation and
subordination.
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(b) Malay 'backwardness' in exploitative capitalism
Despite colonial rule and problems associated with capitalist
penetration into the Malayan economy, Emerson stresses that the Ma lays
as a people have succeeded in resisting the onslaught of capitalism
brought about by the Europeans and Chinese because 'They are a people
with a highly developed culture of their own and with a distinct and
well-formulated attitude toward life which has tended to isolate them
in some measure from the surroundings which have been thrust upon
them. [p.22; Trans. Appnd. 6.1]' Nonetheless, this factor does not
prevent the Europeans and Chinse complaining - as Emerson indicates
- of Malays being lazy and shiftless. Having said this, Emerson
argues that,
This is a libel which has been too often exploded to need
elaborate further refutation. It is a fact written clearly
on the record that the Malay in general is strongly averse
to giving up his own more independent way of life in order
to become a coolie on the rubber estates or tin mines of
European or Chinese capitalists (p.22; Trans. Appnd. 6.21.
On page 138 in Chapter Three, Emerson provides us with another
example of how members of another ethnic community, in particular some
Chinese businessmen, demonstrated their inability to understand to a
large degree the sociological background to this 'Malay backwardness'.
In a petition which was signed by 248 Chinese b.msinessmen and given to
the British Governor to request that the British authorities abandon
their non-intervention (in the Malay States) policy, the Chinese
bisinessmen commented that 'Its application to the half-civilized
States of the Malay Peninsula (whose inhabitants are as ignorant as
children) is to assume an amount of knowledge of the world, and. an
appreciation of the elements of law and justice, which will not exist
among those Governments until your petitioners and their descendants
of several generations have passed away. [p.139; Trans. Appnd. 6.3]'
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Such condescending assertion only makes the above cautionary comments
more valuable and helpful. In addition, Mhoo and Lo - whose book we
shall examine later - contend that 'the Malays were not interested in
working harder to accumulate wealth (p.88)' because the feudal
structure of the traditional Malay society is such that any surplus or
form of wealth tended to be usurped by the Malay nobles or chiefs. It
is therefore this social context that provides the justification for
Malay politicians in principle to institute and the Malay community as
a whole to support official policies of 'positive discrimination'
(such as the NEP) for the Mlays as a way of stamping out these
negative stereotypes as well as improving their overall living
standardz - as we have noticed in writings advancing this line of
argument in Periajian Am 2 of Othman et al., Kenearaan Malaysia of
Malhi, Pelenqkap Din: Perrajian Am STPM of Saidi and Salim, and
Penqajian Am 2 of A. Long. In other words, this portion of Malayan
history, i.e. that the Malays' economic well-being had been neglected,
has become the 'significant past' (Williams in de Castell, Luke and
Luke (eds) 1989:58) for the writers of the Pengajian 7m books
concerned to emphasise the importance of and need for government
assistance to the Malays.
Malay opposition to the capitalistic intrusion s compelled the
itish authorities to import Chinese and Indian labour in order to
exploit the natural riches of the land (p.30). It is here that Enerson
describes the immigrant Chinese as being dIligent, capable of
improving themselves economically (p.35). The previous explanation for
the lack of Malay input in the modern economy of the country would
therefore go a long way towards putting the 'Malay problem' in the
context of the economic contributions of the immigrant Chinese and
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Indian groups in Malaya.
(C) Chinese economic contributions
The economic contributions of the Chinese community in the Malay
Peninsula is further emphasised on page 157 where nerson states that
up to the time of federation (i . e. the Federated Malay States)
the economic development of the Peninsula was almost exclusively in
Chinese hands' [Trans. Appnd. 6.4]. Furthermore, on another page
Enerson provides the reader with another account of Chinese economic
contribution in the Straits Settlements, where the economic activities
of the chinese range from the categories of 'coolies, rickshaw
pullers, and house boys at the bottom, through the large group of
skilled workers, clerks, independent merchants and traders, and small
manufacturers or processors in the middle, up to the higher group of
professional men arid of owners of large economic ventures at the top'
(Trans. Appnd. 6.5], apart from a number of Chinese millionaires
existing in their midst (p.331).
After making a broad survey of the economic activities of the
Chinese in the Malay Peninsula, it is therefore less surprising to
find the book writer asserting in the concluding chapter that there
were many among the Chinese 'who have achieved a position of economic
independence and who through a longer or shorter Malayan background
feel that they have achieved as good a claim to be regarded as natives
of the country as have the Malays themselves. [pp.601-602; Trans.
Appnd. 6.6]' In other words, Enerson argues from the vast economic
contributions of the Chinese that many of them felt really 'Malayan',
just as 'native' as the Malays themselves. This brings us back to the
Pengajian Am books, where there is no mention of the economic
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contribution of the Chinese community as a whole, and if there is, it
normally takes the form of Chinese economic advancement in relation to
Malay poverty. In short, those books lack the recognition of this
contribution to the Malay(si)an economy.
(d)Indian economic contributions
nerson states that as part of the imported labour, the Indians,
who too had made their economic contributions, formed the biggest
group of labourers working in rubber plantations, while their numbers
were equal to the Chinese in tin mines (p.49). This account, albeit
not as detailed as the one on the Chinese, would also imply that the
Indians too deserve to be considered as 'native'. As in the Chinese
case, the economic contributions of the Indians is also conspicuously
absent in the Pengajian Am books. Both the Chinese and Indian
contributions can constitute a 'significant past' for many of the
non-Malay readers. In other words, a recognition of their past
collective input to the general economic development of the country
would make them expect to be accorded equal rights and opportunities.
(e)Malay economic problems
(i) Malay economic standing in colonial Malaya
Of the position of the Malays in the colonial economy, Enerson
has this to say:
In the political sphere it has been felt necessary to
maintain a facade of Malay rule, or, at least, of Malay
participation in government, but there was no such necessity
in the economic sphere. The result has been. . .that the Malay
has been economically dispossessed in his own country. He is
allowed to carry on his life in his accustomed ways, but to
date he plays neither a creative nor a servile role in the
new economy which has supplanted his own as the dominant and
the dynamic force in the country. It may be that the future
will see the Malay entering into effective competition with
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the aliens, bot he will have no easy task in forcing his way
into their economic stronghold (p.226; Thans. Appnd. 6.7].
That the Malays had been left to themselves and excluded from the
economic activities of the rest of the Peninsula only strengthens
Emerson's contention that it was wrong of a majority of the British
officials to have had no faith in the Malays. To this misconception,
the writer further observes:
.the Malays have been in contact with Western
civilisation for only a few decades and that in the
Federation at least the plums have in the main gone to the
other races while the ordinary Malay villagers have had to
get along with the second best in every respect. Despite
these handicaps it is asserted that they have made very real
progress and can be trusted to continue onward and upwards
if they are given the type of training, attention, and
protection which has been afforded them in the Unfederated
states [pp.438-439; Thans. Appnd. 6.8].
Given such a situation, it is thus hardly surprising for Emerson
to comment that 'It will be seen that the higher the degree of
economic life in any area the larger is the alien element in the
population as compared with the native. [p.241; Thans. Appnd. 6.9]'
Things had, however, Emerson seems to have hinted, improved to some
extent. For instance, Chinese labour used to constitute an almost
exclusive monopoly of mining in Johore. But now, he adds, the Malays
are found to be 'at least equally suitable as workers on the big
dredges introduced by the British mining corporations' [p.263; Thans.
Appnd. 6.10]. This, plus Emerson's contention that 'the future will
see the Malay entering into effective competition with the aliens',
provides the 'significant past' for the Pengaiian Pan writers who argue
that the Malays as a group need economic assistance in order for them
to progress.
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(ii)Economic disparity between east and west coasts
As a way of demonstrating the socio-economic disparity between
the Federated Malay States (F4S, where most of the Europeans and the
non-Malays were found) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS, where
the inhabitants were mostly Malays), Emerson chooses Kuala Lumpur (of
the former category) and Kota Bharu (of the latter) as objects of
comparison. Kuala Lumpur, he adds, represents 'a relatively highly
developed modern Oriental city [p. 30; Trans. Appnd. 6.11]' whose
prosperity was largely conributed by the Europeans and the
non-Malays. Kota Bharu, on the other hand, is 'a town which, with
modern trimmings, is an obvious outgrowth of the Malay society.
[p.306; Trans. Appnd. 6.12]' In other words, the geographical
segregation along ethnic lines has, in many ways, its origin from this
pattern of colonial rule and economic development. Such a social
situation is further explained by the writer who cautions that such
benefits as were received by the Malays from the socio-economic
development, initiated by the British, were mainly 'coincidental', as
demonstrated by the construction of roads and railways whose primary
purpose is to serve the needs and interests of European, and to a
lesser extent, Chinese capitalists (p.596). In other words, the
Malays were not primarily identified as the main beneficiaries of the
infrastructural construction and other modern public amenities. Once
again, this situation has provided the rationale - as presented by
the Perçajian m book writers - for helping the Malays economically.
(iii)British 'protection' of the Malays
Despite the economic priority that had captured the imagination
of the British colonial government, Emerson maintains that the British
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nevertheless had the general welfare of the colonized people at heart.
For after all, adds Enerson on page 578, the colonial government did
not necessarily work only in the interests of capital. As an example,
Enerson cites the creation of Malay land reservations as a British
endeavour to protect Malay interests. Under this scheme, 'land may be
al leriated only to Ma lays and must thereafter remain in Malay hands'
[p.587; Trans. Appnd. 6.13]. This is a measure taken by the British
administration to help avoid the possibility of the Malay peasantry
being made landless, and hence revolting, in the face of capitalistic
penetration into the Malay States and, in particular, the 'swarming'
of the Chinese population. Another of his examples of the British
government 's 'concern' for the welfare of the colonized people is the
improvement of public amenities such as sanitation and medical care
and facilities. This, as Enerson argues, served the long-term
objective of the government to provide a better, healthier local
workforce for the European capitalists and entrepreneurs ( pp . 576-577).
The professed 'good intentions' of the British were counter-productive
as nerson declares on page 612,
The creation of Malay reservations in the Federation,
Johore, and Kedah, a 1 though it is in good part merely a
British weapon against the Chinese and the Indians, may be
seen at once symbolic and as one of the most significant
practical expressions of this officially fostered trend
toward sheltering the Malays from too intimate a contact
with the new forces that are at work in their country.
[Trans. Appnd. 6.14]
To be sure, this land scheme only resulted in ethnic tension and
suspicion between Malays and Chinese. Chinese objections to this
scheme at the time lay in the term 'Malay' which not only applied to
those Malays who were born in the FMS or the Peninsula but also to
those recent Malay immigrants from the Archipelago. The Chinese, on
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the other hand, were totally excluded irrespective of whether they
were born local ly or just arrived from China (p. 587). Predictably,
this opposition was strongly felt among those Chinese who had been in
the Malay Peninsula for a long while and who felt quite 'native'. This
then provides a wider option for the reader to interpret Malay(si)an
'nativeness' in particular and Malay(si)an history in general as
compared to the one offered by the Pengajian jn books. To sum up, the
underlying objective of this 'British protection' and its consequences
are brought to the fore.
(iv) Preservation of the 'Malay character'
Given such economic and political realities at that time, it is
significant to find that certain of the UMS had taken 'defensive' or
'corrective' steps to reserve administrative or political posts, or
opportunities for further studies, to the Malays as a measure not
only to try to conserve their 'Malay character' but also to ensure
that some Malays were allocated jobs that were considered to have high
social status. Hence the state of Penis, with the agreement of the
British authorities, reserved government posts for Perils Malays
(pp.287-288). Government posts, especially the administrative and
clerical, in Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were also reserved for
Malays (p.292). The Kedah royalty, for instance, confined members of
the State Council. with the exception of British advisers, to Malays
'in response to a general recognition by the native Kedah population
that any increase in the power and prestige of the Chinese would
seriously endanger their economic position and threaten the Malay
character of the State' (p.294; Trans. Appnd. 6.15]. This endeavour to
preserve the 'Malay character' finds its saliency and relevance in the
government's project to forge a Malay-based national culture as
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discussed in the Pengajian Am books.
(f) The 'benevolent British'
At the risk of sounding like an apologist of imperialism, erson
holds that the British colonial government did help cushion the impact
of the modern and industrial world which the Malay people had
received, apart from he 1 ping the Ma lays to make the leap 'from
Malaysian medievalism to the modern world' [p.593; Trans. Appnd.
6.161. This point, about protecting the natives from the aggressive
features of capitalism, is alo emphasised on pages 589-590 where at
the same time he states that he does not deny the attendant
'oppressive features' of imperialism. The writer further asserts that
imperialism can be justified in so far as it transforms the subject
people as quickly as possible into 'independent communities able to
take their equal and autonomous share in the world's activities and
decisions' (p.594; Trans. Appnd. 6.171. Clearly, this stand runs
counter to his later contention that an imperial power, given its
vested interests, would not provide much assistance to the natives to
enable the latter to 'enter into the modern competitive world economy
on equal terms' [p.604; Trans. Appnd. 6.18] - which implies a certain
ambivalence on his part. This perhaps largely explains why after all
the years of 'British protection', the Malay majority was still in the
grip of poverty. Moreover, this is the sort of soclo-economic
situation that lends credence and political legitimacy to the
professed commitment of post-independence governments to help the
Malay poor.
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ThE POLITICAL
(a)Problems of multiethnic society
In the 'Introduction', Enerson establishes the fact that a
society can get very complicated with the entry of people of various
ethnic origins along with the intrusion of Western imperialism:
In colonial regions the already complex is further
complicated by the contact of two or more widely divergent
races, each bearing its own traditions, peculiarities,
aptitudes, and vices. Upon peoples deep-rooted in their own
ways and institutions is suddenly thrust, with varying
degrees of vehemence, an alien destiny which has no prior
relevance to their own. The resultant political structure
and, much more, the resultant human being, European and
native, is inevitably a mixture of things not to be attached
with certainty to either camp as it was before (pp.3-4;
Thans. Appnd. 6.19].
This is indeed a cautionary note to the reader about the social,
economic, political and cultural complexities that are inherent in a
multiethnic society like Malaysia's. The last sentence of the extract
above also indicates that the ethnic border of each community is
necessarily blurred and. thus implies that any attempt - as can be
found in the Pengajian Am books - at glamorizing the ethnicity of a
particular community is futile. The discussion below is an
illustration of such problems. However, if seen in a positive light,
such a blend of various cultures and peoples can also mean the opening
up of a whole range of potential in the evolution of a new and. richer
culture - as hinted at by the article on the Malay language in
Pengajian Am 2 (Othman et a 1.).
(b)The origin of the Malays: nativeness questioned
Enerson's search for the origin of the Malays may be quite
unsettling for some Malay readers and, to a certain degree, non-Malay
ones, for it unearths some evidence that tends to show that the Malays
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are not the original inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula:
The origin of the Malay race which gave the country its
name is an unsolved anthropological mystery, but there is
some evidence to support the view that the Ma lays were
driven southward by the constant pressure of the Chinese
tribes and occupied the furthest reaches of Asia. perhaps at
a time when the Peninsula was linked in a continuous land
formation to Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. That the Malays are
not the earliest inhabitants of the Peninsula is indicated
by the remnants of more primitive peoples, who, driven back
into the dark jungles and the mountains by the superior
culture and force of the Malay invaders, cling with tragic
insistence to their aboriginal nomadic life. Where they have
followed the Malay into Mohaxnmedanism, they have also tended
to adopt his language and his culture and to become absorbed
indistinguishably into the Malay community [p.15; Trans.
Appnd. 6.201.
The writer's contention above seems to be reinforced by an
account on another page which states that the Malay Peninsula '... has
always been less of a true Malay center than the surrounding
Archipelago. It was in the islands that the older Malay kingdoms and
empires flourished, with the mainland being drawn in, apparently, only
in a subsidiary fashion.' [p.16; Trans. Apprid. 6.21] This does give
the impression that the Malays originate from what is now called
Indonesia, and that many of them have since migrated to what is now
Malaysia, particularly Peninsular Malaysia. Such an historical
background would help the reader understand the significance of the
following observation made by Emerson:
Although it is usual to think of the Malays as having an
immemorial title to Malaya it must be remembered that
immigration from the Indonesian Archipelago has continued to
the present day and that a very considerable proportion of
the present Malay population is made up of immigrants who
were themselves born elsewhere or whose forebears came to
Malaya only in the last few decades. In contrast to the
other immigrant races which have come to Malaya in recent
times, the Malaysians - a term used to embrace the Malays
both of the mainland and of the surrounding islands - tend
to settle in the country permanently and to become members
of the established Malay population. [p.19; Trans. Apprid.
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6.22]
Thus although the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia include a
substantial immigrant population, the similar cultural background
between the Malays and the Indonesians poses no difficulty for the
Malay immigrants in the Peninsula to assimilate themselves into the
already established Malay community, and to be considered as 'Malays',
and hence 'native' or 'Bumiputeras' of the country. 6
 This then brings
us to the earlier account (p.587) about the strong objection voiced by
the Chinese, especially those who had been residing in this country
for long enough, they argued, to be deemed 'natives' of the land. In
short, a culturally dissimilar group is excluded in the overall
consideration of categorising people as 'native', irrespective of the
length of one 's domicile.
The subject of Malays being 'native' surfaces again in the
section on 'The Peoples of Malaya' on pages 23-24 where flnerson
maintains that
it may be said that the Malays are the true natives of
Malaya, subject to the qualification that they are
themselves in good part newcomers to the country. ait
however good their historical claim, which is at least
better than that of any other race, the country is in fact
slipping from their grasp. Already they are outnumbered
by the other races. The census of 1931 disclosed that of a
total population of 4,385,346 the Malays accounted for
only 1,962,021 or 44.7 while the Chinese caine to
1,709,392 or 39.0 and the Indians to 624,009 or 14.2.
[Trans. Appnd. 6.23]
The 'native-ness' of the Malays, as erson points out, is a
qualified one as well as controversial. Apart from that, the Malays
themselves have been confronted with the fear of losing in the
'numbers game', which is closely related to their struggle for
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political ascendancy in the country. 7 Such Malay fear would however
be somewhat allayed by the following comment made by Sir Hugh
Clifford, the British High Commissioner, and quoted in the book. He
implicitly suggested that it was a British duty to protect the
position of the Ma lays even if it meant depriving the country of a
democratic system of governments
 (which in principle is nm by the
will of the majority) [pp.212-2131.
The controversy surrounding the position of the 'native' is again
pursued by erson on pages e13-614. He obviously differs from Sir
Hugh Clifford's argument because he firmly holds that the interests of
the Chinese cannot be neglected or ignored since 'The hard truth of
the matter is that the Malays can't be regarded as the sole natives of
the country', and also 'It must be accepted as the patent and
indisputable fact that the Chinese are now settled in Malaya in large
numbers, that many of them have been established there for long
periods of time and that they feel their interests to be entitled to
at least as favourable consideration as those of the Malays.'
Besides, with the coming of the Great Depression when Chinese
political consciousness and pro-Malay sentiment among some leading
British officials were high so that preferential treatment for the
Malays caused the non-Malays to 'not only fear that the Malays will
prove unable to handle their responsibilities but also are justifiably
reluctant to abandon their claims to equal treatment in the country of
their birth. [p.632; Trans. Appnd. 6.241' This historical account has
therefore problematised 'Malay natives'. It could constitute a
'significant past' of Malayan history for the non-Malay reader.
However, the established notion of the Malays being indigenous, as
sketched by many of the Pengajian Am books, may well make Eknerson's
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claim contentious, 9 and subsequently alienate the Malay reader and
perhaps even harden her ethnic sentiment.
(C) Position of Malay rulers
In Chapter Four where Enerson discusses the FMS, the position of
the Malay Sultan is drawn as one of protector of Malay interests.
Although in reality it was the British Resident who was active in the
administration of the state under the Residential System, the Sultan
nevertheless was still perceived, particularly among the Malay people,
as the one governing the state apart from having, as the Residential
System stipulated, complete jurisdiction over matters pertaining to
Islam and Malay custom (pp.169-170). This nominal status of the Sultan
served the interests of the British, especially when pressed by the
Chinese immigrants who demanded their rights. It is therefore 'a
comforting and useful fraud to proclaim that since these are Malay
States under Malay rulers the concessions which the aliens ask are
beyond British granting' (p.171; Trans. Appnd. 6.251.
Once again we witness a situation in which the interests of the
British were served and protected by not shaking the position of the
Malay rulers and consequently by not giving the Chinese access to more
rights as residents of the country. The position of the Malay rulers,
seen in this light, would tend to mean one that protects the interests
of the Malays to this day - as illustrated by arguments advocating
this view that are found in Perajian Am 1 of Othnian et al.,
Keneqaraan Malaysia of Malhi, and Penqajian Am 2 of A. Long.
While the Malay rulers' position might be 'sacrosanct' (p.212)
and unassailable to the British (and the Ma lays as a community), it
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certainly has taken a severe beating from Emerson himself. In trying
to explain why Johor, despite its official status as one of the
Unfederated Malay States (UMS), was in many ways different from the
rest, Emerson holds that this
appears to lie primarily in the character and strength of
the rulers who have held the throne of Johore since the days
when Raffles intervened at Singapore to upset the local
balance of power. These rulers, some of whom are commonly
asserted to have a considerable admixture of non-Malay blood
in their veins, have not been noted for their high moral
character or, perhaps, for their scholastic brilliance, but
they have been gifted pith political talents of a high
order. They have known how to bow gracefully to the
inevitable and to salvage the best out of it for themselves,
how to adapt themselves to the standards and requirements of
the new imperialist world which was thrust upon them, and
how to play off against each other the various elements and
interests, both European arid. Asiatic, with which they came
in contact [pp.242-243; Trans. Appnd. 6.26].
Such an observation can hardly be considered in general complimentary
and pleasing to the Malay royalty as well as the Malay reader. For
one, the Malay rulers are portrayed as hybrid, whose 'true Malay
blood' has been diluted by other types. But equally, if not more,
importantly, this remark blemishes the notion advanced by an article
in A. Long's book that characterises the institution of monarchy 'as
a symbol of unity, as the source and bulwark of justice, as a place to
seek sympathy and forgiveness, as a provider of honours'.
(d) 'Communal politics'
In this book, Emerson expresses his reservation about 'communal
politics'. In his discussion of the Legislative Council in the Straits
Settlements (SS), Emerson identifies the problem encountered regarding
the kind of elected representatives that the people ought to have. He
states, 'Here the fundamental problem is one of finding an acceptable
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and viable electorate. To flee to communal representation is the
easiest course but also in the long run the most dangerous, as the
experience of India has amply shown. Wherever it has been tried it has
been found to intensify rather than to minimize communal conflict.
[p.362; Trans. Appnd. 6.271' He further stresses the possible dangers
of increasing or heightening ethnic sentiments which this kind of
'communal representation' would be likely to bring (p.363). This can
be interpreted as a warning to adherents of 'communal politics' such
as the ruling Barisan Nasional. It contradicts the view of this party,
held by Maihi, as one of the positive steps towards remedying ethnic
problems in the country.
(e) Malayan Union
As regards the Malayan Union proposal, Enerson informs that the
basic idea was to unite the FMS, the UMS and the SS so as to form a
big federation that was supposed to enjoy the political and economic
benefits that such a union would bring. However, the Unfederated
states of Kedah, Johore, Trengganu and Kelantan were vehemently
opposed to this proposal for fear of losing their Malay character and
'the ability of the state to pursue its more modest Malay aims...
[p.424; Trans. Appnd. 6.28]' It is clear that changes in the social
structure, economic system and the ethnic complexion that were taking
place in the FMS had compelled the UMS and their people as a whole to
be aware of their 'Malay-ness' and to feel the need to maintain their
'Malay character'. In other words, this is probably the beginning of a
shared sense of an 'imagined political community' (Anderson 1983:
15-16), a feeling of ethnic solidarity among the Malays.
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i1 CULI1JPAL
(a) Malay as national language
An endeavour to raise the status of Malay to the level of an
official language found expression in a treaty of 1923 between the
British and Kedah which stipulated that Malay be made the state
official language (p.287). And the status of Malay as a 1 iriqua franca
of the country was also acknowledged by the British particularly in a
period when the British were planning to decentralise the federation
and strengthen state administrations. It is here that certain serious
problems were identified, one f which being the language of debate in
State Councils. Emerson comments, 'The traditional practice is,
naturally, that the Councils should be conducted in Malay, Ixit this is
a language with which the new members are likely in most cases to be
grossly unfamiliar, their acquaintance with it frequently not going
beyond the bastard Malay which serves as a crude lingua franc
throughout Malaya. [p.419; Trans. Appnd. 6.29]' This observation
illustrates Emerson's dislike about Malay being made the country's
lingua franca, which is confirmed in his concluding chapter: Emerson
criticises the British government' s refusal 'to acknowledge anything
except Malay as the appropriate lingua franca of the country. [p.634;
Trans. Appnd. 6.30]' In this connection, the writer also criticises
the British government's educational policy which he feels had
contributed to the worsening of ethnic tensions in the country. This,
he holds, is mainly due to the discriminatory practice of providing
free Malay primary vernacular education while neglecting those of the
non-Malays, which were consequently catered through private
initiatives (pp.634-635). Emerson's criticism of Malay as national
language certainly runs against the nationalistic fervour of the
proponents of the national language as found in Penqailan Am 1 of
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Othman et al., Pelenqkap Din: Penctaji.an Tuii I'PM of Saidi and Salim,
and Peraiian Jm 2 of A. Long who essentially perceive it as a
necessary medium of inter-ethnic communication. However, Maihi does
remind the reader of the constitutional provision (Prticle 152) that
'.... no one should be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise
than for official purposes) or from teaching or learning any other
language' (p.40), which implies that teaching and use of other
vernacular languages in the country are legitimate. Maihi 's comment
hence could be a vehicle for Emerson's view on the necessity of
including and respecting non-?lay vernacular education.
Use of phrase
When discussing the lack of Malay participation in the modern
economy of the country, Emerson concludes that the result is '... that
the Malay has been economically dispossessed in his own country
(p. 226, emphasis added).' The phrase 'his own' strongly suggests an
almost natural association between the Malay and 'his own' country,
Malaya, despite evidence presented in this book that points to the
contrary. Put another way, such usage of 'his own' is tantamount to
making it sound rather 'commonsensical', in the Gramscian sense
(Forgacs (ed) 1988:421), which in effect would only further emphasise
the popular contention - as advanced by most of the Pengaj Ian m
books - that the Malays are indeed indigenous.
Summary
On the economic side, Emerson points out the enormous
contributions of the Chinese - who were brought into Malaya to meet
the labour requirements of British imperialism - to the economic
development of Malaya, so much so that the Chinese, he adds, demanded
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'native' status with the Malays as a recognition of their important
contributions. This demand was rejected by the British. Nonetheless,
this portion of Malayan history could constitute the 'significant
past' which the contemporary Chinese reader can employ to lend
legitimacy to their demand for greater say in the political, economic
and cultural direction of Malaysian society. The same applies to the
Indians who had also made substantial contributions. At the same time
Emerson highlights the economic problems faced by Malays which, to
him, stem from the British policy that essentially marginalized them
from the modern economy. He is confident though that the Nalays, whose
stereotypical laziness he dismisses, can make significant progress if
given the right kind of assistance and 'protection'. Protection here
meant the British reserving permanently agricultural land for the
Malays, a policy which neither helped improve the living standards of
the Malays nor fostered good ethnic relations, as many of the
non-Malays themselves required land for their economic activities. It
is here that Emerson's ambivalent attitude towards British imperialism
surfaces: On the one hand, he praises the British for 'protecting' and
'cushioning' the Malays against the direct impact of the 'modem
world' (p.593), while on the other he argues that the British were
less serious and sincere about helping the Malays. Emerson's
ambivalence notwithstanding, the Malay reader would hasten to employ
this part of Malayan history to justify the need and importance of
providing governmental economic assistance to the Malay cormnunity.
Smith (1988:23-6) argues that ethnic nationalists would tend to
evoke memories of the past in order to strengthen the nationalist
feelings of a country's inhabitants. He asserts that there are four
dimensions of an 'ethnie' or ethnic community: (a) a collective name;
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(b) a common myth of descent; Cc) a shared history; and (d) a
distinctive shared culture. As far as the Malays are concerned, what
is revealed by Emerson could have posed a problem to categories (a)
and (C) - I . e. had the Malays been really non-indigenous (See Husin
All (1987) and Ismail Hainid (1988)). For the book claims in great
length that the Malays are not the original inhabitants (and hence,
cannot lay claim to the collective title of 'native') of the Malay
Peninsula and that many of them were recent immigrants from Indonesia,
thereby having the effect of turning the claim of the Malays to
numerical majority and thus litical dominance on its head. On the
other hand, Emerson does support (d) for Malays, immigrant and
settled, which may also explain the attempt of preserving the 'Malay
character' by the Malay States, especially when one is fearful of
losing the 'numbers game'. Malayan Union was one British proposal that
was largely seen as harming the numerical strength and thus political
supremacy of the Malays. In addition, the position of Malay as the
linqua franca of the country and the education system are assailed by
Emerson. All this could create havoc to the official definition of
Malaysia 's national culture, whose very foundation is the 'indigenous
culture'. Emerson's historical 'revelation' would be discomforting for
most of the Malay readers. If anything, they would tend to ignore
this, or question its verifiability to the point of subsequently
heightening their ethnic sentiments.
As regards the institution of monarchy, the manner in which it is
run and maintained gives one the impression that it is mainly a
bulwark for Malay interests and demands. Besides, an institution that
supposedly gives expression to the Malay-ness of the country's
political structure potentially faces problems with Emerson's exposure
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of the rurs' mixed ethnic background and questionable moral and
intellectual standing.
Notes
1. Hence, the 'English translation' of Malay excerpts in this
analysis is largely derived from the English original.
2. British imperialism in Malaya, asserts Labour Research
Department (1926), serves the economic interests of the European
capitalists by not only making Malaya a rich source of materials
they required but also a captive market of their industrial
goods.
3. Smith (1988:23-26) argues that an ethnie or ethnic community
derives its sense of cmmunity from the following dimensions:
(a) a collective name; (b) a common myth of descent; (c) a
shared history; and (d) a distinct shared culture. And for
Williams (in de Castell, Luke and Luke (eds) 1989:58), it is
important for a group or class in a society to select a
'significant past' - hence termed 'selective tradition' - that
can connect with and ratify the present, as well as being useful
in the process of social and cultural definition and
identification.
4. Chua Jul Meng (in MCA 1988:91-95) expressed concern over the
government 's apparent obsess ion with issues of Malay poverty to
the exclusion of sympathy and care for urban Chinese poor.
5. Alatas (1977:72) argues that the unwillingness of the Malays
to 'become a tool in the production system of colonial
capitalism', earned them a reputation of being 'indolent'.
6. The relative ease which Indonesian immigrants have when it
comes to assimilating themselves into the Malay culture owes
largely to the fact that they belong to a 'bigger entity known
as the Malay stock' (Husin All 1987:4).
7. See for instance Kadir Pbadi (1987) which essentially
strongly supports Dato' Abdullah Jthmad's speech that called for
the perpetuation of 'Malay political dominance' in the country.
8. It is interesting and significant that a similar sentiment
has its place in present-day Malaysia: Perlis UMNO chief Dr.
Aixl.ul Hamid Pawanteh reminded UMNO Youth members that 'Malay
survival is more important to the party than upholding the
principles of democracy. (New Straits Times 28/10/1989)'
9. 7\rchaeological findings have shown that the Malays are the
indigenous people of Malaya. For a detailed account, see 1-lusin
All (1987), particularly chapter 2; Ismail Hamid (1988), in
particular chapter 1.
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(ii). Gilbert Khoo and Dorothy Lo (1981), Asia Dalarn Perutnhan.
Sejarah Tenqqara. Selatan dan Timur Asia (Asia in Transition. The
History of South-East, South and East Asia), Petal inq Jaya: Heinemann
Educational Books (Asia).
The Analysis
Sections of the book that were analysed are: Chapters 1; 2; 3; 5;
7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; and 13. These are chapters that pertain to
Peninsular Malaysia while the omitted 4 and 6 concern historical
accounts of Sabah and Sarawak.
ThE POLITICAL
(a) The rich multicultural Malaysia
In Chapter 1 (pp.3-9), Khoo and Lo praise the economic dynamism
of Malaysia which, according to them, was based on the country's
growing political stalility and national unity, while at the same time
they clearly celebrate its multiethnicity: 'This country has a mixture
of races that provides it with a certain freshness and potential which
cannot be found elsewhere in the Southeast Asian region as well as the
rest of the world. (p.3; Trans. Appnd. 8.1]' Implicit in the
positiveness of this statement is the message that the country can
progress in a dynamic manner if the socio-economic. political and
cultural potential and contributions of each of the ethnic groups are
fully realised. This optimism is echoed by an article found in
Penqaj ian Am 2 (Othman et al.) which applauds the existence of various
ethnic cultures in the country as opposed to the other Pengajian Am
books (except Malhi's which doesn't discuss culture at all) which
promote Malay culture to the neglect of other ethnic cultures. In
terms of economic contributions to the country, unlike the Perigajian
Am books, Enerson, Hall and Tate as well as this book highlight those
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of the Chinese and Indians, which serves to remind the reader that
these contributions deserve recognition.
(b) Malay political structure
In Chapter 3 (pp.78-95), the writers trace the political
structure of Malay society where they identify two social classes in
Malay political organisation: the ruling class and the ordinary people
(p.82). To a large degree, they add, the source of power of the nobles
and the Sultan derived from social tradition and control over material
resources and wealth of the conomy. Hence, they argue, since the
Malacca Sultanate it has been a tradition for the Sultan and his
nobles to be given the people's tnist by which the latter would have
their lives and material possessions protected by the former (p.85).
Under this feudal relationship, it is no surprise that forced labour
became a widespread practice exercised by the nobles (p.88). The
writers assert that the two large groups of people were so closely
linked to each other that the Malay society as a whole, even though
Islamic in faith (as the religion proscribes, for instance, slavery),
was essentially trapped in fatalism (p.88). They add,
the Malays were not interested in working harder to
accumulate wealth because such deed would only mean having
oneself eventually being dispossessed of one's own
material belongings. As such, there did not exist an
environment that would encourage the Malay peasants to
improve their agricultural productivity or living
standards. [p. 88; Trans. Appnd. 8.2]
The writers further comment that the institution of slavery had been
embedded in the psychological and social development of the Malays:
'They were not encouraged to work harder so as to improve the living
conditions because of the prevalent social hierarchy. The freedom that
would allow social mobility has been completely curbed. [p.90; Trans.
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Appnd. 8.3]' This explains partly the 'late socio-economic
development of the Malays' in the context. of a larger multiethnic
Malaysian society. But more importantly, this also helps to explain
the existing residue of feudalism in the psyche of the Malays in
general, which in turn causes to a certain degree a virtually blind
loyalty of many, if not most, Malays towards their leaders. 2- This
segment of Malay history also explains the saliency of the concept of
'protection' for the Malays by the institution of Malay monarchy in
the present Malaysian political structure. An undiluted, positive
approach to this concept is fbund in Penqajian Am 1 (Othman et al.),
Keneqaraan Malaysia (Malhi), and Perajian Am 2 (A. Long).
(c) Royal support for British colonialism
In their discussion of the British Residential System in Chapter
5 (pp.l21-172), the writers assert that despite initial apprehension
from the ruling Malay elites, the British Residents generally received
support and cooperation from the respective Sultans and noblemen as
the latter were eventually made to realise that such an agreement had
brought relative peace and economic progress to the Malay States as a
whole. Nonetheless there were, for instance, pockets of resistance in
Perak against British presence (pp.141-142) 2 is here that one
senses a taint of pro-imperialism in the writers: 'A clever and
farsighted person, His Majesty (The Perak Sultan) had cooperated with
(British Resident) Hugh Low in the State Council which was set up to
act as an advisory body in the formation of the state's
administration. [p.l44; Thans. Appnd. 8.4]' It can be argued that the
Perak Sultan was very supportive of the British precisely because the
whole structure of the Malay political system in Perak had been
changed in such a way that the next succession to the Perak throne was
196
very much dependent on the support of the British Resident. This
contention may be supported by the following (p. 144): 'Although it is
maintained that the Residents were supposed to give advice, in reality
it was they who would nile in the Council behind the Sultans
concerned. [Trans. Appnd. 8.5]' Such political manipulation by the
British is again felt when the writers hold that the Ma lays were
governed and controlled by the British through their traditional
leaders (p.148). The writers add that the same strategy applies to the
Chinese community where the fiction of their leaders playing an
effective role for the benefit of the whole community was sustained by
the British (p.148-9). This questiona)le position of the Malay rulers
and political leaders and Chinese leaders as representatives of their
own communities is also pointed out by iierson and Hall. In the case
of Emerson, he focuses on the Malay rulers' political shrewdness and
opportunism. In contrast, a survey of the Malay rulers' background by
one or two of the Pengaiian Am books (such as A. Long) do not reach
these recesses of the royal history.
(d) Malay economic problems
In their survey of the socio-economic and political changes that
had taken place in the Malay Peninsula under the British, the writers
detect marked changes mainly in the urban areas of the Malay States
while in the rural areas (which most Malays inhabited) virtually
nothing had occurred. This is where the writers comment that despite
the British attempt at modernising the country, 'The Malays did not
understand and also were not interested in embracing Western
lifestyle. [pp.162-163; Trans. Appnd. 8.6]' The writers' observation
in Chapter 7 (pp.194-206) however seems to indicate that the above
statement is not wholly true. For they write there that the Malays as
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a group, at least towards the later part of the British presence, were
interested and understood what Western lifestyle entails. There were
Malays who were keen on social and economic progress and at the same
time they 'expected the British to protect them from the negative
effects of competition with other ethnic communities. [p.200; Trans.
Appnd. 8.7)' Besides, as the writers assert, 'The British, apart from
modernising Malay society, also wanted to maintain the traditional
Malay village lifestyle, [p.200; Trans. Appnd. 8.8]' a position
which was supported by their education policy that aimed at only
making the Malay children btter fishermen or farmers than their
parents (p.200). Thus, there prevailed a sharp socio-economic gap
between the Malay society and the non-Malay one. Such a disparity is
also acknowledged by Emerson and Tate, a disparity that can represent
a 'significant past' in writings about Malay poverty arid the New
Economic Policy in Penqajian Am 2 (Othman et al.), Keneqaraan Kita
(Malhi), and Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long) - which advocate governmental
and institutional assistance to Malays.
(e) Preservation of the 'Malay character'
Like Emerson and Hall, the writers tell us that in most parts of
the Malay-dominated Unfederated Malay States the Malays were able to
jealously guard and preserve their traditions, as well as acquire more
autonomy without any interference from traders who would be quick to
request British help and intervention and have eventually to serve
their economic interests (p.169). Such a position taken by these
Malay States to protect Malay traditions from the onslaught of western
culture and modernization would find. adherents among present
Muslim-Malays, for the latter perceive the resurgent interest in Malay
and Islamic traditions as an effective way to be culturally and
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politically independent of outside influence. One has only to remember
the cal 1 to 'purify' Ma lay songs in A. Long's book. gain, this is 'a
significant past' of Malay history that can promote and strengthen a
sense of shared history and culture among the Malay readers concerned.
(f) Job discrimination along ethnic lines
The issue of unequal citizenship as regards employment in the
Malayan civil service surfaces on page 198. Many Malays, especially
English-educated, had been abeorJed into the British administration
during the First World War th1ough the Malay Civil Service, thereby
making them 'less unfriendly' with the British, a practice to which is
attributed the evolutionary - rather than revolutionary nature of
Malay nationalism. Many non-Malays, on the other hand, were not given
the opportunity to serve in the administration because they were
mostly transient in status. it this denial of occupational
opportunities was also inflicted on those non-Malays who had decided
to make Malaya their homeland, a fact which prompts the writers to
argue that '..,. this British policy of depriving them (the non-Malays)
of government posts is one way of isolating one race from the rest in
Malaya so that there would not occur a socio-cultural interaction.
[pp.198-199; Thans. Appnd. 8.9]'. The question of equal opportunities
in civil service recruitment surfaces again in Chapter 8 (pp.207-214)
where the writers state that there appeared a group within the Chinese
community, the Straits Settlements Chinese, popularly known as Baba
Chinese, who insisted on being given equal employment opportunities on
the basis of having regarded Malaya their homeland for the past 100
years. The Ma lays opposed the demand of this 'foreign race' (kaula
asing). The British government on its part refused to entertain the
Chinese demand, for it had committed itself to protecting the rights
199
and privileges of the Malays (p.207). Clearly the book writers are
critical of this practice given the multiethnic composition of the
Malaysian society. In addition, this 'affirmative action' that was
undertaken by the British for the Malays reminds us of the present one
that has been adopted by successive post-Independence governments and
one that is discussed by A. Long in relation to Malay poverty.
(g) Ethnic nationalisms
Malay perception of non-Malays' anibiguous political allegiance to
their country of abode not only had caused suspicion between the two
ethnic entities but also eventually created islands of ethnic
chauvinism. The nationalistic sentiments of the Chinese in Malaya
before the Second World War was China-oriented, and this made their
loyalty to Malaya suspect in the eyes of Malays and British. The
revolutionary movement in China which opposed the Manchu rule captured
the imagination of the local Chinese in Malaya. The significance of
the events in China was brought closer to Malaya with Sun Yat-sen, the
leader of the Kuomintarç (KMT) establishing his headquarters in
Singapore and branches in Malaya (p.208). The book writers do caution,
though, that 'the Chinese in Malaysia were compelled to regard
Malaysia as their own country because they did not want to return to
China' (p.210). However, China's Chiang Kai-shek had made it difficult
for the Chinese to feel 'Malayan' and be accepted as one because he
had declared that 'overseas Chinese are citizens of China if their
fathers are of Chinese origin' [p.210; Trans. Appnd. 8.10].
	
This
predictably had caused a rift and tension between the Malays and
Chinese, a situation which to a large extent compelled the
Straits-born Chinese, especially Tan Cheng Lock their leader, to unite
the Chinese community, who by then had already made up its mind to
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live permanently in this country, in order to demand collectively for
its rights and to protect its interests (p.211). The Indians in
Malaya, who as a group also by now had decided to settle permanently
in the country, too tried to unite themselves so as to protect and
promote their collective social and economic interests. However, the
Indian attempt failed (before the Japanese Occupation) because of
competing ideologies, one of which was the commitment to help liberate
India from British rule (p.213). As for the Malay immigrants from
Indonesia, the writers tell us that they did not have major problems
in assimilating themselves ' into the Malay culture because of
similarity in ethnicity, culture and religion, and hence the relative
ease of being considered Malay (p.213). Their inclusion strengthens
the sense of common bond within the Malay community vis-a-vis the
non-Malay communities. Such 'separatist' ethnic social arrangements of
the old somehow present a historical link to the present-day communal
politics that is criticised by Tate and one that is practised by many
political parties, including the component parties of the ruling
Barisan Nasional. Ironically, Malhi sees such political arrangements,
as characterized by the ruling Barisan Nasional, as being useful in
the effort to achieve inter-ethnic harmony. The rest of the Pengajian
Am books are silent on this.
(h) Japanese Occupation and divide-and-rule
Bitter Malay-Chinese relations in Malaya appear in Chapter 9
where the Japanese Occupation of Malaya is said to be the primary
cause. The sharp enmity between the Japanese and the Kuomintang in
China caused the former to be antagonistic towards the Chinese in
Malaya who in turn launched a major anti-Japanese offensive. To
compound the situation, the Japanese trained a large number of Malays
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as policemen and soldiers to fight against the Chinese guerrillas.
This consequently heightened the suspicion and tension between the
Malays and the Chinese, and subsequently damaged the cooperative
spirit between the two ethnic communities for several years (p.215).
Thus the writers warn: 'It has been a Japanese pci icy to create
conflict between the races so as to cause a loss of trust between
them. [p.216; Trans. Appnd. 8.11]' The dangers of this divide-and-rule
policy of the Japanese are raised again by the writers on page 219. In
addition, the Japanese Occupation had also generated ethnic
nationalisms among the locals', particularly the Malays (p.218). This
thus reveals the ugliness of ethnic chauvinism and of communal
politics (as mentioned above) which find their divide-and-rule origin
in this period of Malayan history. Such divisive politics would not
gain support from a reader whose concern is good ethnic relations.
(1) From Malayan Union to Malay nationalism
Chapter 10 highlights the Malayari Union scheme that was proposed
by the &itish government to the Sultans and the Malay community, and
which consequently propelled the growth of Malay nationalism. The
latter rejected this proposal because they felt that it meant easy
granting of citizenship to all non-Ma 1 ays who were born in the
country. Strong opposition to this proposal led to the creation of the
Malay-based United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), headed by its
first leader, Dato Onn Jaafar. This opposition had generated a Malay
nationalism (p.222) that argued for the importance of the rights and
privileges of the Malays, Rulers' sovereignty, and states' autonomy
and strove that these would be considered when drafting a new
constitution for the country. The Chinese were disappointed for being
neglected by the British, 'but they eventually accepted this reality'
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(p.224). Despite the initial apprehension among the non-Malays, the
Chinese in particular, as regards the drafting of the constitution,
the writers tell us that the Federal Constitution represented a
compromise between Malay radicalism and non-Malay demands. Although
the Malays had gained a lot of privileges, they add, the non-Malays
did not incur immense loss. For instance, the Sultans were made the
protectors of Malay rights and also of the rights of other ethnic
groups in the country (p.225). The manner in which the constitution
was drawn and the 'compromise' struck by leaders who professed to
represent their respective dommunities represent the 'significant
past' of the Malayan history that can be 'intended to connect with and
ratify the present' (Williams in de Castell, Luke and Luke (eds)
1989:58) Malaysian political situation. In other words, 'Malay
nationalists' of today can always resort to these origins of the
political bargaining in order to sustain legitimacy to their
continuous claiuis to Malay special position and privileges. As
mentioned elsewhere, the bargain was essentially about the citizenship
for non-Malays being granted in return for the special position of the
Malays. This line of argument strikes a chord with the article in A.
Long's book which supports the rejection of the Union proposal in
order to give way to Malay political supremacy. Hall on the other
hand, believes that the Union was essential in preparing Malaya for
se 1 f-government and democratic rule; but his advocacy was undermined
by his approval of the uneven and communal politics practised by
political parties such as the ethnic-based Alliance.
(i) Communist insurqency
After the constitutional agreement, leaders of all communities
were preparing themselves for the eventual independence of Malaya from
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British rule. However, their anticipation was destroyed by the
incursion and insurgency of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) which
preferred Communist rule over Malaya. This subsequently led to the
declaration of Energency in the country (p.226). The Communists'
protracted war against the authorities had caused further tension and
suspicion between the Malays and the Chinese as many of the members of
the MCP were Chinese, arid the British use of the Chinese 'new
villages' strategy as a means to cut communications between the
Communist and the Chinese community as a whole also meant the physical
isolation of a large segment of the Chinese community from the Malay
community. The activities of the Communists provide the background and
legitimacy to the curbing of basic freedoms by the government as
discussed by an article in A. Long's book, arid they also constitute
the raison d'être for the existence of the powerful Internal Security
Act of 1960 as mentioned by Maihi. In other words, in the name of
protecting the country from Communist threat, certain fundamental
liberties which are crucial for the political, economic and cultural
expressions of citizens have been sacrificed, a situation that could
impede a sense of 'fair play' among the readers within the project of
forging national consciousness.
(k) Malay nationalism and communal politics
In Chapter 11 where the writers trace 'The Development of
Malaysian Nationalism and Political Parties' (pp. 243-257), the reader
is told that the collective political awareness about Malaya being
their country first prevailed among the Malays, and was subsequently
acquired by the Chinese and the Indians. The bitter experience of the
Japanese Occupation fanned ethnic nationalism among the Malays to the
extent that they resolved to maintain their dominant position in
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society. This then propelled the Malays to unite under the UMNO banner
(p.243). The first leader of the UMNO, Dato Onn Jaafar, decided to
open up the party to everyone from all ethnic groups. His suggestion
however was wholly rejected by the Malays, which then led to his
resignation. Onn believed, the writers add, that Malays and non-Malays
must fight together for independence and for the eventual formation of
a united and strong nation. However. 'Such a view is too premature
and ahead of its time. [p.244; Trans. Appnd. 8.12]' ann later formed
the multiethnic Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). He received less
support from the Chinese who Dy then were mostly active in forming the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), but instead gained only the support
from the Malays who 'didn't have racist attitude' and members of the
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) (p.244-5). Racial politics in Malaya,
the writers caution, became more obvious when UMNO and MCA joined
forces to contest the 1952 town council elections and consequently won
51 out of 52 seats that were contested (p.245). If a hint of regret on
the part of the writers regarding the growing 'popularity' of racial
politics cannot be strongly detected in their above account of the
development of Malayan party politics, such sentiment is clearly
expressed in the following: The successful experimentation in ethnic
politics employed by UMNO and MCA spurred them to adopt this
'political arrangement' across the country. It is in this context that
the writers lament: 'This is very unfortunate for Dato Orin, for the
future Malaysian nation as well as for the government and the
Federation of Malaysia. [p.251-2; Trans. Appnd. 8.13]' Unfortunately,
as the writers seem to suggest, ethnic politics of short-term gains
eventually prevailed in the country. They thus note that although MCA
and UMNO did have fundamentally conflicting objectives of promoting
each its own community's interests, these crucial differences were
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bur:ied under, at least temporarily, the attractive goal of winning the
1955 general election. The image of UMNO-MCA partnership as a
'multiethnic' party was enhanced with the later participation of the
MIC (p.252). The general election of 1955 resulted in the Alliance
party winning a handsome majority.
It should be noted at this juncture that the the writers however
do suggest on pages 245-246 that it is essentially out of political
exigency that ethnic-based political parties such as the MCA and the
MIC were formed - i.e. to chainpion and protect the interests of the
respective ethnic communities, cooperate with the other ethnic groups,
and unify the people from within each community. Tunku lthdul Pahman,
the first prime minister of the country arid leader of the Alliance,
was quoted as saying that the success of the party was nothing but due
to the issue of independence. The writers are however quick to deny
this, and claim the people's support for racism (p.256-7). Racism did
flourish on the political scene at that time when the kind of
'multiethnic politics' employed by the Alliance caine under challenge
from groups such as the Malay Nationalist Front, which was led by Dr.
Burhanuddin. Another political threat to IJNNO was the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (PAS) whose ideological base is Islam (p. 254). These
parties felt that the 'cooperation' struck between the UMNO and the
MCA might jeopardise Malay interests, and hence the need to pursue a
Malay-based politics. There was also opposition from the left, such as
the Labour Party, whose political structure and numerical strength
were however so weak that it disintegrated in 1972 (p.254). We thus
witness here a period in which successful political parties rode on a
strong wave of racism, a legacy of the past that still haunts the
present Malaysia.
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(1) Economics and ethnicity
The 1950s saw leaders of the three major ethnic groups
acknowledging the importance of cooperating and working with each
other in order to strive for national unity. However, this objective
was fraught with fundamental problems: Malays clinged to their special
position and privileges because they feared that without this
'protection' they would be inadequately prepared to confront the
economically advanced Chinese who might use their strong economic
position to acquire political power. The Chinese as a whole still
maintained their dominance in the economic sector (p.247), the origin
of which can be traced to the earlier economic contributions of the
Chinese as indicated by Enerson, Hall and Tate. In other words, an
identification of economic function as well as political dominance
with ethnicity goes a long way towards impeding the difficult task of
forging national unity among the various ethnic groups in the country.
Which is why the writers express their long-term hope of a demolition
of this dichotomy after the Malayan Constitution was drawn up:
Even though this Constitution has temporarily placed
political power in the hands of the Malays and economic
power in the hands of the Chinese, both sides are however
confident that these features would gradually fade away
after the economic conditions of the Malays improve
[p.262; Trans. Appnd. 8.141.
To help combat this problem, the writers add, the government had
launched economic programmes to help modernise the rural population
(mainly Malays) so that the economic gap between the rural and urban
sectors would be narrowed. The Rural and Industrial Development
Authority (PIDA) was entrusted with this big task (p.247). This has
been the main thrust of the argument p1.it forward by the architects and
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supporters of the New Economic Policy, that is, to eliminate the
identification of economic function with ethnicity - a crucial factor
that is pointed out in Peraiian Am 2 (Othman et al.), Keneqaraan
Malaysia (Maihi), Pelenqkap Din: Pengajian Am STPM (Saidi and Salim)
and Penqajian Am 2 (A. Long).
In Chapter 12 the reader learns that soon after its triumph in
the election, the Alliance began working towards self-government and
Malayan independence. The British laid the groundwork by instituting
the Reid Commission whose prizary objective was to gauge the political
sentiments of the people. The commission presented the following
conclusions: a strong federal government; equal citizenship for all in
the federation; 'the protection of the special position of the Malays
and the legitimate interests of other races'; and Malay to be
acknowledged as the national language (p. 258; Trans. Appnd. 8.15].
Leaders of the Alliance discussed matters that concerned the
harmonious relationship and cooperation between the three major ethnic
groups. It was decided that non-Malays who were born after
independence would be citizens automatically, and those who were
already citizens would remain so. The Malays demanded that their
'special position' be acknowledged. They would be given preference in
matters concerning land, civil service employment, government
scholarship, and business facilities, measures that were considered to
be a strategy to help prepare the Malays to step into the world of
competition with the economically advanced Chinese (p.260). Realists
among non-Malays agreed that Islam would be the official religion
while the Malays consented to freedom of worship to the non-Malays
(p.262). Both sides considered the eventual Constitution as one of
compromise, the kind of political document, say the writers, that
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suits the multiethnic complexity of Malaya at that time (p.262). This
'political bargaining' constitutes a 'significant past' for Malhi and
A. Long that justifies and maintains government's 'affirmative
actions' such as the New Economic Policy.
(m) National lanquage for national unity
The book writers say that social interaction between the Malays
and the non-Malays failed after the Second World War because they were
faced with serious problems such as suspicion between them that was
created by the Japanese andthe Communist insurgency. The writers
assert that this lack of inter-ethnic communication was solved to a
certain degree by the making of Malay as the national language. Such
contention strikes a chord with all of the Pengaiian Am texts as they
promote and defend the status of the national language. Emerson, on
the other hand, believes that other vernaculars should also be
accorded equal status as Malay.
THE ECONOMIC
(a) British economic imperatives
In Chapter 2 where the writers focus on 'The Growth of the
Straits Settlements' ($5), the fact is established that the ports of
Penang, Singapore, and Malacca were opened by the British purely for
economic reasons. This view is shared by Emerson, Hall and Tate.
Because of the growing economic activities in the SS, labour shortage
became an important problem in the 19th century. As a result, the
British authorities encouraged immigration (p. 19): 'The Malays from
Sumatra, especially the Minarigkabaus, a small group of Bugis, Ambon
and Javanese people had come to these settlements as craftsmen and
small traders. In the 1840s a Malay labourer fetched about $3.50 a
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month in Singapore, while Indian and Chinese labourers received about
$4.00 and $5.00 respectively. [Trans. Appnd. 8.16]' Such
discriminatory practice along ethnic lines in industry may in part
explain as to why some Ma lays shied away from the exploitative employ
of the British entrepreneurs and which may also lend credence to the
myth of 'the lazy natives' (p.19). Such misconception of the 'lazy
native' may also occur if the reader, who is particularly not aware of
the Malay feudal history of forced labour, reads the following on page
151: 'The Malays much preferred to take up easy and dignified Jobs, or
jobs that were sanctioned by heir tradition, instead of work that was
done by the Indian labourers which they considered worse than that of
the debt slaves. tThans. Appnd. 8.17]' In contrast, the writers put
emphasis on the significant role the Chinese played in the commercial
success attained in the 53. I<hoo arid Lo say that a number of writers
and government officers in the 19th century had acknowledged that the
'diligent Chinese' were the foundation of the 55 economy (p.20). As if
to reinforce their argument about the Chinese contributions to the
economic development of Malaya as a whole, they comment (p.20): 'In
towns, the Chinese were good businessmen; and in the rural areas, they
were clever farmers. [Trans. Appnd. 8.181' The writers nevertheless do
remind us in passing of the economic contributions of the Malays as
well as other exploited workers to the commercial success of the
Chinese businessmen (p.35). The writers say that Chinese, Indian and
Malay labourers met the needs and requirements of development in the
53, and add that 'Chinese traders had become rich because of their
diligence. (p.35)' In other words, what the two writers point out is
the hard work of the workers of all ethnic groups that constitutes the
very foundation of economic development of the 53. At the same time
they acknowledge that many of the rich Chinese contributed a lot to
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social and welfare projects, like building hospitals, water supply,
building bridges, educational facilities, drainage and roadwork
(p.39).
(b)Chinese economic contributions
That the Chinese economic contributions in Malaya must not be
forgotten perhaps explains in part why the writers argue that while
the Chinese immigrants did cause political and social chaos to the
region they nevertheless constitute a 'useful' group of immigrants
(p.37). We are told that &en though the Chinese were involved in
'immoral deeds' such as prostitution and opium smoking, the British
just turned a blind eye. In other words, as far as the British were
concerned their relationship to the Chinese was merely functional.
This explains why, the writers add, the British perceived the Chinese
community as diligent pioneers in prospecting the region's economic
resources, especially for the benefit of the Straits Settlements
(p.48). The writers remind again on pages 148-149 that the British
acknowledged the economic significance of the Chinese community: 'They
are the backbones of the economy of the Malay States. . . .They're the
labourers, miners, shopkeepers, contractors, capitalists, also
contributors to state tax revenues in the peninsula. [Trans. Apprid.
8.19]' Having said that, the writers nevertheless acknowledge the
economic contributions of all the ethnic groups (p.155). The economic
contributions of the Chinese in Malaya is also highlighted by Eierson,
Hall and Tate, while all of the Pengajian m texts are silent on this
matter.
(c)Indian economic contributions
As regards the Indians, the writers state that a big portion of
211
the Indian population was concentrated in Penang. Most of them came
from South India, mainly traders or small businessmen, labourers and
money lenders (p.36). Although the writers' account of their economic
contributions is not as elaborate as the one on the Chinese, like
Emerson and Tate, !thoo and Lo nevertheless make an acknowledgement of
such contributions. This nevertheless stands in stark contrasts with
its total absence in all of the Pengajian lm books, a past that
apparently is not selected and deemed 'significant' by these books.
Cd) Inter-ethnic economic cooj3eration
If there was an early form of Malay-Chinese cooperation in
business, it must be the one that involved one of Perak's noblemen,
Long Jaafar, who requested some Chinese miners from Penang to work his
tin mines in Larut in 1848 - in order to procure larger profits. The
same goes with Selangor where Raia ALidul Sainad invited some Chinese
businessmen and workers to open up tin mines in Kelang and Ainpang,
which subsequently brought progress and prosperity not only to these
two towns but also helped build Kuala Lumpur, the later-thy capital
city of the Federation (pp.121-123). This goes to show that close
cooperation and ethnic interaction, which largely are encouraged and
governed by financial considerations, can prevail particularly at the
level of the dominant class or bourgeoisie. Although such a social
arrangement is still applicable in the present-day Malaysia, nowhere
in the texts, particularly the Pengaiian in ones, is this cooperative
spirit or alignment of interests advocated.
}E CULI1JPAL
(a) Hindu influence in Malay culture
In Chapter 1 Khoo and Lo detect the lingering Hindu influence in
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the Malay culture, even after the Islaniization of the Malay community.
Thus they observe:
As such courtly events and the institution of royalty are
maintained to this day as Malay traditions. Even though
Islam remains as a strong influence in the lives of the
local people, animism still exists and is interlinked with
Hindu and Islamic beliefs (p.4; Trans. Appnd. 8.20].
Like Hall, the book writers thus bring into question the very
institution that symbolises Malay-ness, Malay culture and the
protection of Malay interests and Islam - the Malay royalty - as is
portrayed in Penqajian Am 1, Keneqaraan Malaysia, and Pengajian Am 2
(A. Long). On the other hand, this may well illustrate to the reader
the dynamism of Malay culture in its capacity to absorb foreign
cultural elements.
(b) Common education system for national unity
In thapter 12 the writers note that one of the ways of forging
good ethnic relations that was suggested was that there should be
provision for a common education system for all children in Malaysia
so that a common loyalty to the country could be inculcated in them.
'This certainly cannot be achieved if there still existed three
separate systems of education. [p.260; Trans. Appnd. 8.21]' Hence, the
Barnes Report of 1950 recommended a common national education system
for all children educated under one common syllabus content, while the
subsequent Fenn-Wu Report of 1951 suggested that Mandarin be
maintained while Malay and English became part. of the curriculum.
Consequently a review committee on education took consideration of
both recommendations (p.260), which became the overall guiding
principles for the later education policies of the country. This view
is in essence consonant with Hal l's. flnerson shares this view in so
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far as the State provides and maintains vernacular education, but not
necessarily to be subeunied under a common education system.
Summary
The writers' appreciation of Malaysia's multiethnicity is matched
by their dislike of the divisive and ethnic politics of the kind
practised by many local political parties, the ruling party being one.
Unfortunately, they too, like many of these parties, do slide -
although to a limited extent - into justifying the need of each
ethnic community to protecI and promote its own interests. Such
negative sentiment is borne out of the notion that each ethnic
community can on its own contribute towards improving ethnic relations
by inculcating Malaysian consciousness among its members while at the
same time championing their rights and interests in the name of that
community. Both objectives can radically conflict at certain
historical moments. The reader may be made to appreciate the
divide-and-rule strategy of the colonialists and the Japanese as well
as the economic disparity and political injustice that prevailed over
a long time as being the causes of suspicion and tension between the
Malays and Chinese. It is however an unresolved contradiction and
therefore a disservice to the reader when the writers imply that an
enhanced sense of ethnic bond among members of a particular community
provides the necessary, if not the only, solution to ethnic problems
in the country.
Notes
1. See Chandra Muzaffar (1979) for a lengthy discussion of
unquestioning loyalty within the Malay community.
2. In this book on pp.157-158, Khoo and Lo also mention another
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example, the British intervention in Pahang in 1875 where it met
with strong protest from Malay noblemen and also the Sultan
himself. A revolt broke out involving famous nobles like Tok
Gajah, Mat Kilau, A1ul Rahman and Maharaja Perba, personalities
who were later revered by the latter-day Malays as they
symbolised Malay capability and success in defending their
'racial honour'. After 1892, the revolt was however crushed by
the British.
3. This reminds us of a not-too--complimentary observation of a
British writer, C.G. Warnfor-Lock, when he defines Chinese
'industriousness: 'He is the mule among the nations - capable
of the hardest task under the most trying conditions; tolerant
of every kind of weather and ill usage; eating little and
drinking less; stubborn and callous; unlovable and useful in the
highest degree. But never, under any conceivable circumstances,
to be trusted or made a friend of. (Cited in Alatas 1977:75)1
4. For an analysis f such an alignment of economic and
political forces, see Martin Brennan (in P. Higgott and P.
Robison (eds 1985:93-127).
General Conclusion
All of the History textbooks have acknowledged, implicitly or
otherwise, the fact that the opening up of the Malay Peninsula to the
British was very much related to the imperatives of imperial
capitalism. Views on British imperialism vary between these textbooks.
flnerson, for instance, is rather ambivalent about it, for he feels
that imperialism has its good and bad features. Hall on the other hand
is more positive towards British imperialism, for he believes that it
was the British presence and 'protection' (like Malay land reserve and
special position) that enabled the Malays to be 'guided' gradually
into the modern capitalist economy and at the same time acquire the
trappings of a modern lifestyle. Tate is more concerned about problems
associated with a multiethnic society which British rule was
instrumental in creating, problems such as economic disparity between
Malays and non-Malays. He nonetheless gives implicit approval to
British attempts at 'modernising' the Malayan economy as a whole.
Unlike Tate, Khoo arid La celebrate the multiethnicity of Malaya that
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originated from British imperialism as, to them, it promises a wealth
of potential from all the ethnic groups with which the country can
progress and modernise. In other words, the underlying message of
these writers is that modernisationt as a doctrine introduced by the
British is essential, as students of modernization would argue, in
propel 1 ing Malaya into a modern, industrial era. It is a project
which has its early beginnings in British Malaya and has sustenance in
present day Malaysia. It has, in brief, pennanence. Despite the
conflicting views of the book writers on imperialism, the fact is
that Malaya was colonized bythe British, and this fact alone would
have the potential of rallying the reader, Malay and non-Malay alike,
to the cause of promoting national consciousness, that collective
feeling of wanting to build and modernise the nation from the
perceived 'ruins' of colonialism (Bottomore 1979:112-113).
It is in this context that Malay economic problems are raised by
all the history book writers, problems which stretch from rural-urban
disparity to British policies that essentially condemned the Malays
into perennial poverty. The twin objectives of the British to
modernise the Malays as well as maintain their traditional way of life
is one particular example. At a glance this policy may seem
conflicting, but on close inspection it is in many ways complementary,
for the kind of economic system that had been introduced by British
imperialism demands social differentiation and necessitates uneven
development (Hoogvelt 1982:162-164). This is likely to convince
particularly the Malay reader of the importance of giving economic
help and support to the Malay community whose welfare, as a whole, had
been neglected under colonial rule. Apart from focusing on the Malay
economics, all of the writers also lay emphasis on the contributions
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of the nori-Malays, particularly the Chinese, towards the general
socio-economic development of Malaya. The reader is constantly
reminded of these contributions in such a way that what is suggested,
implicitly or otherwise, is that the Chinese community (and the
Indians as well) deserves to be accorded equal citizenship and social
justice. And some of the Chinese, like the 'Baba Chinese' of the
Straits Settlements, had, as Khoo and Lo reveal, already demanded to
be considered 'native' given their long residence in and strong
allegiance to the country. All of the writers except Hall also
acknowledge the economic contributions of the Indians. If, as Willianis
(in de Castell, Luke and Luke (eds) 1989:58) holds, sections of the
past - consciously selected and deemed to be significant by a group
or class - can shape the future, then some readers may well at this
juncture take this historical account as a positive indication of the
economic contributions of all Malaysians, particularly the workers of
all ethnic groups who had toiled under the weight of British
imperialism and various other exploitative conditions.
Related to the issue of British imperialism is the stereotype or
myth of the Malays as a lazy community. All writers of these books in
their own ways explode this myth. Both Enerson and Hall see the
importance of providing British 'protection' to the Malays (who,
according to them, have the capacity to progress economically) in
order to introduce them slowly into the competitive, modern economy
without them having to take the full brunt of capitalism at one go. It
should be said here though that the 'progress' of the Mal ays is seen
by both Enerson and Hall only in the context of capitalism. In other
words, the Malays are still perceived by both writers as less
developed so long as they persist to be on the outside of the
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capitalist orbit. They may remain to be such for, as Emerson also
remarks, the Malays as a group have the ability to resist the
onslaught of capitalism. Khoo and Lo and Tate on the other hand argue
that the feudal system which the Ma lays had been exposed to provides
the explanation for their reluctance to work hard in order to
accumulate wealth or surplus production. This also offers explanation
to the fatalistic attitude of the Malays. 2
 In addition, the experience
of forced labour in the traditional Malay society made many Malays shy
away from the deplorable working conditions of the tin mines and
rubber plantations. This is the kind of 'lazy image' that many
modern-day Malays want to shnig off. Spurred by this wish, many Malay
political leaders encourage Malaysians, particularly Malays, to
emulate the diligence and industriousness of the modernised and
industrialised Koreans and Japanese. The desire of many political
leaders for the country to 'take-off' to this modernised stage of
soclo-economic growth and also to have citizens who are hard-working
and successful dictate to a large degree the features of the Malaysian
government's New Economic Policy, in particular the emphasised
objective to modernise the Malay society by creating a small group of
Malay capitalists6 (INThN 1988:1-6). Many Malay readers would not
quarrel with this economic pursuit as they probably see
'modernization' of their community as the only way out of poverty.
Malay nationalism and/or ethnocentrism is also touched upon by
all the writers in various ways. Principally, the notion that 'Malay
nation' has its origins in rapid socio-economic development, that was
perceived to be a threat to Malay political, economic and cultural
survival in the Malay States. This sentiment was felt particularly
after the Malay rejection of the Malayan Union proposal which was
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largely seen as an attempt to usurp what was seen as their political
supremacy. Later in the years before Independence, i .e. during the
Japanese Occupation, suspicion of Chinese loyalty and fear of their
economic prowess hardened these Malay nationalistic sentiments. Malay
nationalism springs from the belief in their indigenousness, a claim
which is questioned by Enerson. Eknerson argues that the Malays were in
the main iimnigrants from elsewhere, including the Malay Archipelago
(where Indonesia is now). The aborigines in the Peninsula, he asserts,
are the original inhabitants (some but not all of whom have
assimilated themselves into ?a1ay culture) and therefore they are the
legitimate claimants to the inthgenous title. His scepticism about the
indigenous status of the Ma lays however turns out to be unfounded, for
archaeological findings have confirmed their indigenousness (Husin Au
1987; Ismail Hamid 1988). Tate, on the other hand, acknowledges the
'immigration' of Malays (from Indonesia) into Malaya, but he does not
see this demographic movement as 'immigration' in the strict sense of
the word as the Indonesians were perceived to be moving into an area
that is culturally and historically part of their larger 'Malay
World'. Khoo and Lo argue that British refusal to entertain demands
from the Chinese community as they did not want to disturb Malay
feelings was an indication of British recognition of the Malays'
indigenousness. In other words, nerson's assertion is less likely to
create a problem to a future project such as the Malay-based national
culture. If anything, this would only strengthen the argument of the
Malay culture lobby. The question of 'numbers game' or numerical
strength that necessarily relates to political supremacy, becomes of
paramount importance to the Malays as a community vis-a-vis the
non-Malays - as revealed by Hal 1 and Tate. This numerical factor saw
its importance emphasised in British Malaya when Malays as a group
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were at one time outnumbered by the immigrant Chinese; a 'problem'
that was later given the British solution of encouraging immigration
of neighbouring Indonesians into Malaya. A relatively recent example
of attaching significance to this numerical factor is when Malaysia
was about to be formed. The inclusion of Chinese-dominated Singapore
into this federation to a large degree prompted Malay leaders in the
Peninsula to incorporate territories of Sabah and Sarawak where there
are a sufficient number of Malays and imiputeras (indigenous group)
to maintain the political supremacy of Malays in the Peninsula.
Despite and perhaps beca1use of the questioning of Malays'
indigenousness such as Emerson's, the Malay reader would be
overwhelmed by what s/he sees as the importance of attaching oneself
increasingly to Malay identity. The non-Malay reader would be alarmed
and feel insecure by this, and. subsequently may be persuaded to jump
onto her/his own ethnic bandwagon.
The position of the Malay rulers as a collective protector of
Malay interests and of Islam is assailed overtly or otherwise by all
writers hit Tate. Khoo and Lo suggest that the Malay rulers had given
their tacit approval to British intervention in the Malay States as it
primarily served their own interests. Hall on the other hand has
demonstrated in great detail the strong influence of Hindu culture
upon the indigenous cultures of Southeast Asia, including that of the
Malay Peninsula. And an outstanding example of where Hindu influence
holds sway is the institution of Malay royalty, as asserted by both
Hall and Emerson. While some non-Nalay readers may see this as Malay
culture's dynamism in being able to absorb and adapt to foreign
influences and thus adding to its richness, Malay nationalists and
Muslim fundamentalists would rather that this episode of Malay
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cultural history be down-played or, better still, forgotten in order
to keep some semblance of 'pure' Malay-Islamic culture. In addition,
the Hindu input in Malay royalty and Enerson's case study of Johor
royalty's questionable ('pure') Malay, Intellectual and moral
background could undermine its position as the guardian of Malay
interests and of Islam. This notwithstanding, Hall's account of
Malacca as the Islamic power base for the Southeast Asian region may
well be considered and employed by many Malay readers as the
'significant past' that can give weight to and inspire the present
drive of the Muslim community and the present government to inject
more Islamic values into the government administration (INTAN
1988:89-96) and the Malaysian society in general in order to make
Malaysia achieve a reputable standing in the eyes of the international
Muslim community.
Khoo and Lo, Hall and Tate have all established the fact that
Malaysians of all ethnic background have fallen victim to the divisive
politics of not only the thvide-and--rule policies of the British and
the Japanese (during their Malayan Occupation), but also the 'communal
politics' practised by political parties such as the Alliance (now
transformed into the National Front). While Tate, for instance, is
consciously aware of the dangers of communal politics, Khoo arid Lo,
despite their apparent concern, momentarily also fall prey to the
argument that it is out of necessity that ethnic politics has been
resorted to. Hall detects the danger of the divisive politics of the
Japanese Occupation, and yet he applauds the communal and divisive
politics practised by the ruling Alliance party. The image of ethnic
tension and suspicion particularly between the Malays and the Chinese
however does not necessarily, as Tate obeerves, rule out the
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possibility of ethnic interaction and cooperation especially if it
serves the economic interests of their ruling elites and bourgeoisie.8
If anything, such ethnic division that is brought about by a strong
sense of 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983:15-16) is to a large
degree instrumental towards maintaining the positions of each of these
elites, as they are invariably perceived as championing and protecting
the rights and interests of their respective communities. Thus the
divisive aspect of communal politics may serve as a warning as well
as a path towards understanding and appreciating the origins of such
politics to the readers. On the other hand, some readers may be swayed
by the argument put forward by }(hoo and Lo that despite its dangers,
communal politics is a necessity.
In the context of multiethnic problems the question of education
policy is raised by Hall, Khoo and Lo, and Enerson. Hal 1 has expressed
his reservation about the 'wisdom' of maintaining separate vernacular
school systems as he foresees their disruptive chauvinistic tendencies
or potential. I<hoo and Lo take a step further by suggesting that a
common education system that incorporates all of the vernacular
education is good for ethnic relations. In addition, they feel that
Malay as a national language can play a sigmificant role in
facilitating inter-ethnic communication. nerson however differs as he
feels that it was unjust of the British to neglect the vernacular
education of the non-Malay children. Neither does he believe in the
ability of Malay performing effectively as the linciva franca of the
country given the lack of proficiency in Malay of many of the
non-Malays in pre-independence Malaya. Such a controversy rages on
into the present-day Malaysia even after it was officially decided
that a common education system and Malay as a national language and
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also medium of instruction can play a prominent role in fostering good
ethnic relations in the country. Some non-Malay readers would still
feel apprehensive of the common education system unless facilities for
the teaching of vernaculars under the present system are improved.
Khoo and Lo are the only writers who touch on the subject of
communist insurgency in Malaya. Such a perceived threat, rightly or
wrongly, laid the groundwork to future curtailment of certain
fundamental liberties of Malayan citizens. Certain readers may be
convinced by the 'social and political exigencies' of these curbs. For
others who see their individual and collective rights as citizens of a
professedly democratic country being trampled, this 1communist
argument' could be discomforting and alienating.
As for the phrases and terms used in these texts, all of the
analyses show that they have an effect or perhaps a calculated attempt
of imposing on the reader a feeling of 'naturalness' and 'commonserise'
in the Grainscian spirit (Forgacs (ed) 1988:421) as regards the
indigenous status of the Malays and Islam's role in the Malaysian
society. Thus Enerson, for instance, states that '...the Malay has
been economically dispossessed in his own country', thereby subtly but
strongly suggesting that the Malays are the 'owner' of Malaya (or, in
Malay, Tanah Melayu). This connotation of 'Malay ownership' is again
evoked when Hall remarks, for example, 'Naturally the Malays regarded
themselves as the people of the country...' This terminological
assertion is made more forceful when Hall further comments that the
Malays would, if they were not careful with their political and
economic positions, eventually find themselves 'pushed out of their
own house on to the doorstep'. Again, the term 'own' serves to confirm
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Malay indigenous relationship to the land.
There are accounts in these history books which constitute
conflicting 'significant pasts 1 . For example, the Hindu cultural input
into the Malay culture suggests that one, Malay culture is not 'pure'
but a product of incorporation of elements of foreign cultures, and
two, Malay culture is dynamic enough to absorb foreign cultural
elements (including, later, Islam). This example could be used
particularly by some non-Malays as their 'significant past' to
demonstrate that the government's fonnul ation of the national culture
is faulty right from the start. In other worcLs, the national culture
cannot be solely Malay- and Islamic-based, but also should include
other cultural bases. The economic contributions of the non-Malays (as
well as the Malays) to the overall development of the country could be
collectively formed and highlighted as another 'significant past' in
arguing for an economic reform, progress and social justice for all
Malaysians - irrespective of ethnic origins - especially the
disadvantaged. The Malay reader on the other hand could employ items
such as one, the historical neglect of Malay economic well-being which
was primarily due to British economic policies in general and two, the
'lazy Malay' stereotype that was popularised by the British and
Chinese which has put them in an economically disadvantaged position
- to form her 'significant pasts' to marshall the argument that the
Malay community as a whole deserves special economic attention and
assistance from the government. That the Malay nationalist movements
were in the forefront of the Malayans' struggle for independence could
be used as another 'significant past' and as a leverage for Malays'
special position. Finally, the triumph of Islam in the golden days of
Melaka empire could constitute another of her 'significant pasts' to
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illustrate that Islam has gained a foothold in this 'Malay region' for
a very long time and thus deserves to be made the basis of the
proposed national culture. Al 1 the history books on balance have
managed to put many things in their perspective. For instance, Malay
economic neglect is traced to its origins in British Malaya and not
simply a matter of a conscious Chinese attempt at dominating the
Malayan economy. In addition, fundamental and structural factors are
attributed to the Malay economic plight. At the same time, the reader
is reminded of the economic contributions of the non-Malays to the
general socio-economic progres of the country. The non-Malay economic
contributions, at least in the eyes of the non-Malay reader, do have
the potential - if their outstanding political, cultural and economic
needs and demands are not effectively and immediately met - of
creating, or at least creating a semblance of, separate
'nationalities' within the Malaysian polity.
Notes
1. For a critical analysis of modernization theories, see
Hoogvelt (1982:116-119).
2. Tham Seong thee (1983:9) points out the strong belief of the
Malays that no-one can master his/her fate. Thani adds, 'The low
status of the Malay commoners, closely linked to their attitude
of submission to the traditional aristocracy, shaped and
conditioned a further set of beliefs that paralleled arid
reinforced the existing value propensities and social ideals arid
gave them a negative twist. The traditional belief was to regard
the chief or ruler as the embodiment of the fortunes of the
state and its inhabitants.'
3. Alatas holds that Malay unwillingness to 'become a tool in
the production system of colonial capitalism' earned them a
reputation of being 'indolent' (1977:72).
4. Alatas argues, 'the colonial ideology utilized the idea of
the lazy native to justify compulsion and unjust practices in
the mobilization of labour in the colonies. It portrayed a
negative image of the natives and their society to justify and
rationalize European conquest and domination of the area. It
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distorted elements of social and human reality to ensure a
comfortable construction of the ideology. (1977:2)' In Chapter
9 of his book (1977), Alatas has marshalled a set of evidences
to show that diligence and hard work are indeed part of the
Malay value system. He also asserts that this lazy image of the
Malay, however, still strongly influences 'an influential
section of the non-Malays' and also a section of the Malay
intelligentsia (ibid: 16-17). For instance, still imprisoned and
stung to a large degree by this colonial image of the Malay,
ruling UMNO party saw it as its solemn duty to 'correct' this
image by publishing a book compiled by party secretary-general
Senu Abdul Pahman, Pevolusi Mental (Mental Revolution), in 1971
which, according to Alatas (ibid: 152), 'is even more negative
in scope than that of colonial capitalism.'
5. Mahathir Mohainad (1981:162-163), the present prime minister
of Malaysia, has shown a lack of understanding of the
sociological context which has brought about the apparent
'laziness', the fatalstic and lackadaisical attitudes of the
Malays as a group. His notion of these negative Malay values,
which to him are inherent in the Malay mind, perhaps plays a
greater part in his formulation of the Look East Policy, which
essentially asks Malaysians to admire and follow the 'positive
examples' of industrious and industrialised Japan and Korea
(INAN 1988:99-104). In addition, he believes that the Malays
are hereditarily inferior to the 'diligent and industrious'
Chinese (1981:25). 'The implications,' he confesses, 'are too
depressing and hold no promise of easy or rapid remedies.
(ibid. :2)' He asserts that this genetic inferiority stems from
Malay cultural preferences, particularly 'in-breeding' which he
defines as 'marriage between first cousins and other close
relatives' within the Malay community (ibid. :2). He nevertheless
suggests intermarriages as these are seen as enriching the Malay
stock. Alatas argues (1977: 163) that, like the Pevolusi. Mental,
the weakness of Mahathir's book, The Malay Dilemma, is that it
puts 'the blame for the exploitation of the Malays on their
character, British rule, and the impact of immigrant business
but not to the sane degree on the Malay ruling class which
profited from colonization.'
6. Lim Mah Hui (in Taylor and Turton (eds) 1988:28) comments
however that almost all of the prominent Malay bourgeoisie 'have
made a dramatic leap into a corporate world through an initial
windfall obtained from state concessions'.
7. This area constitutes part of what is known as the 'Malay
rchipelago' where its many inhabitants belong to the larger
entity of Malay stock. For a discussion of the origin of the
Malays, see Husin All (1987); Ismail Hamid (1988).
8. Lim Mah Hul (ibid. :29) argues that the contemporary Malay
bourgeoisie 's lack in 'capital, know-how and market
connections,' often compels them to have joint economic ventures
with 'either foreigii and/or Chinese capital, (thereby) creating
a symbiotic relationship between Malay and non-Malay
bourgeoisie...'
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Overall conclusion (for both the General Studies and History texts)
Most versions of 'tradition' can be quickly shown to be
radically selective. From a whole possible area of past
and present, in a particular culture, certain meanings and
practices are selected for emphasis and certain other
meanings arid practices are neglected and excluded. Yet,
within a particular hegemony, and as one of its decisive
processes, this selection is presented arid usually
successfully passed of f as 'the tradition', 'the
significant past'... It is a version of the past which is
intended to connect with arid ratify the present. What it
offers in practice is a sense of predisposed continuity
(emphasis in original). Raymond Williams in de
Castell, Luke and Luke (eds) (1989:58).
The analysis of the two sets of History and General Studies texts
shows that both are furxiamentally different insofar as the first set
in effect offers the second a Malay(si)an past whose segments it can
arid does - as asserted by Williams above - select arid emphasise,
neglect or exclude. The manner by which the General Studies books
promote an aspect - arid hence, neglect others - of a text that thus
assumes a position of 'the significant past' is two-fold: One, it
promotes explicitly through excerpts that have similar inclinations.
These extracts are mostly derived from Ma lay newspapers, contemporary
magazines and journals which are largely intended for Malay audience,
arid thus for the 'Malay mind'. Two, such promotion is done by
repetition through the use of chapter summaries, discursive questions,
and multiple-choice questions. Here, as de Castell, Luke and Luke
argue, such 'intentional sectioning arid punctuating of information
reinforce the apparently "neutral" character of the information, arid
serve distinct instructional ends', the manner of framing and the
choice of content to be framed would not to a certain degree be able
to preserve 'the very words' of the writer (1989:250). In other
words, different meanings would emanate from such corisc bus framing,
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meanings which may deviate to some degree from the ones initially
intended by their original authors as it may involve taking things out
of context. What these General Studies books exclude are materials
pertaining to detailed discussions or information regarding elements
of Chinese and Indian cultures, non-Malay economic contributions, and
poverty inflicting the Chinese and Indian communities and steps, if
any, taken to overcome this economic hardship.
On the other hand, the History books, written by Western and
Chinese writers, generally pi-wide useful background so as to pave the
way for a better understanding of the present Malaysian situation.
And, as already intimated earlier, they also inform the reader of that
part of the Malay(si)an history which is neglected or excluded from
the pages of the General Studies books. Promotion, in the case of the
History books, is implied by the repeated appearances between and
heavy emphases within texts of a certain aspect. Contradictions
nonetheless do appear within and between texts particularly when
selection or promotion is juxtaposed with exclusion or neglect, or
when a certain selection conflicts with another selection. These
contradictions can in many ways provide for the reader alternative
'reading' of these texts. In other words, the product of these
contradictions can forge a new 'significant past' that is totally
different from the one originally intended by the writers concerned.
Malayan economics generally dominate the content of all the
History books basically because the writers focus their attention on
the impact of Western industrialisation and colonialism upon the
soclo-economic life of Southeast Asia. Hence, one of the recurrent
themes in these books is Malay economic problems (and, to a lesser
228
degree, their economic contributions) that receives detailed treatment
from all the writers. In this connection, it is perhaps riot surprising
that all of the History writers refer, directly or otherwise, to the
myth of the 'lazy Malay'. Another theme that is highlighted and given
heavy emphasis by all of these writers is the contributions of the
Chinese to the economic development of Malaya. We are told in this
instance that the Chinese saw their contributions as so great as to
contest and qualify themselves for the 'native' category as well as
for social justice. Also highlighted, although with less intensity, by
all except Hall is the ecctiomic contributions of the Indians in
Malaya. In other words, these History books have acknowledged the
contributions of members of the major ethnic groups towards the
soclo-economic development of the country. In short, this constitutes
their 'significant past'. The General Studies books however form their
own 'tradition' as far as the Malay(si)an economic situation is
concerned. All but Peixiaiian Am 1 emphasise the economic problems of
Malays - to the exclusion or neglect of the significant contribitioris
of non-Malays in the economic development of the country. Three of the
concepts that are frequently employed are Malay poverty, Malay special
position, arid the New Economic Policy (particularly the stress on
creating a small group of Malay capitalists) that is waved almost as
an economic wand. As if this isn't enough, the economic plight of
certain Chinese arid Indians is hardly mentioned in any of the General
Studies texts. If anything, as highlighted by most of the General
Studies books, the historical neglect of Malays' economic well-being,
when placed and seen in isolation, appears to become increasingly
urgent so as to lend legitimacy arid justification to the governmental
and institutional aid for Malays. Thus from here we could deduce that
each set of books in general have created their own kind of ethnic
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readership; General Studies books are expected to be favoured by most
Malay readers while the History ones by most non-Malay readers.
The History book writers recognise that immigration and economic
and political problems were brought about by British imperialism in
Malaya. Here a shared sense of being victims to British economic and
political exploitations can be constructed. However, writers such as
Thierson, Hall, and Khoo and Lo also at the same time assert in various
ways that there are some 'virtues' of this political and economic
intervention. Somehow their imperialist and capitalist preferences
manage to slip in. These contradictory positions can evolve into two
distinct 'significant pasts' for the reader to choose or perhaps
incorporate both to form a third, middle path: i . e. one, that there
are some goodness in British imperialism; two, that the British
presence in Malaya only brought negative impact on the economy,
particularly on its Malay sector, which as a result requires massive
governmental help; and finally, that British imperialism wasn't too
bad after all.
Malay culture and Islamic tradition, on the other hand, dominate
the attention of most of the General Studies texts. That both
constitute the bases of the proposed national culture of Malaysia
suggests that the writers concerned are highly influenced by the
official project. It is particularly felt when aspects of the
non-Malay cultures, Qinese culture to be specific, are marginalized
and reduced to being an extract and part of multiple-choice questions.
It should be noted here that Indian culture, as a separate and living
entity in Malaysia, is not at all mentioned or discussed in these
texts. Malay language, which is officially hailed as the national
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language of Malaysia that is supposed to function as a communication
link between the ethnic groups, at times tend to be sketched by these
books less as a laruage of Malaysians than of Malays. In addition,
the constitutional provision for the use of other ethnic languages is
only mentioned in passing in one of the texts. Seen in this
perspective, flnerson's criticism of the exclusion of other vernaculars
in choosing Malay as the national language could gain credence.
Malay culture, national culture, Islamic tradition, and national
language are all tied, in various ways, to the notion of the Malays
being the original people of the land. This subject is discussed
implicitly or overtly by most of the History writers, particularly
Enerson who essentially starxs the Malay claim to indigenousness on
its head by showing other than the Malays to be indigenous. Enerson's
'revelation', however, could have wide implications to the above
national objectives and been employed as a 'significant past' by
especially a non-Malay reader had it not been for the fact that Malays
have been established (by archaeological evidences) as being the
indigenous people of Malaya (Husin Au 1987; Ismail Haniid 1988). Given
this historical reality, the writers of the General Studies who
propagate the notion of Malay indigenousness have obviously chosen to
neglect this questioning of the Malay claim. As far as the Malay
reader is concerned, the emphasis given by Enerson to his spurious
claim may only serve to harden the former's ethnic consciousness. And
it is interesting that of all the General Studies writers, only Maihi
sees it appropriate to trace and discuss the origin of the special
position of the ?4alays. The other writers, all Malays, perhaps have
taken this constitutional provision, i.e. the Malay special position,
for granted. Despite and perhaps because of this controversy,
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Penqajian Am 1 and Penqajian Ani 2 (A. Long) see the need to highlight
ethnic Malay nationalism and ethnocentrism. So do all of the History
writers for apparently different reasons: the first group generally
seems to heighten and reinforce Malay claim to special position, while
the second in general to indicate the socio-econornic, political and
cultural significance of this Malay special status. The indigenousness
of the Malays may in part explain why some of the writers appreciate
the importance of the 'numbers game' or Malay political supremacy to
the Malays: Othman et al., Hall and Tate. Such a display of Malay
ethnocentrism could alienate the non-Malay reader. What is meant to be
educational could serve as a grim reminder to the reader of the
dangers of such ethnic sentiments.
Malay culture receives very elaborate treatment from all the
General Studies writers except Malhi. While in most cases Malay
culture is promoted in full gear, there are occasions when its
dominant cultural and political position gets undermined by certain
contradictions. For instance, the liberal approach to culture and
education as manifested in Penqajian Am 2 (Othman et al.) makes the
official project of constituting a Malay-based national culture appear
rather contentious. Another example of a cultural and political
tension is the universalism of Islam and the specificity of the Malay
culture. The liberal approach to culture and, to some degree, the
universal ism of Islam can both serve as a 'significant past' for the
reader who is quite critical of the official notion of national
culture that is seen to be narrow in scope and definition. On the
other hand, the universalism of Islam could be interpreted by the
reader as its being dynamic and magnanimous enough to absorb other
cultural values so as to become the basis of the proposed national
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culture. On the subject of Islam, only Hall (of the History writers)
discusses it in relation to the glory of the Melaka empire. On the
surface, it would seem that there is more concern with Islam in the
General Studies. On closer inspection, however, Hall's discussion can
constitute a very important element in strengthening the argument of
these General Studies writers as Hall provides them with their
'significant past', i.e. the glory of Islam under the Melaka empire.
Still on a Malay-related subject: Malay rulers, or rather their
position in Malay society, 'command attention in flnerson, Hall, and
Khoo arid Lo, and in General Studies, except those by Saidi and Salim,
arid A. Long. While the latter draw the rulers as almost an ideal type,
the former's remarks on the royalty are quite unpleasant at best and
scathing at worse. Enerson is particularly biting in his observation
of the Malay royalty, revealing, like Hall arid Khoo and Lo, amongst
other things, its mixed parentage and hence the 'dilution' of its
Malay blood. This could go both ways: The vision of the rulers as the
collective protector of the Malay community arid guardian of Islam is
jolted among the Malays, while for some non-Malays this 'tradition'
could symbolise the cultural dynamism of the Malay royalty. Anyway,
given this inherent arid historical role of the Malay rulers, they are
often sketched as a social and political institution that is more
significant to the Malays than the nori-Malays. Corollary to this, the
rulers' official status as the symbol of unity of all Malaysians can
be brought into question.
Despite the professed concern for national unity in relation to
the use of the national language, the subject of national unity
doesn't seem to merit elaborate treatment by many of the book writers.
233
Hence, only Maihi, Othman et al., and Khoo and Lo touch on this
subject. Unlike the others, Malhi allots a whole chapter to the
question of national unity. A multiethnic treatment to a subject
receives scant regard by the writers. When there is such a treatment,
as in the case of Othinan et al. and A. Long, it only takes the form of
multiple-choice questions, with their restricted format preventing any
possibility of developing characters into people who could represent
the various ethnic cultures in the country. If anything, this
represents a half-hearted attempt at being multiethnic. The dangers of
communal politics that is inherently divisive gains the attention of
only the History writers (with the exception of Tate). mong them,
Hall and Ithoo and Lo tend to justify the kind of pro-Malay politics
practised by the ruling party. The question of racism is raised by the
General Studies writers only, with conflicting emphasis. Othman et al.
arid A. Long in effect emphasise racial differences while Saidi and
Salim condemn racism. Such contradictions could go a long way towards
educating the reader not only of the ugly face of racism hit also help
her to detect racism in the other contents of the books concerned.
Education as a tool for promoting ethnic harmony is discussed by
A. Long, Hall, Enerson, and Khoo arid Lo. Unlike the rest, Enerson
dislikes the notion of a common national education system as he
perceives it as an attempt to stifle vernacular education, a criticism
that may not find sympathy and support especially among many
contemporary Ma lays because it would mean, amongst other things,
undermining the Malay language not only as the national language (and
hence a language of unity) lut especially as the main medium of
instruction. A. Long, Hall, and Khoo and Lo generally embrace this
view of the national education system which stipulates the use of the
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national language as the main medium of instruction, apart from
providing facilities, albeit less emphasised, in State-run schools for
the teaching arid learning of other vernaculars.
Basic freedoms or fundamental liberties are recognised by most of
the General Studies writers as requirements of the project to
modernity. The desire to achieve this 'modern' objective is however
partly arrested by certain constitutional and legal qualifications or
curbe. The mention of communist insurgency and threat by Xhoo and Lo
presents a 'significant past' that justifies practices as expressed in
the General Studies texts, such as detention without trial under the
powerful Internal Security Act. Aspects mentioned as related to basic
freedoms are the Malaysian constitution, the Judiciary, and the useful
role of the Opposition. These, particularly the last one, are quite
significant in the way of symbolisirç the legitimate right of a
citizen to debate and dissent in a parliamentary democracy that
Malaysia is supposed to practise. For the critical reader, this
democratic right to dissent and discussion is found wanting in, for
instance, the discussion of the controversial question of national
culture in the General Studies texts.
Finally, most of the concepts, themes, terms and phrases used in
these texts analysed suggest a general attempt at making many of the
things said in the books into something 'natural' arid 'commonsensical'
so as to evoke in the reader's mind, a sense of intellectual
satisfaction arid a refusal to question certain assumptions. The
'commonsensical' phrasing normally hovers over the question of Malay
indigenousness.
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On balance, one could argue that the overall and underlying
emphasis of these books, particularly the General Studies ones, is the
promotion of things Malay, be they economic, cultural or political.
However, these are nevertheless countered within and between texts by
contradicting discussions, the neglect, exclusion or appearance in
another text of certain aspects of Malaysian economic, political and
cultural life. Here we see the 'significant past' being actively
constructed by writers of contemporary Malaysia through the General
Studies books, who, with the exception of Malhi, are Malays. One can
also argue that the Malay *bias in the General Studies is sharply
reinforced in part by the use of extracts from Malay newspapers,
popular magazines and journals that are in essence targeted for the
Malay audience. One then wonders whether the existence of materials in
the History books which are neglected in the General Studies books can
be attributed to the fact that the writers of the History books in
question are non--Malays. This then brings to mind whether with the
passage of time the present History books will be replaced by new ones
that are written by more local (and perhaps mainly Malay) historians
and scholars, and whether this would necessarily mean a shift of
emphasis and new inclusions and exclusions. Such processes of
inclusion and exclusion that are influenced by ethnic considerations
can have the effect of dividing the readers into 'them' and 'us',
thereby promoting just the opposite of what the national education
system attempts to achieve, i . e. to try to foster good ethnic
relations and forge a national identity amongst students. In addition,
one can also attempt to identify aspects of the books that purport to
be temporally specific while others universal. The economic factors,
i.e. economic assistance for Malays and Malay special position, and
national security and divisive politics belong to the first category,
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while the national culture project, national unity, the monarchy,
national laruage, arid fundamental liberties fit the second. The first
category needs to be phased out of the books gradually and
systematically in order that the long-term goal of achieving national
unity could be further' emphasised. As far as the second category is
concerned, the national culture project, despite its professed concern
f or unity, can be very contentious and ethnical ly damaging as well.
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CHAPTER VII
EDUCATION AND CONSCICUSNES-FORMING:
SflJDENTS' POSITION AND DISPOSITION
Schools, accordirg to the popular notion, are an effective
instrument in transmitting cultural values or 'culturally significant
knowledge' to students in particular and the society's new generations
in general. While this perspective presents a vision of a group of
students a1orbirg passive1y almost everything that is imparted to
them, another theoretical construct perceives political and cultural
discourses within and from outside of the school as functioning 'to
promote in a wide variety of students contradictory forms of
consciousness and behavior, some of which may be exhibited in
resistance, in accommodation, or in outright self-indulgence' (Giroux
1983:105). It is in this light therefore that a survey was conducted
to explore the views, attitudes and mental inclinations of a group of
150 students in three secondary schools in the state of Periang with
regard to the political, economic, cultural and educational aspects of
Malaysian life. From here, we would attempt to gauge how these views
and attitudes would respond to the images and messages presented by
the textbooks already analysed. The ethnic and gender composition of
the students interviewed is as follows:
Table 7.1: Ethnic and Gender Composition of Students Surveyed
Chinese	 Indian	 'Malaysian'	 Total
Male	 12	 36	 5	 4	 57
Female	 13	 67	 8	 5	 93
Total	 25	 103	 13	 9	 150
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The schools that came under study were predominantly Chinese in terms
of student population, and hence Chinese were greater in number than
Malays in the survey sample. 'Malaysians' were those students who only
wished to be identified as such, and not according to their respective
ethnic origins.
7.1 The Political
It should be stated at the outset that this survey was conducted
some months after the Mahathir administration launched a series of
mass arrests since October 27, 1987 of Opposition leaders, a few
politicians from the ruling party, government critics, academics,
trade unionists, and social and religious activists. Not only did the
public image of the government suffer to some extent at the time, at
least in the eyes of many of the non-Malays, its drastic actions also
resulted in a climate of fear descending on Malaysian society.
F\i.rther, ethnic tension and suspicion still prevailed, to a certain
degree, at the time. 1 In other words, such a political climate
rendered it difficult for a researcher to gauge the degree of
sincerity (and accuracy) of the responses of certain students,
particularly in areas that were considered 'politically sensitive'.
Thus it was against this political backdrop that when, for
instance, the students were asked, 'In Malaysian history, who are the
political figures whom you favour less and why?', 37 of them, as
shown by Table 7.2 below, chose to answer 'None', although 25 of them
did register their disapproval of Mahathir and his political allies.
While there might be a number of students who genuinely did not have
any political leader to disfavour, it was quite conceivable that, in
the wake of the mass arrests, many of them opted not to disclose their
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16
20
20
17
18
60
3	 3
2	 2
2	 2
o	 0
0	 0
0	 0
0	 0
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35	 100
51	 100
45	 100
40	 100
83	 100
64	 100
20	 100
political choice for fear of possible political repercussions. A
comment from one student might illustrate this kind of political
nervousness: 'There is one particular person and he is still playing a
major role in the Cabinet and the Par-i iament and he is power-crazy.
But I will not reveal his name because I may be sent to Kamunting.2'
Another student remarked: 'I don't think I should mention it (the name
of political figure(s). I might (be) charged under the ISA (Internal
Security Act).' It is also illustrative that the students who decided
not to declare their choices were: 64 of the Indians, 45 of the
Chinese, 20 of the 'Malayslans', and only 6 of the Malays . As we
can see, the percentage of non-Malays showing their apparent
apprehension about making their political feelings publicly known is
far greater than that of the Malays. This could in part be attributed
to a general sense of political insecurity among many non-Malays after
witnessing the consequences of an inter-ethnic conflict, or what was
purported to be one. On the other hand, most of the Malay choices were
more decisive by choosing Malaysia's octogenarian first prime minister
Tunku Jthdul Pahinan and allies (46), and Opposition politicians (34)
Table 7.2: Percentacte of students d1sfavourin g Malaysian politca1 figures
Mahathir & Co.	 Tunku & Co.	 position	 Other
Male	 9	 30	 44	 13	 4	 100
Female	 0	 75	 17	 0	 8	 100
Sub-total	 6	 46	 34	 8	 6	 100
Chinese
Male	 35
Female	 29
Sub-total	 31
Indian
Male	 40
Female	 0
Sub-total	 18
'Malaysian'
Male	 20
Mahathir & Co. 	 Tunku & Co.	 Opposition 	 Other	 Hone
Female	 60	 0	 0	 20	 20	 100
Sub-total	 40	 0	 0	 40	 20	 100
100
as their disliked political figures in the country. As far as many of
the Malay students were concerned, Dr Mahathir Mohamad was their hero
and saviour, especially in times of social and political distress that
was seen as threatening the unity of the 'Malay community'. This
explains in part why they opposed Thnku Ahiul Rahman (whom many Malay
students perceived as being too liberal and 'soft' on Chinese
demands). In contrast, Mahathir (and allies) was chosen by 31% of the
Chinese students as their disliked political figure.
If declaring one's disfavoured political figure(s) seemed like a
formidable task at a time like this, stating the ilkeable or favoured
one(s) appeared to be less problematic. If anything, choosing a
particular figure seemed to be, for some students, one way of going
around the problem of declaring their disapproval of another figure.
Hence, when the students were asked, 'In Malaysian history, who are
your favourite political figures, and why?', Thnku .AhIul Rahrnan and
allies (including Mahathir's rival Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and former
prime minister Tun Hussein Onn) were popular among most non-Malay
students and the 'Malaysians'. Some 70% of the Chinese students, 78%
of the Indians, and 64% of the 'Malaysians' gave support for the
first prime minister and allies. In contrast, 36% of the Malay
students gave support to Mahathir and supporters, 19% to Tunku arid
friends, while 42% went to various other individuals (alive as well as
deceased) under the category of 'Other' and 3% to the Opposition.
While the popularity of Mahathir was still strong among the Malay
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students concerned, the overall figures also reflects their general
anxiety and apprehension as regards the internal feud arid conflict -
of which Mahathir was one of those deeply involved - that afflicted
UMNO, which in turn could be conveniently interpreted as a threat to
the unity and security of the 'Malay community' (and by extension, the
Malaysian community). In other words, those who sought other
individual Malay figures were apparently also looking for some kind of
a unifying symbol for the Ma lays as a whole.
In the wake of a politiôal crackdown that was largely attributed,
at least by the government, to ethnic conflict, but interpreted by
government critics as a political ruse to muffle growing dissent and
criticisms of the government, the question of freedom ('Some people
think there should be more freedom, others think there should be less.
What do you think...?') elicited an interesting response: 'More
freedom' was demanded by 5O of the Chinese students, followed by 43
of the 'Malaysian' students, 38 of the Indians, and only 26 of the
Malays. The group that topped the list of those who asked for
'moderate freedom' was that of the Malay students with 63 of them
saying so. This was followed by 63 of the Indian students, 57 of the
'Malaysians', and 39 of the Chinese. Those who chose 'more freedom'
felt that only with freedom could their political, economic arid
cultural survival be assured in the country. While those who asked for
'moderate freedom' argued that more freedom in a multiethnic Malaysia
could be darqerous as it could conveniently be abused by certain
people, especially politicians who, in their quest to make quick
political gains, trampled upon the sensibilities of the major ethnic
groups and consequently hampered national unity initiatives. One could
perhaps at this juncture surmise that these are the sort of people who
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would be inclined to support government measures - some of which are
restrictive and fundamentally undemocratic in nature - taken in order
to protect 'national interests'. Perhaps this political accommodation
could be related to the students' response to the question, 'Do you
thini< that sometimes the government must force people to do things
against their will?'. Some 58 of all the students said 'Yes' while
38 said 'No', and 4 'No comment'. However, when it comes to
individual ethnic groups, only the Indians differed: 56 of the group
voted 'No' to this question. One possible reason for the affirmative
response is that there were some students (out of the 58) who might
have felt compelled to do so, given the 'sensitive' nature of the
question and the uneasy political situation in which this question was
posed. On the other hand, the 56 of Indian students who replied 'no'
to this question were probably the ones who felt the need to have more
freedom, particularly those who perceived their community being
marginalized in many ways. Thus, the issue of fundamental liberties as
presented by many of the General Studies books, for instance, must
have aroused a lot of interest from the students, particularly those
who sought 'More freedom' and who felt apprehensive by the assertion
of many of the textbook writers that curtailment of certain
fundamental liberties is necessary. In other words, discussion of such
a crucial matter, as in the General Studies books, results in
conflicting responses from the students.
7.2 The Cultural
It is interesting that most of the students, irrespective of
their ethnic origins, defined race relations as achieving ethnic unity
or better ethnic relations: 95 of the Malay students said so,
followed by 95 of the Chinese, and all of the Indian and 'Malaysian'
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students. It is also significant that, in response to the same
question (i.e. 'What is 'race relations' to you?') 5 of the Malay
students and 5 of the chinese argued that one should only think of
one Malaysian race as opposed to emphasising the division of the
society into many ethnic groups. However, despite the concern for
national unity in the country as indicated above, ethnic
considerations still seemed to play a significant part in the lives of
these students, regardless of whether they're fully conscious of this.
Such a tendency is implied by the response to the following question:
'Do you think it sometimes helps to understand others if you know what
racial group they be long to?' Affirmative answer was given by 69 of
all the students; 75 of the Malays, followed by 73 of the Indians,
7O of the Chinese, and 44 of the 'Malaysians'. Such a response from
these students is hardly surprising in a society where ethnic label or
a strong sense of belonging to one's own community is often
consciously or unwittingly celebrated. Thus, it seems like a
formidable task to extricate oneself from the habit or practice of
measuring others by an ethnic rod - even for some 'Malaysians'.
Certain State policies also appear partly responsible for the
perpetuation of pronounced ethnic consciousness. As one student
commented, 'I rn made to feel this way (I . e. it 's important to know a
person's ethnic background) by the discriminatory policies of the
government.'
That an ethnic label is important in many ways in Malaysian
society is perhaps indicated by the following: 41 of the Malays saw
themselves as 'Malaysians', 32 as 'Malay-Ma laysians', 23 as 'Malay'
and	 4 as 'Other'. As for the Chinese, 56 of them considered
themselves 'Malaysians', 25 'Chinese', 19 'Chinese-Malaysians'. With
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regard to the Indians, 5O perceived themselves as 'Malaysians', 25
as 'Indians' and another 25 as 'Indian-Ma lays ians'. The 'Malaysians'
on the other hand saw themselves as 'Malaysiaris' arid 'Malaysians'
only. This suggests that, with the distinct exception of the
'Malaysians', both Malays arid non-Nalays as a group have in themselves
an identity conflict between being Malaysians arid ethnic individuals,
particularly those whose identities are hyphenated to 'Malaysian'.
This 'identity tension' has its origins in the communal politics of
most political parties in the country, arid ethnic-based government
policies, or at least, theethnic-biased implementation of certain
government policies. Such a situation can perhaps be related to the
kind of cpiest ion posed by Yinger (1986: 28-29), 'Who benefits most when
ethnicity plays a prominent part in the ways in which interests are
pursued?' While in most cases only the minority from each of the
communities would be likely to benefit from capitalising on ethnicity,
the majority nevertheless may still believe, or want to believe, that
much could be gained from promoting ethnic labels. In other words, a
Malaysian identity is still receiving strong challenge from ethnic
identities.
Religion plays an important part in the lives of most Malaysians.
When asked, 'How important is religion to you in your daily living?',
all the Malay-Muslim sttxients interviewed replied that their religion
was important to them. Some 84 of the Chinese expressed similar
sentiments, followed by 92 of the Indians, arid all of the
'Malaysians'. Such emphasis given to religion by the stidents could be
attrib.ited to several factors. One, the Islaniization policy of the
government has raised the religious consciousness of not only
Malay-Muslims but also of non-Malays. Two, the forming of a Malaysian
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national culture that is based on Malay arid Islamic cultures not only
emphasises the importance of Malay culture arid Islam, lut also prompts
the non-Malays to jealously guard and promote their cultural heritage.
Consequently, as Chandra Muzaf far (1987:98) observes, 'Dormant, even
dead, customs and practices are being resurrected to emphasize the
uniqueness and the distinctiveness of various non-Muslim religions and.
cultures.' Moreover, the Islamic resurgence in the country has also
generated increasing interest in religious activities among
non-Muslims to such an extent that there developed 'an undefined sense
of solidarity among non-Malays that they are not Muslims' (S.E.
Ackerman and R.L.M. Lee 1988:5).
Further, with the official promotion of Islamization policy and
national culture, the seeming oppositional stand taken by Muslims and
non-Muslims in the larger society, and the ethnic dimension that is
added to religious affiliation, it is not surprising that when the
Malay students were posed with the question, 'Do you feel differently
about people who belong to different religions?', 83% of them said
'Yes' with 17% saying otherwise. The response was however different
with the non-Malay students: 67% of the Chinese said 'No', 31% 'Yes'
and 2% were 'Indifferent'; 91% of the Indians said 'No', and 9% 'Yes';
arid 61% of the Malaysians said 'No', 37% 'Yes' and 2% were
'Indifferent'. The comparatively less percentage of non-Malays who had
the 'sense of religious difference' can be interpreted as those who
were willing to see others outside their faiths as being equal insofar
as their sense of religious freedom and rights is not seen as being
threatened. In other words, discussion and promotion of Islam and
national culture to the exclusion or marginalization of those of the
non-3alays - as is done in most of the General Studies books - must
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have alienated and frustrated the non-Malay reader and by extension,
heighten ethnic suspicion and tension.
a. Classroom activities
As far as subjects in school are concerned, the students in
general put History on top of the list of their favourite subjects.
while Economics came first in their list of least liked subjects.
lkirther, among the textbooks they used which they liked best are those
concerning History, Economics and General Studies. Reasons given for
these preferences ranged from wanting to know the past and present of
Malaysia to effective teaching of certain teachers of the subjects
concerned.
When broached with the question, 'Are there textbooks which you
find unattractive because they are offensive to you? If any, please
specify in what aspect, and how?', 56 of them said 'None', 38 'No
comment', and 6 felt there were such cases. One Malay student briefly
described his objection: 'The origins of the Malay royalty.' He was
referring to the ethnic Indian and Hindu cultural background of
certain Malay rulers of the old days, for it is not commensurate with
the status of today's Malay rulers who are generally seen as the
protector of Malay culture, Islam and interests. Another response
seems to relate to the History textbooks: 'The Chinese and Indian
contributions to the struggle for Malaya's independence were
neglected.' This appears to represent a general feeling of
dissatisfaction among some non-Malay students over the lack of
appreciation of the sacrifices made by the non-4lalays in their fight
for the country's independence, a sentiment that is much related to
the question of national identity formation. A sense of unfairness was
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also registered by another student who felt that social problems faced
by other ethnic groups were not highlighted by the books: 'The
textbooks do not mention social injustice experienced by certain other
racial groups.' This and the previous criticisms could be related to
the promotion by certain History and General Studies book writers of a
certain 'significant past' to the exclusion of others. That there was
only a small number of students expressing their objections can be
attributed to several factors: (a) In the wake of the late 1987
political crackdown, many students who were critical tended to be
over-cautious about displaying their political opinions; (b) State
ideological penetration of the students' mind had been quite effective
as to make the latter incapable of noticing anything objectionable,
I . e. able to see most things as 'natural' or 'commonsensical' in the
textbooks; (C) the time constraint experienced by the students when
responding to the questionnaire prevented many from answering certain
crucial questions (that required some time to think carefully)
including this one; (d) there were those who were genuinely unaware of
any offensive items in the textbooks; and (e) a few students perhaps
didn't fully understand, the question.
b. Mass media
The mass media form one of the basic cultural channels through
which members of the Malaysian society are largely informed,
regardless of their degree of accuracy and/or distortion, 4 about
events that happen around them which may possibly affect their lives.
For students, the media constitute an important social institution
which in part help form their political and social consciousness. The
survey revealed that 93 of all the students read newspapers regularly
while the remainder 7 read them on an occasional basis. As far as
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income groups are concerned, all of the upper income students were
exposed to newspapers regularly, followed by 97 of the lower income
group students who read them regularly, with 3 of them occasionally.
In the middle income group, 92 of the students read newspaper
regularly while 8 did so on an occasional basis.
A large proportion of the students were exposed to local
newspapers which were published by Malaysia t s media giants, namely the
Star Publications group, the Fleet group (which owns the established
New Straits Times group) and the Utusan Melayu group, all of which are
directly or indirectly associated with the two major components of the
ruling coalition, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the UMNO
(for the last two media groups) (Article 19 1988:155). The Star group
publishes the daily, The Star, and its Sunday version, Sunday Star;
awl the New Straits Times (N5f) group publishes the dailies New
Straits Times, the Malay Mail and their Sunday editions of New Sunday
Times and the Sunday Mail respectively. The NST group also publishes
its Malay publications, Berita Harian and its Sunday edition, Berita
Mirqu. The daily Nanyart Siang Pau has been acquired by the Fleet
group, thus making it part of the NST stable. The third group, the
Utusan Melayu group, on the other hand publishes the daily Utusan
Malaysia and its Sunday edition, Minqquan Mala ysia. Apart from these
papers, there are also the Chinese daily Kwor Wah Jit Poh, Malay
tabloids such as Bacaria and Watan, the PAS party's weekly, J-farakah,
and the consumerist Utusan Penqquna.
When asked, 'Name the newspapers you like', the Malay students
chose Malay newspapers as their favourites (48 of the students chose
them), 1it English newspapers came near with 4O (see Table 7.3). As
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students as compared to 2O who went for the NST papers. In addition.
only 25 of them read the Malay newspapers. Those who read the Malay
papers did so for the following reasons: (a) They are attracted to
many of the contents of the papers; (b) they want to improve their
Malay language proficiency, in particular for the purpose of doing
well in their examinations; and/or (c) they want to feel the 'pulse'
of the Malay society. This pattern of newspaper preferences was also
found among the 'Malaysians'. Some 62 of the 'Malaysians' chose Star
newspapers as compared to 8 who read NST papers. As regards the
Malay newspapers, 23 of then chose NST Malay newspapers while 8 went
for the Utusan papers. 'Other' publications liked by 21 of the
students include Kwoncr Wah Jit Poh, Bacaria, Watan, Harakah, and
Utusan Penqcuna.
As far as magazines are concerned, 57 of all the students read
Star Group
New Straits Tines Group
Engi ]sh
Malay
Nanyang
Utusan Group
Other
Total
Table 7.3: Newspapers favoured by the students
Clunese	 Indian	 'Malaysian'	 Total
22%	 29%	 50%	 62%	 31%
18%	 11%
	
20%
	
8%
	
13%
18%	 22%
	
20%
	
23%
	
21%
0%	 5%
	
0%
	
0%
	
3%
30%	 6%
	
5%
	
7%
	
11%
12%	 27%
	
5%
	
0%
	
21%
100%	 100%
	
100%
	
100%
	
100%
magazines regularly, 41% on an occasional basis while 3% were not
exposed to magazines at all. Of the magazines read by the students,
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those published by the government's language and literary agency,
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP), such as the monthly Dewan Masyarakat,
Dewan Budaya and Dewan Siswa were the favourites among 43% of the
students surveyed. These were read by 47% of the Chinese, 40% of the
'Malaysiaris', 38% of the Malays and 35% of the Indians. The reasons
given were (a) the non-Malay readers' intent to improve their Malay;
(b) the comparatively cheaper prices of these magazines; and (c) many
of their contents were quite related to the students' academic work
and examinations.	 Other Malay publications from private Malay
publishers were in general also popular among the students, such as
Diskusi and S'IPM Fokus. International magazines which were mostly in
English were popular among 15% of the Chinese, 20% of the Indian, 15%
of the 'Malaysian' and 5% of the Malay students. In the 'Other'
category, magazines that were read are: Asiaweek, National Geoqraphic,
Vcç, Cosmopolitan, Wanita, Var-ia Pop, Vax-ia Sari, ERA, Saturday
Weekly, Galaxie, Team Beat and Utusan Radio dan TV (URIV). This
pattern of readership suggests that alternative views or perspectives
that are often contained in many foreign publications may reach
non-Malays more than Malays, especially when many of the latter are
not proficient in English. The case of the non-Malays, however, may
parallel that of the Malays in the near future when more and more
Malaysians will be more proficient in Malay than English.
As regards income groups, it was most noticeable that only 2% of
the lower income group were exposed to international publications,
followed by 15% of the middle income and 18% of the upper income
groups. One can surmise that the choice of international publications
was governed by financial as well as language capability factors.
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Like the newspapers, television7
 is also popular among students:
89 of all the ethnic groups possessed television sets. And as far as
frequency is concerned, 55 of them watched IV regularly, 45
occasionally and one percent shunned the set altogether. Regarding
radio, all of the students had sets. However, it was not as popular
as IV, as indicated by the following pattern: 37 of the ethnic groups
listened regularly, 53 occasionally and 1O kept away from the set
completely. However, more of the Malay students (68) listen to
radio. A possible explanation for this is that a major portion of the
radio programmes cater to Maly-proficient listeners.
7.3 The socio-economic
The level and nature of social awareness of the students seemed
to a large degree to be influenced by the government 's policies, or
their implementation. Thus, when asked, 'Is there any social injustice
which you think ought to be put right either in school or in your
(larger) society?', the majority of the non-Malays and the
'Malaysians' pointed to racial discrimination, while the Malay
majority indicated 'rich-poor gap' (see Table 7.4 below). It is
significant that 79 of the Chinese, 5O of the Indians and all of
the 'Malaysians' cited 'racial discrimination' as one form of 'social
injustice', an inclination that probably stemmed from a perception,
real or imagined, that most of the State policies benefited only the
Malays, and hence the State was largely identified with the Malays.
For the Malays, on the other hand, the 'rich-poor gap' was perceived
- also in ethnic terms - to be a social injustice that was marked by
the supposedly material affluence of the 'Chinese community'. Thus, to
them, this economic imbalance requires immediate remedy that is
embodied in government policies such as the New Economic Policy. In
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other words, both Malay and non—Malay groups viewed social injustice
not only in ethnic terms but also in a polarised fashion. These
conflicting perspectives of social injustice must have to a certain
degree influenced the students' response to materials that discuss,
for instance, economic policies such as those found in many of the
General Studies. We can also deduce from here that while most students
shared concern for good ethnic relations, as indicated earlier, they
nevertheless disagreed about how to achieve that goal. After 'social
injustice' came the students' concern for the lack of freedom of
expression, and lack of hinan rights in the country, which in
themselves indicate the students' apparent inability to place social
injustice in a wider context of human rights and freedom of
expression.
Table 7.4: Ethinc groups' views of 'social injustice'
j•	 Chinese	 Indian	 'Malaysian'
	
Total
'Racial discnmination'
	
38%	 79%	 50%	 100%
	
74%
'Rich-poor gap'
	
50%	 10%	 25%	 0%
	
16%
'Lack of freedom of expression'	 12%	 8%	 0%	 0%
	
8%
'Lack of human rights'	 0%	 3%	 25%	 0%
	
2%
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%
	
100%
In conclusion, there are many aspects of Malaysian life - in and
outside the school - that are ethnically divisive, or at least
promote ethnic consciousness, that could influence the formation of
students' political arid social consciousness. These factors, when
positioned against the reading materials that the students have to
read, can produce in general conflicting results. This implies that
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not only are certain State policies easily identified with a
particular ethnic group, arid thus alienating that group from members
of other ethnic groups. bit they also promote ethnic consciousness
among Malaysians. The distorted implementation of the New Economic
Policy (that is often mentioned and discussed in most of the General
Studies textbooks), which is biased towards the Malays as a whole, is
one such example of a government policy that has a divisive effect on
the people, including students. These responses can take the form of
heightened ethnic sentiments and thus consolidate a person's sense of
belonging to an ethnic community, or that of an awareness that the
route to ethnic harmony is the breaking down of ethnic labels and
practices. In other woiiis, certain kinds of presentation of the
social, economic, cultural and political aspects of Malaysian life in
these textbooks can result in their competing for the reader's
national and/or sub-national or ethnic loyalties.
Notes
1. A few students whom I interviewed personally had to make sure
that I am a member of their ethnic group before becoming candid
about their feelings towards members of other ethnic communities:
'M-e you one of "us"?', they enquired swiftly. Another group of
students (whose ethnic background was different from mine) on the
whole seemed measured and even over-cautious in its response to
certain 'ethnically sensitive' questions.
2. Kainunting is where one of the country's political detention
centres is located.
3. Percentages of the Indians and 'Malaysians' must be taken with
a pinch of salt as they constituted a very small group in this
survey.
4. Particle 19, an international human rights organisation, states
that the government owned and control led broadcasting media 'have
been instructed since the early 1970s to help oppose
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"anti-national elements".' As for the privately-owned press in
Malaysia, it adds, 'Party politics tend to dictate the news
values and editorial policy of these major newspapers' (rticle
19 1988:155). 'Party pa' here refers to that of the ruling
party.
5. The Utusan Malaysia however has already allotted certain news
coverage and columns in their papers that are supposed to attract
non-Malay readers, but the nature of these columns generally
suggest that they are mere tokenism. For instance, there is an
opinion-competition column entitled, 'What the non-Malays say'.
The themes or topics of discussion are however decided by the
papers' editorial board which normally skirt around more
important, and often controversial, issues.
6. It was generally believed that The Star was an indirect means,
a sounding board, by which its owner, the MCA party, expressed
its displeasure over certain issues to its UMNO partner.
7. There are two television stations: one, Radio-Television
Malaysia (RTh1) is State run and controlled and two, TV3, a third
channel station, is jointly owned by members of the major parties
of the ruling coalition.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The forging of a common or national culture is, as discussed
earlier, crucial to the construction of a national identity amongst
people, particularly in a multiethnic society like Malaysia that
perceives its long-term survival in fostering good inter-ethnic
relations. As a corollary, this national identity is pivotal in the
nationalist design to pursue economic development arxl modernization.
Formal education therefore must be situated in this larger
societal context, for in tune, to a large degree, with the State's
socio-econouiic aixi political objectives, educational institutions are
expected to meet certain declared goals such as forging a national
identity, fostering national unity and educating and training students
to meet the country' s manpower needs. This thus suggests that any
designing of curriculum and writing of textbooks will have to take
cognizance of this larger nationalist design. Smith holds, 'The
solidarity of citizenship required a common "civil religion" formed
out of shared myths arid memories arid symbols, arid communicated in a
standard language through educational institutions. (1988:136)' In
practical terms, this can be interpreted as the State having the need
to encourage arid ensure that publishers arid writers publish and write,
respectively, textbooks and other educational materials that provide
and transmit 'national symbols, myths arid values' with which students
of all ethnic backgrounds can share arid identify.
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As already inUmated, social institutions such as schools become
ideological 'sites' where the State can constantly try to impart its
own version of historical and cultural 'past' that has been
re-interpreted and re-constituted for the use of the general public
and students in particular; and this is where 1aymond iams'
concept of selective tradition comes into play. This study indicates
that the books analysed have certain outstanding features or themes
that recur from text to text or within the same text. This also
implies that, at the same time, there are items or themes which,
because of overemphasis of certain other things, get marginalized,
de-emphasised or even excluded completely. I have argued that such
patterns of emphasis arid de-emphasis or selection and exclusion
indicate that the writing and publishing of these reading materials
are largely informed or influenced by policies arid political
philosophy of the State.
As far as the General Studies books are concerned, Malay arid
Islamic cultures, which form the bases of the proposed national
culture of Malaysia, constitute the themes that dominate these reading
materials. Such cultural discussions include the questions of national
language and Malay royalty. Politically, issues of Malay nationalism,
Malay special position, arid the 'political bargain' that was struck by
the partners of the Alliance before independence were emphasised.
These constitute in large measure 'the significant past' for those who
argue for promoting governmental assistance to the Bumiputeras, many
of whom lag behirxi. economically. In economic terms, these books focus
mainly on Malay poverty and socio-economic development arid
institutional assistance for the Malays through the NE?. All the
topics that receive the attention of the book writers, especially
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those of the General Studies ones, were underpinned by at least the
writers' assertion of the indigenous status of the Malays, and the
concern for a national unity to be achieved through socio-economic
development, modernization and industrialisation. Any attempts at
being multiethnic, which there are, are easily submerged by this Malay
emphasis. Not only that, when juxtaposed with the large array of Malay
materials in these books, the presentation of items of non-Malay
interest and concern can only be interpreted at best as mere tokenism,
or at worst, to convey in the reader a sense of the marginality of
non-Malay cultures. In connection to this, what is most pronounced is
the complete absence of any discussion of Indian culture. Having said
that, the presence of a few extracts in the books concerned that
possess a liberal approach towards say, ethnic cultures and
multicultural education - thereby contradicting the overall
inclination of the books - can have the effect of making the reader
aware of the Malay bias of these books.
As regards the History books, the writers' relatively wider
perspective of Malay(si)an history enables the reader to acquire a
broad overview of the origins of the country's multiethnic society and
its attendant problems. Thus, for instance, the reader is informed
that under British colonialism, non-Malays made contributions in
various ways to the overall economic development of Malaya, and at the
same time is also informed about the roots of Malay economic problems,
and their impact on ethnic relations. These non-Malay economic
contributions, as indicated elsewhere, can be considered as 'the
significant past' of those who advocate that the State provide fair
treatment to all Malaysians irrespective of ethnicity. Modernization
of the Malayan economy by British initiatives on a capitalist model is
259
presented by the writers as being the only route towards
soclo-economic development and modernization. Like the General Studies
books, the history ones seem to emphasise with little qualification
the virtues of capitalism, to give the reader the impression that
there was no alternative economic system that pre- and
post-independent Malaya can or should adopt. In other words, the books
could have problematised the concept of capitalism (as well as
socialism) so that for instance they could discuss the disadvantages
of Malaya's entry into the international system of capitalism as well
as their impact on ethnic relations in the country.
Communist insurgency is presented as being a real threat to the
country's political security and stability and hence, so the argument
goes, necessitates the instituting of powerful and dangerous laws such
as the controversial Internal Security Act, and Printing and
Publications Act. This thus has the effect of ratifying 'the present
and to indicate directions for the future' (Williams 1978:116), i.e.
curtailment on or erosion of certain fundamental liberties have been
legitimated by this 'significant past'.
Another theme that is commonly highlighted by these books is the
Malay concern with the 'numbers game' and their political supremacy,
which is seen by the Malay community as being challenged by the coming
of the non-Malays into the country. nother common item is the
(communal) politics of the Alliance that is highlighted in such a
manner as to overwhelm other political activities in which other
political organisations or movements (which were mass-based and
multiethnic) were involved, particularly in the perIod before Malayan
independence.
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As far as the sources of 'culturally significant knowledge' are
concerned, the study indicates that the Malaysian government in
general and the Ministry of Education's Textbook reau in particular
by and large has a control or at least an influence over the materials
published by government (I . e. Dewan Bahasa dan PustaJca) and private
publishers. Ideological imperatives of the government and b.isiness
contractual relationship between the ministry concerned and the
publishers largely govern the latter's editorial independence, if any.
With regard to the teachers, while there were those who did provide
alternative readirç materials to students they nevertheless were
constrained by rules and regulations of the Education Ministry which
can classify certain educational materials as 'undesirable'. Such a
situation can and does help facilitate the selection and. forming of
'the significant past' or the 'the tradition' in the nationalist
design to construct a national identity and promote national unity.
And as the study demonstrates, this ideological process is largely
slanted towards the promotion of Malay - as opposed to Malaysian -
culture and interests. Put another way, although there were published
reading materials, such as the History books, that provided
alternative views of the social, economic, cultural and political
aspects of Malaysian life, the overall impact of both sets of the
General Studies and History books and the ethos of the publishing
industry and of the teaching profession as a whole suggest that the
endeavour to achieve the said nationalist objectives is largely
informed or influenced by the State's own interpretation of Malaysia's
national culture and its promotion of Malay interests.
As regards the students, we have seen in the study, their social
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and political consciousness was not only informed by their reading
materials at school but also by their teachers, social relations arid
especially the mass media and other cultural forms of expression. This
suggests that any crass form of indoctrination of the State' s
political philosophy would likely be met by strong resistance from at
least some of these students. It is when the student-reader cannot
identify with 'the significant past' advocated by the reading
materials concerned that she is likely to seek alternative images or
symbols in these texts that can form her own kind of 'the tradition',
which at the same time may help harden her ethnic attachment. Put
another way, as inthcated above in the discussion about inarginalized
people, a State project to construct a national identity in the minds
of the students may well end up in the creation of alternative and
conflicting identities or the reinforcement of the already existing
sub-national identities to such a degree as to submerge any form of
'national identity'.
At this juncture, it is perhaps useful to remind that this study
was largely conducted under difficult conditions, particularly when it
came to doing the survey of students and the interviews with teachers.
Hence, there were responses to the questions posed - which were, at
least at the time when the research was conducted, considered
'politically sensitive' - that may not necessarily be a true
reflection of the respondents' feelings, views arid attitudes. If
anything, this indicates the fear, suspicion arid anxiety concerning
various social issues that reside within the ethnic groups of
Malaysian society.
If, as Smith argues, the creation of a common culture,
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particularly in a society where there exist more than one ethnie,
involves 'ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and
reconstructions (1988:206)', then educational institutions as well as
other social institutions possess this crucial role because they are
located in this ever-going process of creating a sense of belonging to
'an imagined community' (B. Anderson 1983) or 'a cultural community'
(Smith 1988:136). But if the nation's concern is really with the goal
of forging a national identity and fostering national unity amongst
its people, then certain features or themes found in the books
themselves seem to require 're-interpretation, rediscoveries and
reconsta-uctions' to meet some of the social, political, cultural and
economic needs that relate to the question of national identity and
unity at the time. Such an ideological review would involve important
and crucial matters, namely the New Economic Policy (NEP), the
national culture project, the constitutional provision of 'Malays'
special position and the legitimate interests of other communities',
the question of national security and its relation to the country's
human rights and fundamental liberties, and finally the overwhelmingly
capitalist nature of Malaysia's economic system. The books allow
little scope for such a review; were it to take place, the books
themselves would have to be rewritten.
As regards the NEP, book writers could, in contrast with the
government's preference of concentrating on the restructuring of
society (i.e. creating a small number of Malay capitalists and
entrepreneurs), have emphasised the first prong of the Policy, which
is the eradication of poverty irrespective of ethnicity. For it is
only when steps are taken to redress social injustice that affects all
Malaysians can a reader identify with the NEP, and steer away from the
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dichotomization of Bumiputera and non-Bumaputera. Secondly, the
national culture project could have been problematised in the reading
materials as it is a complex matter that requires a long series of
debate and discussions. While one can take cognizance of the fact that
the national culture ought to be based on the indigenous culture
(because of its historical attachment to the land) - Malay arid other
Bumiputeras - elements of the Chinese and Indian cultures could also
be emphasised and taken into account in discussions presented in
school books. Such a precaution might have been taken, bit instead the
books illustrate what Smith Cb988:150) observes, 'a single strategic
ethnie' would tend to dominate multiethnic states in such a manner as
to seek, to a larger or lesser degree, 'to incorporate, or influence
the surrounding smaller or weaker ethnie'. Thirdly, the question of
'Malays' special position and the legitimate interests of other
communities' requires a critical and judicious review. Although at a
glance, the introduction in the books of the constitutional provision
for this is well-balanced, they do not point out that it is open, as
it has been in certain cases in the past, to ahise. A review of this
constitutional provision can be interpreted as being consonant with a
changing cultural climate where Islam and, to a lesser degree, other
religious traditions, can be expected to be playing a dominant arid
bigger role in Malaysian society. This is because, for instance,
Islam's universalist and egalitarian preferences in approaching social
justice can be perceived as being inconsistent with any form of
special treatment of any group of people. Fourthly, the subject of
national security and its impact on fundamental freedoms of Malaysians
could have been broached by the book writers in a more critical
manner. For the student-reader needs to be made aware that more
freedoms do not necessarily mean jeopardising the country's internal
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security; if anything, it often works the other way round. Finally,
the books concerned could have put the capitalist economic system in
perspective, with all its weaknesses and strerths vis-a-vis other
economic systems that are found in the world. In this discussion, book
writers could have an emphasis on inherent weaknesses of capitalism in
that it promotes uneven development and creates socio-economic
disparity, and this can have serious implications on Malaysia's ethnic
relations and the construction of a national identity.
As implied elsewhere, a chool curriculum and in particular the
contents of the reading materials of the students cannot be positively
changed or mothfied effectively until and unless certain vital changes
are made in regard to the overall policies and ethos of the State,
especially those of the Ministry of Education. This is because schools
and their academic practices and activities are very much determined
or influenced by the State, particularly when the former are perceived
as and made the ideological instrument of the latter. Besides, book
publishers are also influenced by the State in that their financial
survival is almost always tied to government contracts and projects
concerned, thereby making the former less independent editorially. The
Malaysian government may have gained to a certain extent from this
situation which enables it to pursue vigorously its own policies, tut
the social, economic, cultural and political costs may prove too high
to be borne by all Ma lays ians in the long run. The government
therefore may want to consider reviewing some of its policies and also
the manner in which these policies are implemented. As intimated
above, these take the form of the NE?, with its pro-Malay and
pro-entrepreneur emphasis; the national culture; the State's and to
some degree, societal stress on &imiputera/non-Bemiputera dichotomy in
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all aspects of Malaysian life, particularly in relation to education,
employment, and politics. Finally, it may also be beneficial to have a
serious re-appraisal of certain laws that impinge on democracy and
citizens' fundamental liberties such as freedom of expression.
association and movement, for curbed freedoms would necessarily mean
the government depriving itself of vital means of gauging public
opinion regarding its policies and actions.
Unless these changes are undertaken, the State may - after
having succeeded in some mea.ure in eradicating via the NEP the
identification of ethnicity with occupation - find itself creating
another kind of identification of State policies and assistance with
ethnicity, which in and of itself is as ethnically divisive as
creating an identification of the private sector with a certain ethnic
community. In this connection, any scheme of social engineering, for
instance, needs to have the eventual effect of helping all citizens
irrespective of ethnic origins identify themselves with the economic
and cultural affluence, and social and political stability of the
country. In other words, unless these changes are forthcoming, the
State 's hegemonic position may be seriously challenged by groups in
society which perceive themselves as being socially, economically,
culturally and politically marginalized. As Yinger (1986:27) argues,
'The marginality that other persons feel refers not to their own
racial or ethnic group but to the larger society within which they
live - particularly with its polity. This may be expressed by a
transfer of loyalty - or of its strongest expression - to the racial
or ethnic group.' These groups may produce, in and outside the school
ground, their own symbols, meanings and values that are an anathema to
the spirit and objective of constructing national identity and
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securing national unity.
If the present political climate, and the ideological tendencies
of the State persist, and the financial survival of most book
publishers, especially the small ones, is highly dependent on State
'goodwill' - and virtually nothing concrete is done to rectify this
whole situation - then the future of education in particular and the
country's ethnic relations in general seems quite daunting. For what
we could surmise is that with further emphasis on the government's
perspective of national cultureand on State assistance to Bumiputeras
- irrespective of whether the well-to-do reap the benefits - to the
neglect of the economic well-being of the non-Bumiputeras, the bias in
the writing of social science textbooks is predictable. In this case,
the writing of General Studies books would be equally, if not more,
Malay-biased to the marginalization of things non-Malay. In
addition, history books too would face important changes in the way of
more local (perhaps, more Malay) writers writing Malaysian history for
school students with a certain ideological inclination. Implicit in
this change would be that, like the General Studies books, the accent
would be on Malay aspects of the Malaysian life. If this scenario
material ises, education would then have been politicized in such a
fashion as to, to quote thai Hon-Chan (1977:3), 'heighten existing
tensions between groups whose differential perceptions of the role of
education in satisfying their respective social, cultural, and
economic aspirations reflect anxieties over their cultural identities
and economic status in the new political order. In extreme cases,
education may be seen by groups alienated by the political process not
as an impartial instniment of national development bt as a means of
advancing or maintaining the social and economic privileges of the
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powerful.' In rt, the construction of a national identity' may
well face intense competition from sub-national identities, arid
subsequently ieopardise inter-ethnic harmony in the country.
Finally, as a recommendation for future research and with a view
and hope of an improved political climate in Malaysia in future, I
would suggest that a participant observation be conducted to gauge the
interaction between students and between teachers and students in a
classroom environment. Specifically, this is meant to ascertain the
kinds of educational materials frovided and question (relating to the
nationalist design) posed by teachers and responses made by students.
In other words, this is an examination of the process of selection and
exclusion that takes place in the classroom. Secondly, since a
nationalist project constitutes an ever-going process of
're-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions' it would be
interesting to analyse the contents of reading materials that pertain
to the subjects of General Studies, History, Bahasa Malaysia (national
language) and Malay literature, particularly if some of them are
re-written or newly written by local writers. Thirdly, the future
research may need to encompass a bigger area of study to include items
or images in the school texts about and also respondents from Sabah
and Sarawak. For by so doing, the researcher will be examining a wider
process of selection and exclusion of the cultural symbols, ideas and
values of all the ethnic groups in the country with regard to the
nationalist project of forging a national identity and fostering
national unity. In addition, she will also be studying a selective
process occurring in the texts concerned that involves not only the
cultural elements of the Dimiputeras and non-Buniiputeras. bit also
those of the Muslim Buiniputeras and non-Muslim &miputeras in Sabah
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and Sarawak. In other words, the researcher will be examinirç a
selective process that is not only wider in scope but also one that
may prove even more contentious and controversial.
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